

Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-94-195
Friday
7 October 1994

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Daily Report
East Europe

FBIS-EEU-94-195 CONTENTS *7 October 1994*

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All material in this volume previously disseminated in electronic form.

ALBANIA

Berisha: Greek Nationalism Threat to Democracy *[Rome LA REPUBBLICA 6 Oct]* 1
Court Reduces Sentences for Five Ethnic Greeks *[Tirana Radio]* 2
Berisha Proposes Referendum on Constitution *[Tirana TV]* 2
Meksi Outlines Draft Constitution Issues *[Tirana TV]* 4
Romanian Presidential Adviser Meets With Berisha *[Tirana TV]* 5
Russian Economic Cooperation Offers Received *[KOHA JONE 5 Oct]* 5

BULGARIA

Assembly Approves U.S. Aircraft Overflights *[Sofia Radio]* 7
Albania's Arbnori on Partnership for Peace *[Tirana Radio]* 7
Meets Leaders, Comments *[Tirana TV]* 7
Party Leader Advocates Nonpartisan Government *[STANDART NEWS 3 Oct]* 7
DPS Prepared To Support Ludzhev Cabinet *[Sofia Radio]* 9

CZECH REPUBLIC

Ruml on 'Intact' Russian Intelligence Activity *[REFLEX 23 Sep]* 10
Daily Provides List of Parties, Movements *[CESKY DENIK 11 Aug-6 Sep]* 10

SLOVAKIA

HZDS Leader Outlines Movement's Success *[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA 4 Oct]* 23
HZDS Says Cabinet Without Meciar Unacceptable *[Bratislava TV]* 23
Kovac Regrets Meciar Failed To Attend Talks *[Bratislava Radio]* 24
Kovac Explains Moves To Calm Political Situation *[Prague Radio]* 24
HZDS, KDS Discuss Formation of Government *[Bratislava Radio]* 25
Government Without HZDS Unacceptable to SNS *[Bratislava Radio]* 25

HUNGARY

Foreign Minister Comments on Consulate in Romania *[Budapest TV]* 26
Leader Views FIDESZ Role in Opposition *[NEPSZAVA 1 Oct]* 26
Free Democrat Kis Views Coalition Affairs *[NEPSZABADSAG 1 Oct]* 27
MSZP's Geczi Views Trends Within Party *[MAGYAR NEMZET 5 Oct]* 28
Workers' Party Officials Preview Congress *[NEPSZABADSAG 6 Oct]* 30

POLAND

Foreign Minister on EU, NATO Membership *[Amsterdam DE VOLKSKRANT 6 Oct]* 32
Half of Warsaw Against Sending Troops to Haiti *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 6 Oct]* 33
Poll Tracks Support for Parties, Politicians *[WPROST 2 Oct]* 33
Poll Shows Lead for Democratic Left Alliance *[GAZETA WSPOLCZESNA 29 Sep]* 35
Weekly Notes Solidarity Gaining Strength *[POLITYKA 8 Oct]* 36
Former Minister on Conflict Over Military Powers *[ZYCIE WARSZAWY 6 Oct]* 37

General Staff, MON on Drawsko Events *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 7 Oct]* 38
Szeremietiew May Replace Kolodziejczyk in Defense *[ZYCIE WARSZAWY 5 Oct]* 38
Wilecki Said Main Candidate for Defense Minister *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 6 Oct]* 39
Commentary on Expected Changes in Defense Ministry *[POLSKA ZBROJNA 6 Oct]* 40
Finance Minister Discusses 'Strategy,' Budget *[TRYBUNA 1-2 Oct]* 41
Polish-Ukrainian Trade Relations Examined *[ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE 28 Aug]* 43

ROMANIA

First Post-Embargo Flight to Belgrade Takes Off *[Bucharest Radio]* 45
Vacaroiu, Taracila on Possibility of King's Visit *[Bucharest Radio]* 45
Team Supervises Weapons Dismantling in Hungary *[Bucharest Radio]* 45
PL'93 Wants To Set Up 'Right-Wing Alternative' *[ROMANIA LIBERA 3 Oct]* 45
Civic Alliance Stresses Need for CDR Unity *[ROMANIA LIBERA 3 Oct]* 46
CDR Executive Body Rejects PSDR Suspension *[Bucharest Radio]* 47

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

UN Finds Bodies of 20 Soldiers on Mt Igman *[AFP]* 48
'Mutilated' Serb Bodies *[AFP]* 48
Mt Igman Attack Detailed *[AFP]* 48
Mt Igman Muslims Reinforced *[Sarajevo Radio]* 48
Akashi Remarks Questioned *[Sarajevo Radio]* 48
'Massacre' Lights 'Powder Keg' *[TANJUG]* 49
Rose Threatens Force in DMZ *[AFP]* 49
Serbs, UN Agree To Reopen Sarajevo Airport *[TANJUG]* 50
Airport Reopening in Doubt *[AFP]* 50
Krajisnik: Serbs Do Not Want War With NATO *[BORBA 6 Oct]* 50
Karadzic Discusses State Sovereignty *[JAVNOST 1 Oct]* 50
Tuzla-Podrinje Head, UNHCR Official Meet *[Sarajevo Radio]* 55

CROATIA

Krajina 'Hysterical' as Prices Begin Rising *[DNEVNIK 6 Oct]* 56
Article Assesses Montenegro Border Delineation *[NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA 30 Sep]* 56
Commentary on Tudjman's 'Impatience' With UN *[NOVI LIST 30 Sep]* 58
HDSS's Babic Views Party's Aims, Program *[VECERNJI LIST 30 Sep]* 58

THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Ethnic Albanian Party Threatens Election Boycott *[TANJUG]* 61
Alliance Warns of 'Terror' by VMRO Sympathizers *[MIC 6 Oct]* 61
VMRO, Gligorov Supporters Clash *[MIC 6 Oct]* 61

SLOVENIA

Government To Continue Negotiations With Croatia *[Ljubljana Radio]* 62

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

Kontic Seeks UNSC Permission To Export Goods *[TANJUG]* 63
Jovanovic Comments on Butrus-Ghali Meeting *[TANJUG]* 63
President Lilic Receives Russian Special Envoy *[TANJUG]* 63
Kontic Tells Russians UN Fuel Ban Needs Lifting *[TANJUG]* 64
Government Appoints New Deputy Ministers *[TANJUG]* 64
Budget Reportedly Behind Perisic Resignation *[NOVA NADA 5 Oct]* 65
Existence of 'Special Military Factories' Denied *[TANJUG]* 65
Data on J-22 Orao Aircraft *[VOJSKA 7 Jul]* 65
Article Outlines Croatian Weapons Purchases *[VOJSKA 29 Sep]* 69
Yugoslav Economy Receives Favorable Assessment *[London FINANCIAL TIMES 6 Oct]* 70

Serbia

Phone Lines To Srpska Republic To Be Restored *[VECERNJE NOVOSTI 6 Oct]* 71
Deputy Describes Past Army, 'Chetnik' Links *[TELEGRAF 28 Sep]* 71

Montenegro

President Bulatovic Receives Russia's Churkin *[TANJUG]* 74
Cholera in Albania Leads to Oil Smuggling Decline *[RILINDJA 6 Oct]* 74

Kosovo

Rugova: '1974-Style Autonomy' 'Unacceptable' *[RILINDJA 1 Oct]* 74

Berisha: Greek Nationalism Threat to Democracy

BR0610124094 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 6 Oct 94 p 16

[Interview with President Sali Berisha by Gianpaolo Cadalanu on 5 October; place not given: "Albania's Alarm Over Exodus; President Berisha: 'Europe Must Help Us'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana— *Some 15,000 desperate people with a single aim: to cross the Adriatic. Yesterday evening at Durres it seemed impossible to contain the crowds. The multitude of Albanians determined to cross the Adriatic to reach Italy, no matter how, swelled within a matter of a few hours. But the intervention of the Albanian police, with the raising of roadblocks, succeeded in containing the latest exodus. And the brandishing of night sticks averted unrest at the port, where there were no clashes between would-be refugees and police.*

In an interview with LA REPUBBLICA granted just a few hours before the attempted exodus, President Sali Berisha discussed the issue of unauthorized emigration. "We are examining other initiatives to monitor our waters better, in cooperation with Italy," the Albanian president said, "but the emigration problem cannot be resolved solely by means of enhanced surveillance. The Rome government could, for instance, introduce residence permits for seasonal workers, which would help to stem the flow of illegal immigrants. It coula also support our integration into the international community. This is the only sure way, albeit in the long term. The more life improves in Albania, the fewer people will be prompted to leave." But as for the nationalism threatening Albania, squeezed between the irredentist desires of its brothers in Kosovo and its tensions with Greece, according to the Albanian president, the only solution "is the consolidation of the free market and democracy." Now, two and a half years after its first democratic elections, Albania is doubled up by the strain of climbing the economic slope, but is starting to see the first results. Last year its GDP increased 11 percent, and a further increase of 8-9 percent is expected in 1994. Europe's poorest country is able to display the highest percentage growth rate and this, Berisha said, signifies efficiency.

With all its attention focused on restoring Albania's rickety production mechanism to an acceptable standard, Tirana seems disinclined to diplomatic subtleties. Particularly with regard to the Greek minority living in the south of the country. After the initial charges of human rights violations, relations between Tirana and Athens rapidly deteriorated. The dispute was exacerbated following the imprisonment of five members of Omonia, the Greek minority organization, on charges of conspiring against the state.

Albanian workers in Greece have paid for the arrests, and have been expelled in their thousands as a retaliatory measure. The Greeks maintain that they are expelling only illegal immigrants, forgetting that after the collapse of Ramiz Alia's Stalinist regime they opened the country's doors to all Albanians, with or without visas, as long as they were willing to work.

A ruling is expected in Tirana today (6 October) on the appeal against the sentence issued to the five members of the Greek ethnic minority condemned to terms of from six to eight years' imprisonment. But the outcome is almost a foregone conclusion: They may succeed in having their prison sentences reduced by a few years, but the hard line will be reaffirmed.

[Cadalanu] President Berisha, is this a political trial?

[Berisha] There are no political trials in Albania. Nobody will be condemned for his ideas—if anything, for arms trafficking. This group gathered military intelligence, conducted recruiting, compiled lists of Albanian officials, and stockpiled rifles.

[Cadalanu] But they are said to have been armed only with hunting rifles...

[Berisha] Did you see what they did in Chiapas with their shotguns? In the Greek minority area the concentration of weapons is six times higher than in the rest of Albania.

[Cadalanu] Why does Athens not distance itself from the extremists?

[Berisha] If they were merely a group of fanatics we would not have taken them seriously. The sad fact is that Greek nationalism is strong even in official circles, both inside and outside the centers of government. It is underestimated because Athens belongs to the European Union and NATO. The tone of the debate over northern Epirus, which I ignored at first as the expression of a few lunatics, were taken up in exactly the same form by former Prime Minister Mitsotakis in a speech in July 1993.

[Cadalanu] Apart from speeches, is there any evidence of Athens' direct involvement in conspiracies or terrorist activities?

[Berisha] The five defendants confessed to receiving funds from the Greek Government. It is all on record in their statements. And what are we to think about the attack on our barracks near the border? The assailants wore uniforms of the Greek special corps; we know that they came from Greece and that they fled there. Athens has denied us any cooperation in establishing what happened. In fact such events destabilize the entire region.

[Cadalanu] What will be the consequences of this tension? Can the Albanian economy afford to forego the remittances from the expelled workers?

[Berisha] I believe that Greece's attitude could cause much worse disasters than economic ones. Albania needs stability to promote the free market and the recovery of production, but the nationalism that reemerged after the

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collapse of the Iron Curtain threatens not only our budget but the international order. It is a totalitarian philosophy, a threat to democracy. Serbian nationalism is clear to everyone because it is aggressive, but Greece's nationalism acts as an encouragement for it.

Court Reduces Sentences for Five Ethnic Greeks

AU0610182694 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1330 GMT 6 Oct 94

[Arben Karapici report]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Appeals Court today announced a sentence of a total of 29 years imprisonment for the five Albanian defendants of Greek nationality. Though the Appeals Court reduced the sentence somewhat, the crime committed by defendants Vasil Papakristo, Panajot Marto, Theodhori Bezhani, Irakli Sirmo, and Kosta Qirjako has been thoroughly proven. Here is a report by our correspondent Arben Karapici:

[Karapici] Again tolerant, the independent Albanian justice found the five Albanian citizens of Greek nationality guilty and sentenced them to a total of 29 years imprisonment. This was the final verdict of the appeal court announced today.

The verdict sentences Vasil Papakristo and Panajot Marto to five years imprisonment. Theodhori Bezhani and Irakli Sirmo will suffer a six-year prison term each. One of the five, Kosta Qirjako, received the harshest verdict—he was sentenced to seven years imprisonment.

Although the Appeals Court reduced the verdict somewhat, the crime committed by the Albanian defendants of Greek nationality has been proven and the five bear full responsibility for this.

The Greek state is no less responsible regarding the anti-Albanian stances adopted so far.

Berisha Proposes Referendum on Constitution

AU0610160994 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 3 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] President of the Republic of Albania Sali Berisha has proposed that Albania's first European-type constitution be approved by a referendum. To that end, President Berisha has invited all Albanians to inaugurate the referendum, a new institution of democracy, by approving the constitution, so that every Albanian may be able to express his opinion and free will for the basic law of the Albanian state. Here is the message that President Berisha addressed to all Albanians on the approval of the draft constitution:

[Begin Berisha recording] Ladies and gentlemen, brothers and sisters, I address this message to you, Albanian citizens and my compatriots, wherever you are, regarding a fundamental cause that I think is of decisive importance for the present and future of Albania and for Albanians in general—namely, the constitution, the fundamental law of the Albanian democratic state. I am sure that all of you, regardless of which party you support, have a profound interest in this matter and wish Albania to have a constitution of a European standard as soon as possible.

On 22 March 1992, after a long saga of painful trials, tribulations, and sacrifices, we managed to liberate ourselves from the communist dictatorship that was based on barbaric laws of class struggle, the morals of the (?emperor), laws prohibiting freedoms and rights, suppression, persecution, isolation, and laws negating the existence of God himself and the freedoms and rights that He gave to man.

With their free vote, the Albanian people toppled the dictatorship, determined as they were to replace it with a rule-of-law state and a market economy, all of which would be based on a constitution guaranteeing and embodying the most precious principles of mankind: the freedoms and rights of the individual, Albania's sovereignty, and its dignified integration into Europe.

Conscientiously believing that the constitution is a legitimate demand, a desire never attained by all Albanians but a vital necessity for Albania, I have constantly devoted attention and interest in resolving this issue as soon as possible and in the best possible way. For this reason, I have repeatedly addressed parliament with special messages. I have kept in constant touch with the Constitutional Commission. In March 1993, taking advantage of my constitutional right to take legislative initiatives, I submitted the Human Rights Charter to parliament, which is and will remain the great oak tree of freedom, whose roots are nourished by the sincere feelings of every Albanian, for whom freedom is the prime human and national ideal. During this period, I encouraged the work of the Constitutional Commission and followed with interest the polemics about this issue. Today, I have the pleasure of informing you that after careful, long, qualified, and prolific work, the Constitution Commission has finished drafting the constitution and is about to make it public. The draft constitution is in line with existing constitutional laws and the current standards of European legislation.

Ladies and gentlemen, the constitutional laws of Albania have finally proven to be democratic and in full conformity with contemporary standards. They provide for the optimum division of power and guarantee human freedoms and rights, the operation of law- governed state institutions, and the independence of our courts.

The constitutional laws underlying our current institutions proved their vitality and justice during one of the most difficult periods of mankind. In the history of the Albanian state, they are and will always remain highly precious assets of untold value, because they enabled Albania to make its great turnaround.

These laws are precious for Albanians because, rising from the ashes of a bankrupt and dilapidated state that

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presented the country and the nation with dreadful and undeserved alternatives at the end of this century, they managed to create the institutions of the new state that brought Albania out of its profound crisis and led the political, legislative, institutional, and economic reform, whose achievements within a short period of time have surpassed even the most optimistic forecasts.

Based on these laws, Albania laid firm foundations for the development of a market economy and overcame the profound consequences of its 50-year isolation. Albania passed from a classic dictatorship into a country of freedom, from chaos and anarchy to order and calm, and from economic catastrophe to economic growth. Guided by these laws, Albania managed, for a second period in succession, to achieve the fastest economic growth on the continent, thus testifying to the vitality and the extraordinarily creative force of free initiative in Europe's poorest country.

The constitutional laws have been retained because time has proven them to be very good laws. Wise people cannot condemn what is good—be it a law, a tradition, or anything else—because it is retained, cultivated, and developed. Moreover, our constitutional laws have been judged as nothing but completely positive by all international organizations and specialized institutions, such as the Council of Europe, the CSCE, eminent lawyers, and other distinguished experts.

The first part of the draft constitution proclaims Albania a republic and a sovereign state and defines the division of power. According to this draft, the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of power in Albania are separate. The Albanian parliament remains the backbone of the state, electing the president and the supreme judiciary, giving its vote of confidence in the government, and exercising authority over it.

Over the past two years there have been numerous discussions as to whether our country should be a parliamentary republic or a presidential one. As you know, I personally have been and remain against a presidential republic. I expressed this view even when the Democratic Party [PD] was in opposition. I defended it when the PD won the elections and gained two thirds of the seats in parliament, and I have not changed my view to this day. Of course, this is not because presidential republics are undemocratic—the United States and France are presidential republics and are among the most developed democracies—but because Albania has been a country of one-man rule for roughly five centuries, and what it now lacks is precisely the parliamentary tradition that countries with a developed democracy have had for centuries. A developed parliamentary tradition is as important for democracy as the air we breathe. That is why I have the pleasure of confirming to you that in the new draft constitution, parliament remains, as it is now, the central, fundamental institution of the Albanian state.

I know that you have often heard and will continue to hear statements by some politicians that Albania is a presidential republic, and so on. I want to assure you that these are unfounded statements and that there are incontestable documents proving the untruthfulness and complete absurdity of these claims. Serious comparative studies have been made, which show that the division of power in Albania is one of the optimum solutions. Of course, Albania does not need symbolic institutions either now or in the future, but institutions that are the genuine pillars of a rule-of- law state.

The second part of the draft constitution comprises the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms as it was before, which I would say constitutes the real spirit of the constitution, on whose basis the whole infrastructure of democracy—the system of a free press, political parties, trade unions, associations, beliefs, their diversity, schools, and so forth—is set up, consolidated, and developed day by day.

Freedom, as the natural condition of the individual, and all the fundamental rights that go with it, which are as divine as they are human, take up the greater part of this document and provide its strongest judicial guarantees. The Human Rights Charter guarantees all the benefits of freedom—freedom of speech and thought, freedom of assembly and organization, and respect for the individual and his dignity. It does not allow or accept any kind of discrimination and it guarantees the rights of minorities and the development and consolidation of their identity, language, culture, and finest traditions. It provides for the national reconciliation of free people and the airing of disputes and differences through dialogue and good understanding. It guarantees religious tolerance and the freedom to believe in God. All of us should keep in mind the valuable lessons of holy scriptures, which say that where the spirit of God is, there is freedom.

The Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms defines the free choice of the individual—be he a farmer, a worker, a property owner, someone in the creative field, a businessman, or a leader—to be one who generates the development of the family, society, and the country. It creates great room for the talent and creative genius of the individual to blossom and flourish. The charter is in complete accord with the European Convention on Human Rights and Freedoms and is judged to be one of the most advanced charters in Europe. It is a realization of the dreams and ideals of all those Albanian martyrs who gave their lives for freedom, and it synthesizes the most positive and progressive aspects of the customs of our ancient nation.

The Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms in our draft constitution is and will remain the grandest monument in the history of Albanian justice. I am sure that we and the generations to come will always be proud of it.

The third part of the draft constitution guarantees the complete independence of the judiciary and clearly defines the actions to be taken by independent courts to guarantee citizens' freedoms and rights.

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The new draft also reconfirms the Constitutional Court in Albania as one of the most competent courts of our time and the body that will interpret the constitution and guarantee the constitutionality of all laws and legal acts of the Republic of Albania. This institution is and will remain of essential importance to the new democratic Albanian state.

In its final part, a special article in the draft constitution proclaims the immutability of the republican nature of the Albanian state. Another article lays down that the constitution may be amended or added to only by a two-thirds vote in the Albanian parliament and after a popular referendum. Of course, this will be done becuase the laws of this draft in general have already been approved by two-thirds of parliament. First of all, this is because on such great issues, it is logical in a small country that the people and only the people should have the right to decide with their free vote.

To this end, based on Article 3 of the Main Constitutional Provisions, which states that the people exert their power through their representative bodies and by referendum, I propose that Albania's first constitution of European standards be approved by a referendum in which every citizen can express his opinion and free will regarding the state's fundamental law.

My proposal is based on my profound conviction that this most legitimate right—the historic task and supreme honor of approving the first democratic constitution in the 1,000-year history of our nation—belongs directly to the sovereign people with their free vote.

Taking advantage, therefore, of my right to take legislative initiatives, and again based on Article 3 of the Main Constitutional Provisions, several days ago I sent parliament the law on referendums with the request that it be approved as speedily as possible. I hope that parliament will agree to this request. The new Albanian democracy will thus have a strong new pillar—the referendum—a new institution, worthy of and appropriate to the civilization and maturity of our nation, through which the individual and the people at large, by their free vote, will give their opinion, verdict, and consensus on all the great issues affecting their destiny, their future, and their country as a whole.

It is true that the constitution could have been approved by parliament alone, and, as I said before, the laws of this constitution in general have already been given parliamentary approval. The fact that some elements or certain groups rejected the consensus approving the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms testified that it was not an approval of the constitution, but the creation of an artificial parliamentary crisis or the defense of a Hoxha-like anti-Helsinki spirit that was their aim. There was no consensus even on the issue of a constitutional assembly. The opinions of representatives of various parties regarding this assembly, which I suggested as a means of approving the constitution, were contradictory and incompatible, sometimes even illusory and absurd. This goes to prove that for some people, it is not consensus but lack of consensus, not approval of the constitution but the blocking of its approval that remain the leading elements in their legislative and constitutional policy.

Brothers and sisters, such things are understandable, and you know that if we had waited for their consent to topple the dictatorship, Albania in the year 2000 would have remained under red rule as a beacon of socialism on the Adriatic shores. These individuals or groups of individuals see consensus as a rule of the minority over the majority and are trying to exploit it for the aims of their party or group or out of nostalgia for the past.

I would like to take this opportunity to remind them that this sort of consensus is unacceptable, and that there exists another kind of consensus in Albania—the great consensus of free people who are inspired by seriousness, sincerity, hope for a better future, the ideal of freedom, and the national interest. This consensus has proved to be the natural-born power of Albanians to defeat invasions and dictatorships. It is much more powerful than the first. It is this consensus, and not the will of those who have lost power, that liberated the country from the Nazi fascist occupiers and the communist dictatorship. It is this consensus that supported the reform, the consensus of a strong people who are united by their blood and spirit, culture and language, history and flag, and the future of Albania. It is this consensus that determines and will put in place the constitution of the new century.

I therefore have the great pleasure of inviting you, Albanian citizens, to inaugurate the referendum, this new institution of democracy, to approve the constitution, the law that will change human philosophy. For Albanians, just as for all civilized nations, the constitution will be the sacred tome of political, social, economic, legislative, and institutional life, the law of symbolism and inviolate national honor, the law of great hopes, the dignity of the individual, the family, society, and our free Albania. [end recording]

Meksi Outlines Draft Constitution Issues

AU0710102394 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 6 Oct 94

[Report by Vjollca Vokshi]

[FBIS Translated Text] Council of Ministers Chairman Aleksander Meksi gave a news conference today. Over to Vjollca Vokshi:

[Vokshi] In his first news conference with official media and various news agencies held in his cabinet this afternoon, Prime Minister Meksi provided explanations and gave his opinions regarding the new constitution of the Republic of Albania.

Meksi first gave a short history of the more than two years' work to compile the draft of the new constitution of the Republic of Albania. Then he answered reporters' questions.

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Responding to a question on the main features of the constitution, Meksi clarified in detail the constituent parts of the draft constitution and several specific articles. He also gave his opinion on several assessments by the opposition as to choosing the referendum as the most appropriate form to approve the constitution. He also clarified the president's position on this issue.

He spoke about the international experience that has been examined in compiling the draft, by considering the constitutions of 12 countries. Meksi also told reporters that during the preparation phase, the commission debated such issues as the Supreme Council of Justice, the president's prerogatives, etc.

Prime Minister Meksi's news conference lasted for approximately 30 minutes.

Romanian Presidential Adviser Meets With Berisha

AU0610210894 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 6 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] This morning, Council of Ministers Chairman Aleksander Meksi received Mr. Misu Negritoiu, the Romanian presidential adviser, who has arrived in our country at the invitation of Council of Ministers Secretary General Vullnet Ademi.

Mr. Meksi stressed that bilateral agreements should be expanded and implemented under the new democratic conditions, so as to make way for fruitful cooperation. The petroleum, food, light industry, construction, and other sectors are among the fields where real possibilities of bilateral cooperation exist, Meksi pointed out.

Mr. Negritoiu conveyed to Mr. Meksi greetings from the Romanian prime minister and his invitation for Meksi to visit Bucharest in the near future. He also briefed Mr. Meksi on economic developments in Romania and his country's readiness to support Albania in international organizations such as the Council of Europe, etc.

At the meeting with Meksi, the Romanian president's adviser was accompanied by Gheorghe Micu, the Romanian ambassador to our country.

President of the Republic of Albania Sali Berisha received Mr. Misu Negritoiu, who conveyed to him greetings from Romanian President Ion Iliescu and his desire to expand cooperation in all fields. Mr. Negritoiu expressed Mr. Iliescu's concern over the worsening of Albanian-Greek relations and his desire that these disputes be resolved through dialogue.

President Berisha stressed the importance of multilateral initiatives in the Balkans and reconfirmed his desire to receive Romanian President Ion Iliescu in Tirana.

Russian Economic Cooperation Offers Received

AU0610142994 Lezhe KOHA JONE in Albanian 5 Oct 94 p 8

[Lulmir Shala article: "Russian Economic Offers Reach Tirana"]

[FBIS Translated Text] This article is not just about the opening in Tirana of a few exhibitions of Russian goods, but about something bigger. We must concede that Albania has never been left outside the sphere of Russian economic influence. Although absent since the sixties, Albanian traders were the first to descend on the Russian market, not waiting for the signing of governmental agreements after 30 years. Subsequently, a number of Russian- produced articles such as television sets, kitchen utensils, automobiles, and construction material arrived, alongside other goods from East and West offered to the Albanian consumer. In 1993, the volume of bilateral trade between the two countries reached $4,500,000, of which the value of Russian goods arriving here accounted for $4 million. In the first half of this year, the turnover of goods reached $2,400,000.

It is evident that the tendency of the Russians to reserve for themselves a modest place in the Albanian economy is stronger than the movement in the other direction, perhaps because of the old dream of the distant Slavs to reach the shores of the Adriatic in one way or another. There is no doubt that everything occurs as part of a Russian strategy: Of course, methods and circumstances change and are adapted according to the times. In fact, the Russian Embassy in Tirana does not have a trade attache, but an office of the Russian Trade Representation operates separately from the embassy and keeps track only of these trading relations. Indirectly, it cannot be said that our politicians, who follow economic relations as a measurement of attitude, rather than purely a matter of economic interest and mutual profit, have failed to notice this.

It is well known that some of the Russian wares that have arrived in Albania during the last two to three years have passed through third persons, with Bulgarian businessmen or the Bulgarian market acting as intermediaries. Russia itself is not particularly interested in transactions of this kind. Perhaps the forthcoming visit by a high-level member of our government to Moscow will give a fresh impetus to direct economic relations between Tirana and Moscow, whether at a state level, or between individual private businessmen, which would benefit our merchants.

However, wholesale or retail Russian goods sold on the Albanian market are not everything. Despite the silence of the media, there are substantial Russian offers for the creation of joint enterprises, road and factory construction, etc. In the last two years, such commercial offers have arrived in almost every branch of the economy. It seems that the Russian thirst is substantial.

Here are some of the offers. Technostroyeksport has submitted offers to participate in the construction of new cement factories with capacities of 500,000 metric tons a year in Fushe Kruje and 1,000 metric tons a year [number as published] in Vlore. Offers have been submitted for the delivery of loading equipment for the port of Durres, for the completion of the Banje hydroelectric

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project, for the development of the copper industry, and particularly for the extraction of rare metals from copper ore. The Russian side is showing particular interest in Albania's inclusion in the gas supply system organized by the powerful joint-stock firm Gazprom, which is well known in Europe, and will this year reach Skopje. No doubt the Russians are interested in an extension to Durres and possibly even beyond. No Russian statement to different representatives of the Albanian state has been published in the mass media, or at least we have not read or heard such a thing, but this is not important when others, such as the Bulgarians, Macedonians, and Croats, have also made proposals, probably without the knowledge of the Russians.

However, fate has smiled on the Russian offers more than on anyone else's.

The Russians have not undertaken the responsibility for financing the work, because they themselves are in a crisis. Nevertheless, it seems that the Russians are determined on their goal, perhaps because of our country's highly enviable geographic position.

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Assembly Approves U.S. Aircraft Overflights

AU0610142694 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 6 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Some 11 F-16 U.S. aircraft will fly over Bulgaria's Black Sea territorial waters on their way to Turkey on 11 and 12 October 1994. That decision was made by the National Assembly a few moments ago. The decision did not figure on today's agenda and was adopted by voting prior to the start of the debate on today's regular agenda.

Albania's Arbnori on Partnership for Peace

LD0510210594 Tirana Radio Tirana in English 1700 GMT 5 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The Albanian participation in the Partnership for Peace initiative will help in strengthening of the stability in the Balkans and will prevent a spillover of the conflict in former Yugoslavia. This was stated by the speaker of the Albanian parliament, Pjeter Arbnori, in the international conference partnership for peace and NATO in the Balkans, which is taking place in Sofia under the care of the Bulgarian president, Zhelyu Zhelev. It is not the wars and the pressure the minister said of the dispute, but a dialogue said Arbnori.

On his way to Bulgaria, Arbnori had a meeting with Andov, the speaker of the Macedonian parliament. He said good relations exist between Albanian and Macedonia and the possibilities to extend them exist as well.

Arbnori spoke about the problem of the citizenship of the Albanians living in Macedonia and the correct census of them in the [words indistinct]. The Albanians have always been a factor of stability in Macedonia and their treatment in conformity with the international documents is a benefit for both sides.

Arbnori spoke about the same problem even with the CSCE ambassador in Skopje, (Anderson) who was for the resolution of it.

The speaker of the Albanian parliament, Arbnori, had talks with the Bulgarian president Zhelyu Zhelev in Sofia. Both sides considered successful the development of the Albanian-Bulgarian relations as important factors for the democracy, peace and stability in the region.

Both personalities exchanged opinions about the importance of the membership to the partnership for peace with a perspective to journey to another European structures. Zhelev considered the work for the compilation of the Albanian constitution as very important, something which would raise the democratization of the country and paves the way to the Albanian membership to the European Community and NATO.

Meets Leaders, Comments

AU0710083794 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 6 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Continuing his visit in Sofia, Mr. Arbnori met with Bulgarian Parliament President Yordanov. During the meeting, they stressed the need to expand cooperation between both parliaments, which is to the benefit of the progress of democracy.

During the conference proceedings, Mr. Arbnori held a meeting with Moldovan President Mircea Ion Snegur.

At today's session, among many discussions, Greek parliamentarian Professor Theodor Stathis took the floor. He stated that Greece favors cooperation and dialogue with the Balkan countries and that it respects minorities. He explained that due to high unemployment rates, Greece has been obliged to expel some illegal emigrants. Nevertheless, he said, statements and actions by several extremist persons do not represent the official position of the Greek Government.

After the discussion, Mr. Arbnori made a short comment, stressing that he appreciated the statement of his Greek colleague regarding the dissociation of the Greek Government from irresponsible actions of some individuals. However, we would like, Mr. Arbnori said, that Greece first recognizes minorities and then respects their rights.

The conference closed its proceedings today.

Party Leader Advocates Nonpartisan Government

AU0610180094 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 3 Oct 94 p 5

[Interview with Dimitur Ludzhev, co-chairman of New Choice parliamentary group and candidate for prime minister, by Elizabet Dafinova; place and date not given: "We Will Not Become Servants of a Parliament Ruled by Party Bias"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Dafinova] Mr. Ludzhev, the New Choice National Council did not choose a new prime ministerial candidate despite official statements made to this effect by the other parliamentary groups. Does this mean that you will stake your shirt on your horse coming in?

[Ludzhev] New Choice has no other choice. That is why we call ourselves "New Choice," because we are choosing a new, uncommon formula for action. The impossibility of entering into a clear agreement based on national priorities with other democratic forces within the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] poses a dilemma for us: Whether to follow the previous practice of so-called ping-pong politics while being kept in the dark, not knowing who the players are using us as the ball are, or to take a new stand, one that at present is not accepted. In a certain sense, this is like risking one's own shirt. He have assumed the grave responsibility of getting things done, and we believe that this is Bulgaria's last real chance of being ruled by parliament and a working cabinet, rather than by the various party headquarters. The New Choice Political Consultative Council proposes a man who it thinks can do the job. It also proposes a cabinet formula in which the approach is not party-political or based on quotas, on the principle of: If you

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support me. I will give you that ministry. The cabinet must be a team of people who have the moral and political abilities to engage in a particular area of activity. We are ready to hold consultations on accepting this team and its program. We are prepared to discuss all issues connected with the government, including the choice of candidate prime minister, but on the elementary condition that we have a partner to talk to. We want to have a clear idea of who is who, because the most important thing is not whether a cabinet is elected, but whether it will accomplish anything.

[Dafinova] Yet it is precisely the cabinet formula and the way in which New Choice is acting that the deputies find shocking.

[Ludzhev] They are shocked because they are accustomed to petty bargaining. What do they want us to do? To repeat what the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] did with Petur Boyadzhiev? Or to do what Filip Dimitrov did—first do everything possible to lose power and later execute an operation not seen anywhere else in Eastern Europe and aimed at bringing one's opponent to power? They think that Dimitur Ludzhev and his colleagues crave power so much that they will do anything to seize power, whatever the cost. This is the very moment to realize that all this noise and tumult is to no purpose. Whereas Aleksandur Tomov [leader of Civic Alliance for the Republic] may think the cabinet is more important than its cost, for us the cost and our own self-esteem are more important than forming a cabinet. In general, we are not scared of holding elections, nor frightened of the consequences. The only thing I fear is that the state is collapsing and that if we manage to form a cabinet and then fail to cope with the situation, we will completely blacken our name in the eyes of the people. The parliament deputies are most of all shocked by the fact that there is a chance that there will be a government in Bulgaria from which they will be unable to extract their own benefits. I have said on many occasions that there are 121 people in parliament who want a cabinet that serves their own interests. It will be interesting to see if as many votes can be gathered for a cabinet that serves Bulgaria's interests.

[Dafinova] In this connection, one deputy suggested that in a secret ballot 200 deputies may support you. Do you believe this?

[Ludzhev] I do not want to make any predictions. I have already said that we will not hunt for votes. Furthermore, we will not get caught up in the net that various notorious players in parliament have cast—people who make themselves out to be very clever and think they can bluff us as in poker or bridge. I remember how hopefully we supported the Berov cabinet, and what happened? On the one hand, complete lack of will, a game of hide-and-seek, bowing to various party ambitions and, on the other hand, the very people who contracted to support a defined policy set about trying to derive personal and group benefits. All these people now offer to support us, but only in return for their piece of the cake. Well, they will not get it! Parliament will act either as a parliament of the republic or as a parliament of the different parties and party headquarters. We, however, refuse to be the servants of such a parliament.

[Dafinova] Some deputies fear that there will be persecutions and even political killings if your cabinet comes to power.

[Ludzhev] If some people have an uneasy conscience, that is their problem. However, many people who know me are aware that, from the time of the roundtable talks until now, I have always been very cooperative. I have always held out the hand of cooperation and made the riskiest moves with a view to arriving at a decision that is of some benefit to the country. We are deeply convinced that one can only help Bulgaria through joint efforts and by uniting the nation's efforts in parliament and outside it. For example, there is a difference between confrontation and competition.

Confrontation will finally ruin Bulgaria if the bipolar model prevails again, with two opposing sides consisting of hardliners. On the other hand, competition exists between liberal, social democratic, and socialist ideas. However, this does not mean that you cannot cooperate with your opponent. If you cannot find a common language with them, you are simply not a democrat or a politician. As for all the speculation about duress and dictatorship, why is it so difficult to realize that dictatorship can only be imposed in Bulgaria by an organization that has an apparatus, structures, and cadres and one that has demonstrated its ability to exercise such power? I am sick of all these wild partisan statements. The politics of confrontation and rejection are convenient for those party types who cannot achieve in society in any other way. In my view, it will be best for Bulgaria if two main tendencies appear in the political center—a modern social democratic one and a modern liberal or neoconservative one. This will leave the various marginal formations that call themselves communists, extremists, anticommunists, or whatever they like on the edges of the political spectrum.

[Dafinova] Nevertheless, if the deputies' obstinacy and sense of fear leads to a caretaker government, will you agree to become its prime minister, given that the caretaker cabinet will remain in office for only two months and that its members will probably not be able to stand as candidates in the elections?

[Ludzhev] What am I to say about this now? Right now, I want to do my utmost to make people understand that a working cabinet is essential. A caretaker cabinet, even if it serves for three instead of two months, will find it difficult to do anything meaningful in the present situation. In addition, it is burdened with the task of holding elections, not to mention dealing with the country's financial situation. We will have to spend billions merely to prove what is perfectly obvious, namely that the apparatchiks at 20 Pozitano Street and 134 Rakovski

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Street [BSP and SDS headquarters] want elections to establish themselves again in parliament and the executive branch, to wield the knife that divides up the cake. On the other hand, New Choice and the New Policy Center [Ludzhev's own party] are preparing to fight the elections on two fronts—against the BSP and against the SDS.

[Dafinova] Is it possible that by making this move, New Choice may isolate the extremist tendencies in parliament and bring about the formation of the old-new majority that the president has dreamed of for so long?

[Ludzhev] In principle, anything is possible. This would be the best thing that could happen to Bulgaria, and for this very reason I do not believe it will come about. It is high time for parliament to liberate itself from party headquarters and adopt a sensible solution. If this happens, it will mean the end of the bipolar model and the dictate of the party headquarters. This is the nightmare that haunts them, and this is why they are in such a hurry.

[Dafinova] Do you think that you will be finished in politics if you fail?

[Ludzhev] Why? Quite the contrary! I believe that the people will assess a courageous act according to its merits. I do not have any illusions, but prefer to play the game fairly and honestly. If nothing else, the people of Bulgaria will be left with an authentic message showing that this, perhaps, is the way to stand up like David against Goliath. We may be small, but we are intrepid.

DPS Prepared To Support Ludzhev Cabinet

AU0610180994 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 6 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] After consultations between the Movement for Rights and Freedoms [DPS] and New Choice, Osman Oktay said that Mr. Ludzhev's program intentions are satisfactory from the DPS point of view. The DPS is prepared to support those intentions. No names of ministers have been discussed.

Afterward, talks between New Choice and the Democratic Alternative for the Republic opened.

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Ruml on 'Intact' Russian Intelligence Activity

AU0610155894 Prague REFLEX in Czech No 40, 23 Sep 94 pp 18-19

[Interview with Czech Interior Minister Jan Ruml by Zdenek Cech, Dan Ruby, and Bohumil Pecinka; place and date not given: "Are the Russians Here?"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [REFLEX] If someone was active in the past as an agent of the State Security Corps [StB] and now is in a high managerial position, is there a realistic possibility that he could influence the development in our country negatively?

[Ruml] I am far from developing theories about a general conspiracy and claiming that everything is secretly controlled from somewhere or that StB members can return, with all of the consequences that would have. However, I do not understand those who speak about changing the system and do not see that the past regime was created by specific people with specific responsibility, and not by some kind of a perpetual force. Hence, if the law was violated, the specific culprits must be called to account.

There were a number of StB collaborators who were so-called small-fry and over which we can express moral disdain today or for whom we can feel sorry and leave the matter at that. However, there were also structures of agents that had great influence. One of them was the intelligence service. Moreover, this service was under the direct control of the KGB. This is why we have to judge a former intelligence service agent who is in the management of a petrochemical company today differently from an informer from the street.

In this connection, I personally feel very uneasy about the fact that foreign trade enterprises, which were actually centers of resident agents, have been transformed into nonstate shareholding companies without undergoing any personnel changes. I do not want to say that Chemapol, for instance, is still a KGB residency today or that, if the project of the Czech way of privatizing the petrochemical industry wins, our Republic will necessarily be endangered. It is just my obligation as interior minister to publish this information and hand it over to members of the government.

[REFLEX] And your personal opinion? Do you believe that these structures or people could actually have real influence?

[Ruml] The state interests of the Czech Republic are different from those of the Russian Federation. However, we are in the sphere of its geopolitical interests. We have information from our colleagues in Western intelligence services that the intelligence sections of the KGB and the GRU [Soviet Army Intelligence] are operating today to an unabated extent all over the world. In this situation, they certainly can play the role of the traditional link to residencies and agents of the former intelligence service in the Czech Republic. Whom else, if not their tried-and-tested friends, should the Russian intelligence service use?! [punctuation as published] I am not saying that this is the case, but it could be.... It is a matter for the Security and Information Service to monitor those things carefully.

[REFLEX] Has the chaos on the territory of the former Soviet Union led to a dilution of Russian intelligence, or has it remained intact?

[Ruml] The structure, personnel, and spheres of interest of the Russian intelligence service have not changed significantly. At one moment, it seemed that, because of the processes in Russia, the residencies were cut off from the controlling center, which is awfully dangerous because agents who are not controlled can do anything and work for anyone. Of course, this has aroused great concern among our partners. However, according to the most recent findings, Russian residencies have not lost their connections with the control center in Russia, and their role has never been challenged.

[REFLEX] How do Western countries' experts evaluate their standard?

[Ruml] As highly professional....

Daily Provides List of Parties, Movements

AU2509212494

[FBIS Editorial Report] Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech from 11 August to 6 September, under the headline "Czech Political Parties and Movements," carries a series of nine 1,000-word articles by Josef Landergott in which he lists, in alphabetical order, all of the political parties and movements registered in the Czech Republic [CR]. The list includes "the political entities in the Czech Republic registered at the Interior Ministry as a political party or movement in accordance with Law No. 118/94." Only some of those asked responded to the questionnaires mailed by Landergott to the extraparliamentary parties in April and May. The Post Office returned many of them with the note "Return, addressee unknown."

According to Landergott, the "existing political parties and movements can be classified into three groups according to their position in the political system—parliamentary parties, extraparliamentary parties, and the so-called underground ones (that is, those whose activities and representatives can be neither seen nor heard).

"The membership data comes mostly from party records and certainly, for the most part, does not correspond to reality.

"The list also includes certain prominent civic associations that, contrary to the law, are politically active. Of the total number of more than 25,000 associations registered in accordance with Law No. 83/90, however, just a handful need to be included."

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Czech Political Parties and Movements

1. Agrarian Party (AS) [Agrarni strana]

It was registered on 16 March 1990 as the Agrarian Party of the Civic Forum [OF], renamed the Czechoslovak Republican Party of Towns and the Countryside on 21 May 1990, and has operated under its present name since 19 August 1991. It is based in Prague; representatives, membership data, and activity of the party are not known.

2. Association of Radicals for the United States of Europe [Asociace Radikalu za Spojene staty evropske]

It was registered on 6 June 1990 and is based in Prague. The same lack of information applies here as to AS.

3. Association of Social Democrats (ASD) [Associace socialnich demokratu]

It was registered on 12 April 1991 as the Club of Social Democrats OF and is based in Prague. It has operated under its present name since 4 June 1991. Rudolf Battek is its chairman. It has a membership of approximately 100 and many supporters. Only the chairman, who is also active in VONS [Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Prosecuted] and, since the beginning of 1994, also chairs the European Movement in the Czech Republic, appears in public. The party had three deputies in the Federal Assembly in 1990-92 (cf. Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD]).

4. Nationwide Aktiv of Citizens [Celostatni aktiv obcanu]

It was registered on 20 March 1990 and is based in Prague—otherwise completely anonymous.

5. Coexistence [Coexistentia-Souziti]

It was registered on 28 June 1993. The party is based in Cesky Tesin. No activity has been recorded.

6. Czech and Moravian Agrarian Party (CMAS) [Ceska a Moravska agrarni strana]

It was registered on 15 March 1990 as the Free Farmers Party that merged in July 1992 with the Agrarian Republican Party, which had merged earlier with the Party of the Czech Countryside. It is based in Prague; the present name has been registered since 15 October 1992. The CMAS is supposed to have 3,000 members, and Jiri Dusek is its chairman.

7. Czech National Party (CNS) [Ceska narodni strana]

It was registered on 27 December 1991 and is based in Prague. Its membership is not known, and its activities have not been monitored.

8. Czech Party of National Revival-Czech Right Wing [Ceska strana narodni obrody-Ceska pravice]

It was registered this year, on 7 January, and is based in Prague. The same information applies here as to CNS.

9. Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD) [Ceska strana socialne demokraticka]

It was registered on 9 February 1990 (revival of its activity; originally founded in 1878, the oldest Czech political party) as Czechoslovak Social Democracy. It has been registered under its present name since 9 April 1993. It is based in Prague. The CSSD is a parliamentary party. It did not make it to the Federal Assembly or the Czech National Council in the first elections, but a group of Civic Forum deputies (mostly from the Revival Club) transferred to the CSSD at the beginning of 1991 and formed a deputies' club, with a Social Democratic orientation, in the Federal Assembly.

The Preparatory Committee for the revived CSSD was chaired by Slavomir Klaban, and Rudolf Battek (cf. ASD) was the Committee's deputy chairman. After March 1990 (24th Congress in Prague), Jiri Horak (U.S. citizen) became the chairman, and, since February 1993 (26th Congress in Hradec Kralove), Milos Zeman. Pavel Novak, Vaclav Grulich, Petr Moravek, Jaromir Kuca, and Petra Buzkova are the deputy chairmen.

In March 1993, Zeman initiated the creation of the election coalition Realistic Bloc (RB) [Realisticky blok] with a body acting as a shadow cabinet (an assembly of coordinators for individual sectors headed by Vaclav Grulich). The CSSD, the Christian Social Union, and all of the parties of the Liberal Social Union joined the RB. The Liberal National Social Party left in June 1993, later the Green Party and (now as an independent party) the Liberal Social Union. The Union of Czech Women (former National Front) joined in February 1994 and the Movement of Retired People in March 1994.

Membership—a stable 13,000 or so has been given for the years 1990-93. After the issue of new party cards on 1 June 1994, the membership is given as 11,000.

Deputies' Club of the Chamber of Deputies—originally 16, now 18.

Chairman—Vaclav Grulich from 1992; Karel Hrdy from the beginning of 1993; and Zdenek Trojan since July 1994.

Members—Jan Blaha; Frantisek Brozik; Petra Buzkova; Robert Dostal; Vlastimil Doubrava; Jiri Faifr; Eva Fischerova; Stanislav Gross (the youngest member of the Chamber of Deputies); Vaclav Grulich; Karel Hrdy; Pavel Petrzilek; Miroslav Reznicek; Vitezslav Sochor; Zdenek Trojan; Josef Wagner; and Eduard Zeman.

Michal Kraus (originally Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, then the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, and eventually the Democratic Labor Party), elected on the Movement for Self-Governing Democracy of Moravia and Silesia slate, and Jiri Vyvadil, elected for the Czechoslovak Socialist Party on the Liberal Social Union slate (chairman of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party in 1990), joined in December 1993.

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10. Czech Minority and Romany Movement in the Czech Republic [Ceske narodnostni a romske hnuti v CR]

It was registered on 24 February 1994 and is based in Sokolov. Nothing more is known about it.

11. Bohemian-Moravian People's Party (CMSL) [Ceskomoravska strana lidova]

It was registered on 5 October 1992 and is based in Brno. Nothing more is known about it.

12. Bohemian-Moravian Party of the Center (CMSS) [Ceskomoravska strana stredu]

It was registered on 5 April 1990 as the Movement for Self-Governing Democracy-Society for Moravia and Silesia (HSD-SMS) and is based in Brno. From 5 February 1992, it was registered as the Movement for Self-Governing Democracy of Moravia and Silesia. It has been registered under its current name since 31 January 1994. Following the CMSS's 4th Congress, at which Jan Krycer was confirmed as chairman, a group of members in Brno broke away and founded the Movement for Self-Governing Moravia and Silesia (cf. HSD-SMS). It is a parliamentary party like all of the HSD-SMS successor organizations.

Membership—2,000 in June 1994.

Deputies' Club—As the HSD-SMS originally, 14 members; at the beginning of 1994, it broke up and was reestablished in the Chamber of Deputies shortly afterwards but again broke up (cf. HSD-SMS). The following were its original postelection members:

Chairman—Rudolf Opatril; deputy chairman—Frantisek Kacenka.

Members—Jiri Bily; Jaroslav Broulik; Marta Hubova; Jan Jegla; Frantisek Kacenka; Petr Kavan; Michal Kraus (Democratic Labor Party [DSP]); Jan Krycer; Jiri Machacek; Gerta Mazalova; Rudolf Opatril; Milos Skocovsky; Zbysek Stodulka; and Dalibor Stambera.

Kraus transferred in December 1993 to the Czech Social Democratic Party and Hubova to the Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA]. Bily, Kavan, Stodulka, and Mazalova joined the Moravian National Party [MNS] and, along with three former republican deputies, reestablished the HSD-SMS Club, which broke up again in April 1994. In June 1994, Stodulka declared himself to be a Movement of Self-Governing Moravia and Silesia [HSMS] deputy.

The rest founded the CMSS Club (9 members): Chairman—Jan Krycer.

Members—Jaroslav Broulik; Jiri Drapela (previously Liberal Social Union-Czechoslovak Socialist Party); Jan Jegla; Frantisek Kacenka; Jan Krycer; Jiri Machacek; Rudolf Opatril; Milos Skocovsky; and Dalibor Stambera.

13. Czechoslovak Party of International Humanism (CSHI) [Ceskoslovenska strana humanisticke internacionaly]

It was registered on 27 February 1990 and is based in Ostrava. It has remained obscure.

14. Czechoslovak Party of Integration (CSI) [Ceskoslovenska strana integrace]

It was registered on 13 March 1990 and is based in Havirov. It has also remained obscure.

15. Czechoslovak Socialist Party (CSS) [Ceskoslovenska strana socialisticka]

It was registered on 17 December 1993 and is based in Prague. Formerly: See under Liberal National Social Party (LSNS). The party's first congress was held in Pardubice on 11 June 1994; in the CSS's view, however, this was the 27th Congress (in line with the national socialist numbering of congresses). Its chairman is former Minister Milan Adam.

According to its figures, the party allegedly has approximately 4,000 members.

16. Democrats '92 for a Common State (D 92) [Demokrate 92 za spolecny stat]

It was registered on 13 March 1992 and is based in Prague. The party's activities have not been monitored; Chairman Egon Lansky is occasionally involved in journalistic activity. The number of its supporters evidently does not exceed several dozen.

17. Democratic Left of the Czech Republic (DL) [Demokraticka levice CR]

It was registered on 9 April 1990 and is based in Brno. It has 3,000 members, and its chairman is Lotar Indruch. Disputes flared after its merger with Mecl's reform communists in October 1993, and it broke up. At the moment, court action is under way concerning the party's registration at the Interior Ministry and over the name (The Party of the) Democratic Left [SDL]. (cf. SDL).

18. Democratic Party of Czechoslovakia (DSCS) [Demokraticka strana Ceskoslovenska]

It was registered on 21 March 1990. Its constituent congress was held in May 1990. The party is based in Prague. It has 350 members and 4,000 registered supporters. Its candidates took part in the 1990 parliamentary elections in the coalition Alliance of Farmers and the Countryside. It did not take part in the 1992 elections. Jan Kukacka is the party's chairman.

19. Democratic Union (DEU) [Demokraticka unie]

It was registered on 7 March 1994 and is based in Prague. The constituent assembly in Prague on 18 June

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1994 elected Alena Hromadkova chairwoman and Ratibor Majzlik deputy chairman. Membership—approximately 3,000 in June.

20. Democratic Union of Health and Sport (DUZS) [Demokraticka unie zdravi a sportu]

The party, which is based in Jablonec nad Nisou, was registered on 20 March 1990. Nothing further is known about it.

21. Retired People for Social Security (DZJ) [Duchodci za zivotni jistoty]

It was registered on 14 March 1990 as the Movement of Retired People for Social Security [HDZJ] and is based in Prague. On 7 April 1994, the HDZJ renamed itself the DZJ with the statute of party. Its chairman is Josef Konicek. In the last parliamentary elections, the party obtained the most votes—after the Free Democrats (Civic Movement) [SD (OH)]—of the current extraparliamentary parties. Its membership has not been assessed.

22. Movement of Involved Romanies (HAR) [Hnuti angazovanych Romu]

It was registered on 30 January 1991 and is based in Prague. Its chairman is Stefan Tyser. Its membership is unknown; its activity has not been monitored.

23. Movement 90 (H-90) [Hnuti 90]

It was registered on 24 January 1991 and is based in Prague. Its membership and activity during this electoral period, apart from its demonstrations in support of preserving the Federation, are unknown. Its chairman is Zdenek Pinta.

24. The Movement of Self-Governing Moravia and Silesia (HSMS) [Hnuti samospravne Moravy a Slezska]

It was registered on 1 June 1994 and is the youngest party in the Czech Republic. It was founded by 19 deputies from the CMSS Club in the City of Brno local authority. Its constituent assembly was held in Brno on 18 June 1994, and Jan Smejkal was elected chairman. The HSMS is a parliamentary party and is represented by Deputy Zbysek Stodulka (previously HSD-SMS) and, apparently, has "several hundred" members.

25. Movement for Civic Liberty (HOS) [Hnuti za obcanskou svobodu]

It was founded on 15 October 1988, and a number of people who are politically active today—Battek (Association of Social Democrats), Benda (Christian Democratic Party) and ministers in the current government Skalicky (Civic Democratic Alliance) and Ruml (Civic Democratic Party)—took part in its activities. Activity since 1990 has been more or less individual. In June 1994, HOS decided on individual entry into DEU. Jiri Kozelka was its last known representative.

26. Movement for the Equal Status of Women in Bohemia and Moravia [Hnuti za rovnopravne postaveni zen v Cechach a na Morave]

It was registered on 7 March 1990 and is based in Prague. Its chairwoman is Jitka Filingerova. Nothing more is known about its activity.

(Movement for Self-Governing Democracy-Society for Moravia and Silesia, HSD-SMS) [Hnuti za samospravnou demokracii-Spolecnost pro Moravu a Slezsko]

It was an electoral party in 1990. In 1992, it affiliated with the original HSD-SMS, the Moravian National Party [MNS], and the DSP. Its Deputies' Club had 14 members. It was renamed the HSDMS and later the CMSS (cf. above). Deputy Bily and his colleagues from the MNS, along with the expelled republicans, reestablished the HSD-SMS Deputies' Club. Following the dissolution of the DSP, Deputy Kraus transferred to the CSSD (the only communist deputy).

The following were members of the dissolved Deputies' Club (cf. CMSS):

Chairman—Jiri Bily.

Members—Zbysek Stodulka; Gerta Mazalova; Petr Kavan (all MNS); Zdenek Vlcek; Jaroslav Unger; and Ladislav Nedorost (all formerly in the Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia [SPR-RSC]).

L. Nedorost was elected the club's chairman on 5 April 1994. On 8 April, Deputies Bily, Kavan, and Unger resigned from the club and, as MNS deputies, formed an "autonomous unit in the Chamber of Deputies." Thus, the HSD-SMS Club broke up definitively. Z. Stodulka has been in the HSMS since June 1994 (cf. above); the others have remained "unaffiliated."

27. Movement for Social Justice (HSS) [Hnuti za socialni spravedlnost]

It was registered on 17 February 1992, and the party was based originally in the SPIGL editorial office. Its chairman is Zdenek Beck; its activity since the elections has not been monitored.

28. Farmers' Movement (HZ) [Hnuti zemedelcu]

It was registered on 9 March 1990 as the Political Movement of Unified Agricultural Collective Members. It has been registered under its current name since 16 November 1990. It is the smallest element of the Liberal Social Union.

29. Club of Nonaligned Activists (KAN) [Klub angazovanych nestraniku]

It was registered on 7 May 1990. KAN was founded on 5 April 1968 as an anticommunist opposition during the so-called Prague Spring. Its chairman was Jan Stepanek, and its deputy chairmen were Rudolf Battek and Ludvik Rybacek. Its activity came to an end on 29 August 1968,

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and it was proscribed on 5 September. It renewed its activity in December 1989. Its constituent assembly was held on 31 March 1990. Its constituent congress was held in Prague on 6 October 1990; Bohdan Dvorak was elected chairman. At that time, it had 200 clubs throughout the CSFR and approximately 10,000 members. B. Dvorak stepped down at the 3d KAN Congress in January 1993 and, with several others, joined the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] (he is now in the ODS Executive Council).

Today, KAN has approximately 7,000 members in 210 clubs; at the beginning of the year, however, its representatives were still quoting 20,000. Its chairman is Emil Dejmek. It was the fourth most successful extraparliamentary party in the 1992 election after the SD (OH), the retired people, and the entrepreneurs.

Clubs of the Czech Borderlands (KCP) [Kluby ceskeho pohranici]

They are not registered according to the law on political parties and movements. They were established in 1992 in the Chomutov District; the first national KCP assembly was held in Usti nad Labem on 21 May 1994. They are headed by a 14-member National Council, whose chairman is Mojmir Svoboda, from Usti nad Labem, a former university lecturer in Marxism-Leninism and now a librarian. The chairman of the Kadan republicans, Robert Jehlicka, is also a member of the Council.

The KPC allegedly has 10,000 organized members in 61 communities in the CR. The Christian Democratic Movement (cf.) and prominent members of the communist regime—for example, Z. Horeni, the former chief editor of RUDE PRAVO; Vaclav Sipek, the former Communist Party of Czechoslovakia [CPCZ] Regional Committee secretary in Usti nad Labem; former Deputy Culture Minister Josef Svagera; and Cyril Smolik—cooperate with the KCP. They are the only organizations in the CR to openly oppose membership in NATO. They favor neutrality.

30. Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM) [Komunisticka strana Cech a Moravy]

It was registered on 28 November 1990. Before this, it was the notorious Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCZ), established in 1921. From 1990 to 1993, its chairman was Jiri Svoboda; its present chairman is Miroslav Grebenicek. Its deputy chairmen are Miroslav Ransdorf and Zdenek Klanica. Membership—140,000. It is the strongest opposition party.

It entered the 1992 election as the Left Bloc (the original composition of its Deputies' Club—35 members—in the Chamber of Deputies was as follows): Chairman—Jaroslav Ortman. Deputy chairmen—Josef Hajek; Jaroslav Soural; and Marie Stiborova.

Members—Ladislav Body; Stanislava Bumbova; Miroslav Capek; Vojtech Cecha; Kvetoslava Celisova; Vaclav Cundrle; Vaclav Exner; Vaclav Frank; Jiri Hajek; Antonin Hrazdira; Josef Hurta; Martin Chudoba; Vaclav Klucka; Vlastislav Kuchar; Hana Lagova; Jiri Machalik; Josef Mandik: Jiri Maryt; Jaroslav Matejka; Dalibor Matulka; Jan Navratil; Jaroslav Ortman; Jaroslav Palas; Svatomir Recman; Ladislav Rymes; Vladimir Rezac; Tomas Sojka; Jaroslav Soural; Marie Stiborova; Jaroslav Strait; Anna Vachalova; Zdenek Vorlicek; Vratislav Votava; and Jaroslav Zizka.

The Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] and the Left Bloc Party [SLB] (cf. below) split from the KSCM in the summer of 1993. Twenty-five deputies (cf. Chairman J. Ortman; 24 communists and one former republican) joined the SLB. Ten deputies remained in the KSCM Club. The SDL has no one in the Chamber of Deputies. Ladislav Rymes resigned from the Left Bloc Club and is one of the small group of deputies who is "unaffiliated."

The current KSCM Deputies Club has 10 members. Chairman—Vaclav Exner. Members—Kvetoslava Celisova, Vaclav Exner, Vaclav Frank, Jiri Hajek, Josef Mandik, Dalibor Matulka, Jan Navratil, Svatomir Recman, Jaroslav Strait, Vratislav Votava (Left Alternative, not a KSCM member).

For the others, cf. Left Bloc (Party).

31. Conservative Party (KS) [Konzervativni strana]

It was founded as the Party for Constitutional Democracy [Strana ustavni demokracie] and is based in Prague. It was registered on 16 March 1990. On 3 July 1990, it became the Free Bloc [Svobodny blok], and on 1 March 1991 it became the Conservative Party-Free Bloc [KS-SB]. It has been registered under its current name since 4 March 1993, following its merger with the Republican Union (from 6 March 1990 as the Republican Union-Free Bloc and from 28 June 1991 as the Republican Union). The KS General Council, the party's highest body, has not disclosed its membership. Its chairman is now Vladimir Ganzwohl (Jiri V. Kotas was chairman of the Free Bloc and the KS-SB; Igor Klimovic was chairman of the Republican Union). The KS deputy chairmen are Jan Fort, Rudolf Simek, and Myslibor Chalupa. Shortly after the two parties' merger in 1993, Jiri V. Kotas (he has been a member of the LSNS since the beginning of 1994) was KS "election leader."

32. Kingdom of Bohemia—Royalist Movement of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia (KC) [Koruna ceska, royalisticke hnuti Cech, Moravy, a Slezska]

The party was founded in November 1990 and registered on 29 August 1991. It is based in Prague. The KC, which has roughly 450 members, is headed by a nine-member board, whose chairman is Dalibor Stejskal. His deputies are Bedrich Karel and Petr Placak.

Society of Czech Republic Citizens Expelled from the Border Regions in 1938 [Kruh obcanu CR vyhnanych v roce 1938 z pohranici]

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It is not registered at the Interior Ministry as a political party or movement. Its representative is Pavel Machacek from Prague 4. Recently, it was the first Czech civic initiative representing a Sudeten German group to appeal for direct negotiations on compensation.

33. Christian and Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-CSL) [Krestanska a demokraticka unie-Ceskoslovenska strana lidova]

It was registered "by law" as one of the National Front parties (Czechoslovak People's Party); it changed its name on 2 April 1992. The party is based in Prague. In 1990, its chairman was Josef Bartoncik (now honorary chairman of the Christian Social Union) and then Josef Lux. Its deputy chairmen are Jan Kasal (first deputy chairman) and Tomas Rubacek (Minister Antonin Baudys is chairman of the Bohemian Land Organization and Minister Stanislav Belehradek is chairman of the Moravian-Silesian Land Organization).

The KDU-CSL is a parliamentary party and a member of the current governing coalition. Its membership at the beginning of 1994 was approximately 70,000.

Its Deputies' Club has 15 members. Chairman—Miroslav Vyborny. Deputy chairman—Jan Kasal.

Members—Stanislav Belehradek (minister); Josef Janecek; Ivana Janu; Jan Kasal; Jiri Karas; Josef Krupik; Josef Kubis; Karel Mach; Ludvik Motycka; Eva Novakova; Josef Pavela; Pavel Severa; Pavel Safarik; Jiri Uricar; and Miroslav Vyborny.

Janu left at the end of 1993 to become a Supreme Court judge. She was replaced by Jan Decker.

Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) [Krestansko-demokraticke hnuti]

It is not registered at the Interior Ministry as a party or movement. The KDH presents itself as an independent faction of the KDU-CSL. It cooperates with the Christian Social Union. Its chairman is Ognan Tuleskov, and its deputy chairman is Josef Macek.

34. Christian Democratic Party (KDS) [Krestansko-demokraticka strana]

The party was supposed to have been established in the mid 1980's and was constituted on 15 November 1989 as the autonomous Christian Democratic Club and on 3 December 1989 as the KDS. It was registered on 31 January 1990 (the first post-November party along with the Liberal Democratic Party). It is based in Prague. Its 1st Congress was held on 24 March 1990. The Moravian-Silesian Land Committee was established on 20 June 1992. Ivan Pilip has been chairman since the 4th Congress on 12 December 1993. Vaclav Benda was chairman in the years 1990-93 (Pilip was his deputy). Vaclav Benda, Pavel Tollner, and Miroslav Tyl have been the party's deputy chairmen since December 1993. The KDS is a member of the governing coalition.

Its membership at the beginning of 1994 was approximately 5,000.

Its Deputies' Club has 10 members. Chairman—Marek Benda. Deputy Chairman—Jan Zahradnicek.

Members—Marek Benda; Jiri Haringer; Pavel Kolar; Vladimir Koronthaly; Jan Litomisky; Michal Lobkowicz; Venceslav Lukas; Tomas Svoboda; Pavel Tollner (Chamber of Deputies deputy chairman); and Jan Zahradnicek.

35. Christian Social Union (KSU) [Krestanskosocialni unie]

It was registered on 28 August 1992 and is based in Brno. It has 3,000 members. The KSU is a member of the Realistic Bloc (cf. CSSD). It is active more or less only in Moravia. Its 2d Congress, held in Kromeriz on 25 June 1994, elected Milos Hanak the party's chairman; Josef Bartoncik remained honorary chairman. The party's first chairman, Frantisek Michalek, resigned before the congress. The congress stripped Michalek and former Deputy Chairman Vlastimil Vondrak of all of their functions. The KSU wants to cooperate with the members of the Liberal Party but not with its leadership.

36. Left Alternative—Movement for Democratic and Self-Governing Socialism (LA) [Leva alternativa—hnuti za demokraticky a samospravny socialismus]

It was registered on 3 May 1990 and is based in Prague. The party is, in essence, anonymous, although it is a parliamentary party in the person of Vratislav Votava (elected on the Left Bloc's slate and now a member of the KSCM Deputies' Club).

37. Left Bloc (Party) (SLB) [(Strana) Levy blok]

It commenced its activity on 30 June 1993 and was registered on 18 August 1993. Its constituent congress was held in Beroun on 18 December 1993. Its chairwoman is Marie Stiborova. Jaroslav Ortman is acting deputy chairman, and Jiri Sadlo is deputy chairman.

Its approximately 2,500 members are reform communists who split from the KSCM (cf. there and SDL). The party's highest bodies are the 11-member Political Board and the 24-member Left Bloc Central Committee. At the moment, the SLB is perceived in public only as a parliamentary party (it is the second-strongest faction in the chamber after the ODS). It got into the Chamber of Deputies on the slate of the communist Left Bloc. In May 1994, it was joined by Deputy Zdenek Vlcek, who was elected on the slate of the SPR-RSC.

Its Deputies' Club has 25 members. Chairman—Jaroslav Ortman.

Members—Ladislav Body; Stanislava Bumbova; Miroslav Capek; Vojtech Cechak; Vaclav Cundrle; Josef Hajek; Antonin Hrazdira; Josef Hurta; Martin Chudoba; Vaclav Klucka; Vlastislav Kuchar; Hana Lagova; Jiri

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Machalik; Jiri Maryt; Jaroslav Matejka; Jaroslav Ortman; Jaroslav Palas; Vladimir Rezac; Tomas Sojka; Jaroslav Soural; Marie Stiborova; Anna Vachalova; Zdenek Vorlicek; Jaroslav Zizka; and Zdenek Vlcek (former republican).

38. Liberal Democratic Party (LDS) [Liberalne demokraticka strana]

It was registered on 31 January 1990 (the first post-November party along with the KDS) under the name of Czechoslovak Democratic Initiative. It has been registered under its current name since 21 June 1990. Emanuel Mandler was LDS chairman in the years 1990-92. He was suceeded by Viktorie Hradska, who dissolved the party and merged it with ODA with the agreement of only part of the LDS. She was succeeded by Miroslav Litomisky, chairman of the "underground" party, where the LDS sought refuge for a while. Vojtech Prusa has been chairman since 1993. Membership—several hundred, apparently.

39. Liberal Social Union (LSU) [Liberalne socialni unie]

It was registered on 6 December 1991 as an "electoral party-electoral coalition" of the CSS (today the LSNS), the Agrarian Party [ZS], the HZ, and the Greens' Party [SZ]. The LSNS broke away from the LSU in mid-1993 followed by the SZ, and, at the beginning of 1994, the remainder of the LSU transformed itself into a political party with exclusive membership. All of the parties of the LSU were members of the Realistic Bloc, from which they broke away, but as political entities (cf. CSSD). The chairman of the electoral coalition, Frantisek Trnka (originally ZS), and its deputy chairmen were the chairmen of the individual LSU parties.

Frantisek Trnka has been chairman of the LSU since the beginning of 1994; the deputy chairmen are Hana Orgonikova (previously CSS) and Pavel Seifer (previously SZ). Its membership should amount to "several" thousand. In March 1994, Frantisek Trnka's original party, the ZS (his "maternal" party, however, is the CPCZ), decided to merge gradually with the LSU (cf. ZS).

Its Deputies' Club originally had 16 members; then it broke up. The current LSU Deputies' Club has nine members.

The original composition: Chairman—Frantisek Trnka (ZS). Deputy chairmen—Jiri Drapela (CSS) and Pavel Seifer (SZ).

Members—Alfred Frommer; Jiri Drapela; Pavel Hirs (CSS); Stanislav Kozak; Josef Krizek; Hana Orgonikova; Vladimir Prochazka; Miroslav Raska; Pavel Seifer; Jaroslav Sykora; Tomas Sterba; Frantisek Trnka; Jiri Vackar; Jaroslav Vlcek; Jan Vrany; and Jiri Vyvadil.

The club's transformation—The following transferred to the LSNS Club in mid-1993: Pavel Hirs; Alfred Frommer (former CSS); Eva Matouskova; Pavel Kulicka; and Vitezslav Valach (former republican). Meanwhile, in July 1994, Matouskova transferred to the ODA Club, and, in August 1994, former republican Kasparek joined the club.

The following transferred to the LSU Club at the beginning of 1994: Frantisek Trnka; Josef Krizek; Pavel Seifer; Hana Orgonikova; Vladimir Prochazka; Miroslav Raska; Jaroslav Sykora; and Tomas Sterba. Jiri Soler, a former republican, has been in the club since June 1994.

Jiri Vyvadil transferred to the CSSD Club.

Jiri Drapela transferred to the CMSS Club.

The following have remained independent: Kozak; Vackar; and Vrany (all ZS) and Vlcek (SZ).

40. Liberal National Social Party (LSNS) [Liberalni strana narodne socialni]

It was registered "by law" as a National Front party under its name for the past 40 years, the Czechoslovak Socialist Party (CSS). It became the Liberal Social Party-Czechoslovak Socialist Party on 30 October 1992. It was registered under its current name on 29 June 1993. It was briefly a member of the Realistic Bloc as the CSS (until summer 1993) (cf. CSSD). In the fall of 1993, a small group that disagreed with Hirs's leadership renewed the CSS's activity (cf. there); several others transferred to the LSU and the CMSS.

Following the 1990 election, some CSS members transferred to the National Social Party (NSS), which had been reestablished (cf. there). Today, a number of them are back or are members of ODA.

Bohumir Kucera concluded the National Front era as chairman; he was succeeded by Jiri Vyvadil (now CSSD), Ladislav Dvorak, and, since May 1993, Pavel Hirs. The deputy chairmen are Milan Kynicky (first deputy chairman), Frantisek Postl, and Bela Hejna.

Its membership at the beginning of 1994 was approximately 15,000. The LSNS is a parliamentary party; its deputies were elected originally on the LSU's slate. Following its dissolution, they founded their own club, which, however, broke up in July 1994 but was reestablished a month later.

The LSNS Deputies' Club has five members. Alfred Frommer; Pavel Hirs (both elected on the LSU slate as members of the CSS); Pavel Kulicka; Eva Matouskova; and Vitezslav Valach (originally SPR-RSC).

In July 1994, Matouskova left the club and joined the ODA Club, which meant that the club became defunct temporarily on 22 July. However, Miroslav Kasparek transferred from the SPR-RSC Club in August 1994 (he ended his republican membership on 5 August; he has been a member of the LSNS since 8 August).

The Popular Union for National and Social Salvation (LUNSZ) [Lidova unie narodni a socialni spasy]

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It is registered not in accordance with the law on parties but as a civic association. It was established in October 1993 by expelled KSCM members. The initiator and chairman of LUNSZ is Miroslav Stepan. Its activity is popular mainly among old KSC(M) members and traditional Marxist-Leninists for whom the policy of the KSC(M) is unacceptable.

41. Masaryk Democratic Party (MDS) [Masarykova demokraticka strana]

It was registered on 25 May 1992 and is based in Prague. It has 423 members (April 1994) and, every now and then, issues statements against nationalist and racist extremes. The party's highest body is the MDS Executive Council, which has 15 members. Its chairman is Otomar Venzhofer; the deputy chairmen are Jindrich Slavik (first deputy chairman), Alois Dupal, and Kamil Kuchler.

42. Moravian National Party (MNS) [Moravska narodni strana]

It was registered on 28 September 1990 and is based in Brno. It had 5,000 members in 1993 and about 6,500 in July 1994. The MNS is a parliamentary party; its members got into parliament on the HSD-SMS slate (Bily, Kavan, Stodulka, and Mazalova). The deputies left the MNS on 8 April 1994 and operate as independents, but as a triumvirate now: Jiri Bily; Petr Kavan; and Jaroslav Unger (former republican). Stodulka declared himself to be an HSMS deputy (cf. there). The others are unaffiliated.

The MNS chairman is Ivan Drimal. It has been an uncompromising, autonomist Moravian party since the beginning.

43. Moravian-Silesian Movement (MSH) [Moravskoslezske hnuti]

It was registered on 23 December 1991 and is based in Prerov. Frantisek Hala, one of the members of the "Moravian Government" established in 1992, is the chairman of the MSH Council. Its membership is unknown; its direct activity is not monitored. The MSH entered the 1992 parliamentary election on the slate of the Movement of Retired People for Social Security. A. Ovcacikova, a former Federal Assembly deputy for the HSD-SMS and now secretary of the Moravian-Silesian Information Center, is involved in the MSH.

44. National Social Party—Czechoslovak National Socialist Party (NSS) [Narodne socialni strana—Ceskoslovenska strana narodne socialisticka]

It was registered on 20 September 1990 as the National Social Party and is based in Prague. It changed its name on 13 December 1990. In the summer of 1993, following the party's unconcluded 3d Congress, a major part of it transferred to the LSNS (including Chairman Podsednik); others joined ODA. Cestmir Cejka was the party's first chairman, from 1990 to 1992 (deputy chairmen: Josef Lesak and Drahomira Slavikova); he was succeeded by Jiri Vanicek, the mayor of Tabor (now ODA) and Pavel Podsednik. The current chairman is Vlastislav Hrasky.

At the general assembly held on 8 September 1990 to mark its reestablishment, the NSS declared itself to be the successor to the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party under its original 1897 name. However, the NSS was not successful in its dispute with the CSS (LSNS) over legal successorship. Membership—Apparently several hundred.

45. Independent Initiative (NEI) [Nezavisla iniciativa]

It was registered on 22 February 1990 as the Independent Erotic Initiative and is based in Prague; it has been registered under its current name since 9 April 1992. Its membership in April 1994 was about 4,800 registered members, and, according to the NEI leadership, all readers of the NEI-REPORT (print run, 250,000) are among its supporters. The NEI chairman is Radim Uzel, and its deputy chairman is Miroslav Mitlohner (chairman of the NEI-REPORT Editorial Council). According to the electoral surveys, the NEI is the sixth-most-successful extraparliamentary party and, without a doubt, is a European curiosity.

46. Independent Left (NL) [Nezavisla levice]

The date of its registration is unknown. Its chairman is Jaroslav Travnicek. It is a completely anonymous organization.

47. Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) [Obcanska demokraticka aliance]

It was founded on 17 December 1989 and registered on 5 March 1990. It took part in the first election on the Civic Forum's slate. Pavel Bratinka was the party's chairman until March 1992 (fourth nationwide conference); Jan Kalvoda is now chairman. Its deputy chairmen are Daniel Kroupa, Pavel Bratinka, Vladimir Dlouhy, and Libor Kudlacek. Karel Ledvinka is chairman of its Political Board. It is a member of the governing coalition.

On 1 April 1994, it had 2,052 members in 128 local clubs.

The Deputies' Club originally had 14 members but now has 16.

Chairman—Oldrich Kuzilek. Deputy Chairman—Ivan Masek.

Members—Miroslav Cerbak; Viktor Dobal; Josef Effenberger; Rene Haba; Cestmir Hofhanzl; Tomas Jezek; Jan Kalvoda (deputy prime minister); Oldrich Kuzilek; Karel Ledvinka (Chamber of Deputies deputy chairman); Katerina Lojdova (she is not an ODA member); Ivan Masek; Jiri Stadler; Radim Spacek; and Vladimir Suman.

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Marta Hubova (elected on the HSD-SMS slate) transferred from the HSDMS at the end of 1993, and Josef Jezek (formerly in the ODS Club, but an ODA member before the 1992 election) joined in June 1994.

48. Civic Democratic Party (ODS) [Obcanska demokraticka strana]

It was established on 26 February 1991 at an extraordinary Civic Forum republican assembly in Prague (held from 23 February), at which the Civic Forum divided into the future ODS and the Civic Movement. The ODS Preparatory Committee (Vaclav Klaus, chairman; Petr Cermak and Miroslav Macek, deputy chairmen) was established officially on 4 March. The party was registered on 18 March 1991. The ODS constituent congress was held in Olomouc on 20 and 21 April 1991 (Klaus, chairman; Cermak and Macek, deputy chairmen).

The I. Regular ODS Congress, held in Plzen on 22 and 23 November 1991, confirmed its leadership, to which Josef Zieleniec and Jiri Kovar were elected as deputy chairmen. The II. Regular ODS Congress, held in Luhacovice on 26 April 1992, confirmed the leadership from Plzen. The III. Regular ODS Congress, held in Prague on 7 November 1992, elected Vaclav Klaus chairman, Petr Cermak executive deputy chairman, and Josef Zieleniec, Jan Strasky, and Jiri Vlach deputy chairmen. The IV. Regular ODS Congress, held in Koprivnice on 27 and 28 November 1993, confirmed the leadership from Prague.

The 23-member Executive Council is the party's highest organ. At the beginning of 1994, the ODS had approximately 27,000 members.

Its Deputies' Club had 66 members originally; it has had 65 since the beginning of 1994.

Chairman—Jiri Honajzer. Deputy chairmen—Stanislav Volak and Ondrej Zemina.

Members—Petr Bachna; Ivan Becvar; Josef Bejcek; Jaroslav Blazek; Petr Brodsky; Vladimir Budinsky; Eduard Bures; Petr Cermak; Jan Cerny; Josef Cervinka; Ota Fejfar; Tomas Fejfar; Andrej Gjuric; Josef Holub; Jiri Honajzer; Emil Jaros; Josef Jezek; Milada Kadlecova; Jaromir Kalus; Jan Klas; Petr Kohacek; Robert Kolar; Milena Kolarova; Jan Koucky; Frantisek Kozel; Jan Kramek; Vaclav Krasa; Petr Lom (former minister); Richard Mandelik; Hana Marvanova; Jaroslav Melichar; Vaclav Najemnik; Petr Necas; Jindrich Nemcik; Lubos Nemec; Jiri Novak; Libor Novak (born 1958); Libor Novak (born 1962); Miroslav Novotny; Jirina Pavlikova; Jiri Payne; Tomas Pav; Pavel Pesek; Stanislav Penicka; Frantisek Pluhar; Martin Priban; Anna Roschova; Ludek Rubas (minister); Jan Strasky (minister); Martin Syka; Jaromir Simanek; Vlastimil Tlusty; Hana Tomanova; Vaclav Trojan; Jan Trebicky; Milan Uhde (chairman, Chamber of Deputies); Josef Ullmann; Oldrich Vaca; Jiri Vlach (deputy chairman, Chamber of Deputies); Vlastimil Vlcek; Stanislav Volak; Ivan Vrzal; Otakar Vychodil; Ondrej Zemina; Anton Zima; and Leopold Zubek.

Josef Jezek resigned from the party and club at the beginning of 1994. He was briefly independent but is now a member of ODA.

49. Civic Social Activity (OSA) [Obcanska spolecenska aktivita]

It was registered on 5 April 1990 and is based in Prague. Its chairman is Karel Hajek. Its membership is unknown; its activity has not been monitored.

50. Opponents of Communism (OK) [Odpurci komunismu]

The date of its registration is unknown; it is based in Brno. The OK spokeswoman is Tamara Kosinova. Nothing more is known about it.

51. Organization of Independent Romanians (ONR) [Organizace nezavislych Rumunu]

It was registered on 7 March 1990 and is based in Ostrava. It is completely anonymous.

52. Pan-European Union of Bohemia and Moravia (PUCM) [Panevropska unie Cech a Moravy]

It was registered on 23 August 1990 and is based in Prague. Its president is Rudolf Kucera. Nothing is known about the party's activity.

53. Permanent Opposition for Democracy (POZD) [Permanentni opozici za demokracii]

It was registered on 28 March 1990 and is based in Prague. It is a completely unknown organization.

54. Party of Entrepreneurs and Tradesmen (PZS) [Podnikatelsko-zivnostenska strana]

It was registered on 12 February 1990 as the All People's Democratic Party and is based in Prague; it has been registered under its current name since 10 July 1990. Apart from the name of the party's chairman, Jaroslav Samek, nothing is known about the PZS activity.

55. Republicans [Republikani]

This party was registered on 20 February 1992 and is based in Prague. It is an unknown entity.

56. Republican Party (RS) [Republikanska strana]

It was founded on 26 December 1989 in Prague as a federal party. Its base was later transferred to Bratislava, but, since 1 January 1993, the RS has been based in Brno (registered 8 July 1993). Former RS Chairman Ivan Duris is now the RS chairman in Slovakia. Its highest bodies are the Assembly and the Executive Committee, whose chairman is Miroslav Beno (cf. Party for Republican and National Democratic Unity) and deputy chairman is Jaroslav Mechacek. It has approximately 150 members and 1,000 supporters.

57. Romany Civic Initiative (ROI) [Romska obcanska iniciativa]

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It was registered on 2 March 1990 and is based in Prague. It emerged as an element of the Civic Forum; however, its practical activity is not monitored among the public today. Its chairman is Emil Scuka. Its membership has not been disclosed.

58. Romany National Congress (RNK) [Romsky narodni kongres]

It was registered on 15 April 1992 and is based in Prague. Nothing more is known about it.

59. Association of Retired People in the Czech Republic (SD CR) [Sdruzeni duchodcu CR]

It was registered on 2 March 1994 as a political movement and was based in Pelhrimov; it is now based in Prague. The SD CR is linked to the SPR-RSC and is a parliamentary party; the movement's spokesman (previously chairman of the Preparatory Committee) is Jaroslav Novak, an SPR-RSC deputy and member.

60. Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (SPR-RSC) [Sdruzeni pro republiku-Republikanska strana Ceskoslovenska]

It was registered on 27 February 1990 and is based in Prague. Its chairman is Miroslav Sladek, and its membership is given as 40,000. The SPR-RSC is the only party, apart from the communists, that declares that it has a local organization in every CR community.

Its Deputies' Club had 14 members originally; it now has six. Chairman—Jan Vik. Deputy Chairman—Jaroslav Novak.

Members—Miroslav Kasparek; Bohuslav Kuba; Milan Loukota; Ladislav Nedorost; Jaroslav Novak; Jiri Soler; Jaroslav Unger; Josef Valenta; Oldrich Vrcha; Pavel Kulicka; Eva Matouskova; Vitezslav Valach; Jan Vik; and Zdenek Vlcek.

Nedorost, Unger, and Vlcek terminated their membership in the club and party at the beginning of 1993 and transferred to the HSD-SMS Club. They have been independent since April 1994; Unger joined the MNS and, since May 1994, Vlcek has been a member of the SLB and the SLB Deputies' Club (!). Soler transferred to the LSU in June 1994. Kulicka, Matouskova, and Valach, along with Hirs and Frommer, founded the LSNS Club (cf. there). However, in July 1994, Matouskova left the LSNS for the ODA Club. Kasparek terminated his membership in the SPR-RSC on 5 August and has been a member of the LSNS and its reestablished club since 8 August.

61. Party of Democracy and Freedom (SDS) [Strana demokracie a svobody]

It was registered on 3 April 1992 as the Prague Liberal Union; it has been registered under its current name since 2 February 1994. Apart from the name of its chairman, the well-known businessman Vratislav Cekan, nothing is known about the party. He, however, has just announced his intention to transfer to the CSSD.

62. Party of the Democratic Left (SDL) [Strana demokraticke levice]

The party was founded on 16 July 1993 following a rift at the communists' congress in Prostejov (KSCM 3d Congress); it was constituted on 9 October 1993 at a nationwide assembly after merging with the Democratic Left (chairman: L. Indruch. The DL renamed itself the SDL, into which the reform communists transferred noncorporatively). Subsequently, a dispute erupted over the registration of the party's name between Mecl and Indruch, who was the first SDL chairman but was recalled in October 1993. Since February, the DL and the SDL have been involved in court proceedings over the party's registration and name (cf. DL).

Compare with DL for registration.

Name changes—Democratic Left (from 9 April 1990); CSFR Democratic Left (from 23 April 1992); CR Democratic Left (24 February 1993); and Party of the Democratic Left (from 16 July 1993).

Josef Mecl is SDL chairman; Vitezslav Cech and Vladimir Rezac are its deputy chairmen. Frantisek Suchy is the chairman of the SDL Moravian National Committee. The party is based in Brno. Its highest body is the 27-member Nationwide Committee. In April 1994, the party had 10,356 members. The party is not represented in the Chamber of Deputies (cf. KSCM and SLB).

63. Party of the European House (SED) [Strana evropskeho domu]

It was registered on 29 March 1990 and is based in Brno. It is an unknown organization.

64. Party of the Moravian Countryside (SMV) [Strana moravskeho venkova]

It was registered on 5 April 1990 as Party of the Moravian Countryside; from 21 August 1990 it was the Party of the Bohemian and Moravian Countryside. It has been registered under its current name since 14 November 1990. The party is based in Sumperk. Its chairman is Jaroslav Broz. Otherwise, nothing is known about the SMV.

65. Party for the Defense of Culture (SOK) [Strana obrany kultury]

It was registered on 9 April 1990 and is based in Prague. It is represented by the artist Pavel Brom. Nothing more is known about it.

66. Party of Ethnic Romany Citizens in the North Bohemian Region [Strana obcanu romske narodnosti Severoceskeho kraje]

It was registered on 1 October 1992 and is based in Litomerice. It is an absolutely anonymous organization.

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67. Party of Entrepreneurs, Tradesmen, and Farmers of the Czech Republic (SPZR) [Strana podnikatelu, zivnostniku, a rolniku Ceske republiky]

It was founded on 23 February 1992 and registered on 6 March 1992 as the Party of Czechoslovak Entrepreneurs and Tradesmen and later as the Party of Czechoslovak Entrepreneurs, Tradesmen, and Farmers. It is based in Prague. It has been registered under its current name since 3 April 1992. It had about 2,500 members in March 1994. Its chairman is Rudolf Baranek, its first deputy chairman is Rostislav Senjuk, and its executive deputy chairman is Josef Vesely. The party's highest body is its congress (19 members). The SPZR was the third most successful extraparliamentary party in the last parliamentary election. Its activity is associated with that of the Association of Entrepreneurs, of which R. Baranek is also chairman.

68. Party of Beer Afficionados (SPP) [Strana pratel piva]

It was founded by Plzen students on 16 January 1990 and registered on 20 March 1990. It is based in Prague. The SPP leadership has five members, and, according to its information, it had four general and five first secretaries. The SPP chairman is Ivo Dvorak, its secretary is Martin Drab, its press spokeswoman is Zuzana Uhrova, and its adviser is Milos Zeman (not the CSSD chairman).

In April 1994, the party had 8,143 members (including two Slovaks and one honorary member, Russian Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev) in 243 local organizations. The party's slogan is "We drink to lift ourselves up, not to fall down."

69. Party of Republican and National Democratic Unity (SRNDJ) [Strana republikanske a narodne demokraticke jednoty]

The National Democratic Party (NDS) resumed its activities on 4 March 1991 (after 52 years); Jan Valenta was elected chairman and Elmar Chmel general secretary. According to a statement issued by the SRNDJ leadership, Valenta was recalled after his factional activities were uncovered and he was found guilty of collaborating with the StB [State Security].

On 21 March 1992, the NDS merged with the Radical Republican Party (RRS), which was registered on 14 October 1990; it registered its change of name on 3 April 1992. At that time, its chairman was Miroslav Kulhavy, and its deputy chairmen were Elmar Chmel and Miroslav Beno (cf. SR). On 27 July 1992, the Honorary Council (the SRNDJ's supervisory body) suspended Kulhavy's activity and membership. Chmel was elected chairman. The party is based in Brno.

It has 11,600 members. Elmar Chmel is chairman of its Political Board, and V. Z. Prochazka (formerly just Zdenek Prochazka, chairman of the Moravian-Silesian Land Organization since May 1994 and presidential candidate in 1992) and Vladimir Taraba are its deputy chairmen.

70. Party of Free Democrats (SSD) [Strana svobodnych demokratu]

It was registered on 26 March 1990 and is based in Prague. Its chairman is Jiri Vykopal. Otherwise, nothing more is known about it.

71. Party of Physically Handicapped Retired People and Socially Vulnerable Citizens [Strana zdravotne postizenych duchodcu a socialne slabych obcanu]

It was registered on 11 February 1992 as the Party of the Physically Handicapped and is based in Brno. It has been registered under its current name since 14 December 1992. It is absolutely anonymous.

72. Party of Greens (SZ) [Strana zelenych]

It was established and registered on 3 February 1990 and is based in Prague. The party's highest body is the Nationwide Committee (33 members). The SZ was a member of the LSU electoral party and later of the Realistic Bloc (cf. CSSD). It has about 3,000 members and, apparently, 250,000 supporters. Its chairman is Jaroslav Vlcek (Jan Jecminek, Martin Tichy, and Ales Mucha were before him). Its deputy chairmen are Miloslav Kejval and Roman Haken.

The SZ is a parliamentary party. Jaroslav Vlcek, who left the LSU Deputies' Club in March 1994 (and is now "unaffiliated") and Pavel Seifer (currently deputy chairman of the LSU) were elected on the LSU's slate.

73. Free Democrats (Civic Movement) (SD OH) [Svobodni demokrate]

The party was founded (renamed) on 19 January 1994. It was registered on 8 March 1991. Previously, it was Civic Movement, one of the strongest of the Civic Forum's successor parties, to which most deputies and ministers in the 1990-92 Civic Forum government belonged. Its highest body is the Republican Council (102 members) and its 11-member Presidium. Its chairman is Jiri Dienstbier, and its deputy chairman is Tomas Sokol (formerly, from 1991, the OH deputy chairmen were V. Zak, J. Bursik, and T. Sokol).

It has about 3,000 members. The OH/SD (OH) was the most successful extraparliamentary party in the last election.

74. Transnational Radical Party (TRS) [Transnacionalni radikalni strana]

It is represented by J. Dolezal, and its name crops up in public very rarely. The TRS is the Czech branch of a movement whose core is in Italy.

75. Union of Towns and Countryside (UMV) [Unie mest a venkova]

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It was registered on 17 February 1992 and is based in Prague. It is still at the "preparatory committee" stage.

76. Union for Self-Governing Democracy (USD) [Unie samospravne demokracie]

It was registered on 17 February 1992 and is based in Brno. It is absolutely anonymous.

Patriotic Front [Vlastenecka fronta]

It is registered not as a political party but as a civic association. It was registered on 17 June 1993. At that time, it was supposed to have had 200 members. It is supposed to cooperate with the French National Front of Le Pen, the Dutch Centrumspartij '86, and the German National Democratic Party. Nothing more is known about it.

77. Electoral Association of Czechoslovak Entrepreneurs [Volebni sdruzeni ceskoslovenskych podnikatelu CR]

It was registered on 26 September 1990 and is based in Benesov. Nothing more is known about it.

78. Electoral Grouping of Special-Interest Unions in the Czech Republic [Volebni seskupeni zajmovych svazu v CR]

It was registered on 13 March 1990 and is based in Prague. It is absolutely unknown.

79. Agrarian Party (ZS) [Zemedelska strana]

It was registered on 8 February 1990 as the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party. It has been registered under its current name since 29 January 1991. The ZS was a member of the LSU electoral party (then under the designation LSU-Agrarian Party) and the Realistic Bloc. (cf. CSSD). Its membership has not been disclosed. Its chairman was Frantisek Trnka, then Jiri Vackar from 1993, and, following his resignation from the party, Radek Navratil since March 1994. The ZS decided to merge with the LSU; Navratil is also deputy chairman of the LSU, which infringes the Law on Parties. The ZS was a parliamentary party with three deputies elected on the LSU slate—Stanislav Kozak, Jiri Vackar, and Jan Vrany (cf. LSU). They left the ZS at its March congress and function in the Chamber of Deputies as "unaffiliated" deputies.

Defunct Parties (Renamed or Merged With Others)

Agrarian Republican Party (ARS) [Agrarni republikanska strana]

It was registered on 6 April 1990 as the Republican Party of the Czechoslovak Countryside; it was reregistered as the ARS on 5 March 1992. It was merged with the CMAS.

Czechoslovak Democratic Initiative (CsDI) [Ceskoslovenska demokraticka iniciativa]—Now the LDS

Czechoslovak Republican Party of Towns and Countryside [Ceskoslovenska republikanska strana mest a venkova]—Now the Agrarian Party (AS)

Czechoslovak People's Party [Ceskoslovenska strana lidova]—Now the KDU-CSL

Czechoslovak Agrarian Party [Ceskoslovenska strana zemedelska]—Now the Agrarian Party

Democratic Labor Party (DSP) [Demokraticka strana prace]—It was founded in 1991. It had roughly 800 members in the summer of 1992. It folded in December 1993 by merging with the SDL. Part of the DSP, led by Chairman Jaroslav Wurm and Spokesman Stanislav Krecek (formerly CSS and NSS), had previously transferred to the CSSD.

Democratic Party—Sudetenland (DSS) [Demokraticka strana—Sudety]—From the end of 1992 to the beginning of 1994, a small group from Plzen tried to gather the necessary 1,000 signatures; apparently, it obtained 600. Ladislav Duda was DSS spokesman. Its activists have separated into German cultural clubs.

Movement for Czechoslovak Understanding [Hnuti ceskoslovenskeho porozumeni]—It was registered on 29 September 1993. The number of its members is unknown; its activity has not been monitored. The party merged with the Democratic Party of Slovakia before the end of 1993. It is not active in the Czech Republic.

Movement of Retired People for Social Security (HDZJ) [Hnuti duchodcu za zivotni jistoty]—Now Retired People for Social Security

Movement for Self-Governing Democracy of Moravia and Silesia (HSDMS) [Hnuti za samospravnou demokracii Moravy a Slezska]—Now the Bohemian-Moravian Party of the Center (CMSS)

Club of Social Democrats Civic Forum (KSD OF) [Klub socialnich demokratu OF]—Now the ASD

National Democratic Party (NDS) [Narodne demokraticka strana]—It merged with the RSS in the Party of Republican and National Democratic Unity.

Civic Forum (OF) [Obcanske Forum]—It had a spokesman as its most senior representative: Vaclav Havel (now president of the Republic), then Jan Urban, and, finally, Petr Kucera (now CSSD). Vaclav Klaus was elected OF chairman at the end of 1990 (cf. ODS). It was founded in the Cinoherni Klub [Drama Club] in Prague on 19 November 1989 in the presence of, among others, members and former members of the CPCZ.

The LDS left the movement immediately after the 1990 election. At the end of 1990 and the beginning of 1991, the deputies' clubs and the movement itself separated into several independent political entities: ODA, ODS, OH, ASD, ROI, and so on, not all of which, however, formed deputies' clubs. Deputies from the reform communist Club for Democratic Socialism—Revival

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remained partly in the OH until the 1992 election and partly transferred to the CSSD, formed the Social Democratic Orientation (SDO) Deputies' Club, and thus turned the CSSD into a parliamentary party (cf. CSSD).

Civic Movement (OH) [Obcanske hnuti]—Now Free Democrats (OH)

Political Party of Women and Mothers of Czechoslovakia (PSZM) [Politicka strana zen a matek Ceskoslovenska]—It was registered on 18 February 1991, and its chairwoman was Alena Walterova. Its membership is unknown, and its activity was not monitored. According to an anonymous letter (from 790 66 Skorosice), the PSZM was "abolished on 23 November 1993 in accordance with Law No. 424/91" (the predecessor of today's amended Law on Parties No. 118/94).

Political Movement of Unified Agricultural Collective Members [Politicke hnuti clenu JZD]—Now the Farmers' Movement

Prague Liberal Union [Prazska liberalni unie]—Now the Party of Democracy and Freedom

Radical Republican Party (RSS) [Radikalni republikanska strana]—It merged with the NDS in the Party of Republican and National Democratic Unity.

Republican Union-Free Bloc [Republikanska unie-Svobodny blok]—Now the Conservative Party

Republican Union (RU) [Republikanska unie]—It was registered on 6 March 1990. It was RU from 2 July 1990 and the Republican Union-Free Bloc from 28 June 1991. (cf. Conservative Party) Its chairman was Igor Klimovic.

Party of the Bohemian and Moravian Countryside [Strana ceskeho a moravskeho venkova]—Now the Party of the Moravian Countryside

Party of the Bohemian Countryside [Strana ceskeho venkova]—Now the Bohemian-Moravian Agrarian Party

Party of Czechoslovak Entrepreneurs [Strana ceskoslovenskych podnikatelu]—Now the Party of Czech Entrepreneurs

Free Bloc [Svobodny blok]—cf. Conservative Party

Free Farmers' Party [Svobodna rolnicka strana]—cf. Bohemian-Moravian Agrarian Party

All-People's Democratic Party [Vselidova demokraticka strana]—Now the Entrepreneurs' and Tradesmens' Party

Recent Changes

Jan Vrany, elected on the LSU slate, a former member of the Agrarian Party, and "unaffiliated" since this March, has become a member of the KDU-CSL Deputies' Club. Thus, the number of its deputies has gone up to 16 (15 originally). It is necessary to include Eva Matouskova, who left the LSNS Club (elected on the republicans' slate) among the ODA's deputies. Thus, the number of ODA deputies has gone up to 17 (originally 14).

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HZDS Leader Outlines Movement's Success

AU0610131194 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 4 Oct 94 p 4

[Article by Movement for a Democratic Slovakia Deputy Chairman Augustin Marian Huska: "The Retaliation for Independence Did Not Materialize"]

[FBIS Translated Text] 1. The elections have rejected the attempt to creepingly restore our provincial status. Before them, there was a hullabaloo about how they would be a referendum on whether Slovaks want to return to foreign trusteeship. The idea of resurrecting national thraldom has been smashed to ineffectual smithereens. The Slovak nation has matured and, from the depth of its historical experience, has grasped the well-known statement by Edmund Burke that "a nation in fact becomes a nation fully if it manages to become a state." We will manage this.

2. The election has rejected the attempt to cast the movement that achieved Slovak independence in a role of political insignificance in this state's power structure. The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] is not only the strongest legitimate force as a result of the democratic election, but also is stronger than the three major parties that came behind it. The secret hopes that it would be enough, under the president's auspices, to simply ostracize the HZDS from the corral of contenders to form a government came to nothing. It is impossible to form a stable government without the HZDS. The vast majority of parties turned the election into an offensive and did not hesitate to take part in the dirty campaign against the HZDS. The drivel of hatred did not frustrate the will of a formidable number of citizens for the revival of emancipatory continuity. The election in 1992 gave the HZDS 37.7 percent of the vote, and the one in 1994, under the outright power play of the hostile domestic and foreign mass media, 34.9 percent. The political nomads who have altered their convictions two or three times did not even manage, with the help of the mass media, to draw off 3 percent of the HZDS's electoral support. The HZDS has demonstrated that it is a nationally, spiritually, socially, and modernly oriented force that is capable of action.

3. The election has rejected the attempt by the unscrupulous and the Iagos to remove from political life a fixed star of the first magnitude—Vladimir Meciar. It would be a profound disgrace to "remunerate" in this way the person who deserves most of the credit for Slovakia's independence. The panopticon of unfulfilled pretenders has to reconcile itself to the fact that it is dealing with immeasurable greatness.

4. The election has rejected the stage-managed strategy to rehabilitate the right of the posthumous heirs of totalitarian socialism to monopolize power. This also sends a signal abroad. Slovakia has rejected the zigzagging left-right path and has chosen a broad center path, where both the center-right and the center-left have a place.

5. The election has rejected the chaotic and avaricious transformation that, under the banner of "consumer paganism," is attempting to rid Slovakia not only of its economic-ownership identity, but also of its national-cultural and spiritual one. The election results have refused to perceive Slovakia's integration as fusion and have refused to perceive privatization as a bazaar-like clearance sale. Privatization must bring a participative economy.

6. The election has rejected the scandalous manipulation of public opinion. All the research institutes, including those that acquired a reputation in the past, deliberately misled the public in order to bring about a herd effect to support the requirements of the figures from the provisional government and of figures from the background. The bankrupt "pollsters" from the VPN [Public Against Violence] forecast poor results for the HZDS right up until the last moment. This mass manipulation should have a legal sequel.

To sum up: Slovak civic solidarity has thus rejected both the scenario of a "second power center" and the external scenario for our development. This is an expression of the profound logic of the electoral will of Slovak-thinking citizens. We will defend this logic loyally during the quest for possible allies. We must not frustrate this will, and we will not allow ANYONE [preceding word all capitals] to steer the course of state policy against this will, a will underscored by the election. We will be true to the demands citizens made of us at election meetings. I promise this.

HZDS Says Cabinet Without Meciar Unacceptable

LD0610181494 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 2100 GMT 5 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Sergej Kozlik, the deputy chairman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], met journalists from some Slovak and Czech media today.

Among other things, he said: If President Michal Kovac decides to entrust someone else from the HZDS instead of its chairman, Vladimir Meciar, with forming a cabinet, this will not be accepted by us. Our demand that Vladimir Meciar becomes the prime minister is the fundamental point for the HZDS, and all of our political talks will be based on this.

The HZDS considers the resignation of the president of the Slovak Republic to be one of the ways of guaranteeing stability. Sergej Kozlik holds the view that Michal Kovac played an important role in bringing about the current instability of our society, and he also has not forgotten the steps he took in March of this year, when parliament dismissed the then prime minister, Vladimir Meciar. This is why he is watching with suspicion the president's initiative of convening political talks

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between the new parliamentary parties. Let us view this as his personal initiative, Kozlik said.

He also considers the deadline for reporting the results of political talks, set by Michal Kovac for 18 October, to be inappropriate. According to HZDS Deputy Chairman Sergej Kozlik, talks on forming a coalition government have already begun. The movement has entrusted teams of people with this task, who will take turns at taking part in the talks.

He does not consider any link to the Hungarian Coalition and the Democratic Union of Slovakia to be a very realistic option. Kozlik does not think that an incident during talks with the president has ended the movement's chances of holding talks with political entities such as the Christian Democratic Movement, who reject ideas about changing the status of the president of the Slovak Republic. He described the above-mentioned incident as an event that might have been perceived as dramatic at the time but not beyond that place and time.

Kovac Regrets Meciar Failed To Attend Talks

LD0610122194 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 0600 GMT 6 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] We have already reported that President Michal Kovac went on a brief one-day visit to Strasbourg yesterday. [passage omitted]

Correspondent Igor Skocek, who was in the presidential journalistic entourage, is now in the studio. Good morning Igor, what news from Strasbourg do you have?

[Skocek] [Passage omitted] Michal Kovac, speaking at the news conference given shortly after his speech in the Council of Europe, told Slovak journalists he was not going to resign from the presidential post because he did not have any serious reason for doing so. Just as I have to come to terms with Mr. Meciar, so Mr. Meciar will have to come to terms with me, Michal Kovac said, and went on to say:

[Begin Kovac recording] Indeed, I very much regret the first step or, rather, the way in which we entered the postelection period. My impression was that the majority of political parties genuinely hoped to be contacted by the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] and that honest talks would be conducted. I thought the HZDS chairman would attend the meeting, but the decision they made was not just the stand they adopted vis-a-vis the president. It was, in fact, a stand they adopted toward their partners who were there because other parties were represented by their chairmen.

The meeting was not held because of me. The reason for holding the meeting was that I had to tell them that the political entity that won the greatest support should undertake the largest responsibility, and that is why I was prepared to entrust to this movement the task of forming a coalition government.

Unforfunately, you know what happened. It is regrettable, and I would like to rise above all this and would like to hope that this is not a step that indicates some trend in this direction because that would, indeed, be unfortunate and would completely contradict what the HZDS representatives put to citizens during the election campaign. They promised peace and stability. They promised no confrontation or discord, that we should simply accommodate each other so that we could begin true cooperation.

At the moment, I personally have my doubts. Although I am personally able to accept it, I am not sure it has not hampered the talks with other representatives. [end recording]

Kovac Explains Moves To Calm Political Situation

LD0610175894 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1500 GMT 6 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Our collaborator in Slovakia, Renata Havranova, editor of the PRACE daily, reports from Bratislava on postelection developments in Slovakia.

[Havranova] [Passage omitted] Vladimir Meciar, chairman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], and Pavel Delinga, chairman of the Farmers' Party of Slovakia [RSS], have warned the Slovak president that his moves to ask the parties to conduct consultations exceed the constitutional rights vested in the presidential office, and the president's attempts to convince voters not to vote for the HZDS do not guarantee that an objective agreement on a coalition will be reached.

President Michal Kovac reacted to this at today's meeting with citizens in eastern Slovakia, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Carpathian Dukla operation [World War II battle]. He said that it is the president's duty to take steps that were not provided for in the Constitution but that will contribute to calming the political situation and to helping cooperation. He also said that he does not believe in HZDS voters voting at the same time for the president's withdrawal from his presidential office. He appealed to citizens not to support the enmity that has appeared because of the politicians and to realize that they did not cast their vote for the parties in order for the political battles to continue.

According to Prime Minister Jozef Moravcik, as long as the HZDS is convinced that it should reject the policy of casting doubts on the head of state, there is nothing to prevent the formation of a broad coalition. [passage omitted]

The Hungarian coalition has stated that it will not make any demands in this situation. On the contrary, it wants to help in calming the situation. However, Laszlo Nagy, chairman of the Hungarian Civic Party [MOS], said that

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he believes a scenario exists in the HZDS corridors of power to destabilize Slovakia.

HZDS, KDS Discuss Formation of Government

LD0610192294 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 6 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Delegations of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] and the Slovak Peasant Party [RSS] coalition met this afternoon with the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] to discuss the formation of a coalition government. The winning coalition was represented by Olga Keltosova and Augustin Marian Huska, deputy chairpersons of the HZDS. The KDH was represented by deputy chairmen Ivan Simko, Mikulas Dzurinda, and Frantisek Miklosko. The meeting was also attended by Vladimir Palko.

The official statement says that both sides came to the conclusion that it is in the interest of Slovakia to form a government enjoying support that will guarantee stable executive and legislative power. Representatives of the HZDS and the KDH also assessed points where their views, as expressed in their election manifestos, are similar. At the end of the meeting, our collegue Katarina Velicka asked HZDS deputy chairwoman Olga Keltosova to come to the microphone. She started by asking Keltosova's view on which points the election positions of the HZDS and the KDH coincide.

[Begin recording] [Keltosova] We agreed in that we stated clearly what are the manifesto points on which we hold identical views, and we also made clear to each other where we differ. This is the first point. Second, we agreed that the interests of political stability in parliament and government over the next four years will be served by our meeting again. We think that our policies in the social, economic, and privatization fields are not so different as to make it not worth our while to meet again. [passage omitted] The positive thing about today's meeting lies in the fact that we have not closed the door to further negotiations and that we want to meet again.

[Velicka] I want to return to what the greatest point of difference between you is.

[Keltosova] It is the person or the role of president. The KDH holds its opinion and so do we. However, after joint talks, our stances, although distant, have in my opinion a certain rational basis. When we put across our philosophy, the philosophy of danger emanating from the formation of the second center of power, in general, when we pointed to similar examples in the history of European parliamentary democracies, we thought—and this, after all, was also reflected in the final statement—that, when we meet again, it will be worth talking not about the person of the president but rather about our other points of difference that still exist and that I am not going to mention at this stage. [passage omitted]

[Velicka] Are you clear about whom you will definitely exclude from the coalition?

[Keltosova] Personally, I am definitely excluding the Democratic Union [DU]. [end recording]

Government Without HZDS Unacceptable to SNS

LD0610203794 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 6 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Slovak National Party [SNS] officials held talks with the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] in Bratislava today. The Press Agency of the Slovak Republic later issued a report, according to which, after the talks, SNS Chairman Jan Slota said, among other things: I cannot imagine a government without the HZDS; we will not join a government without the HZDS.

According to TA SR, SNS Chairman Jan Slota ruled out the possibility of cooperation with either the Hungarian Coalition or the Democratic Union of Slovakia. Asked about his view on the development of talks on forming a government, Slota said he expected that, in the future, differences would become more apparent in the Joint Choice coalition—above all, in the Party of the Democratic Left—because, I quote, it would be a pity if the pronational forces within its ranks were drawn into an antinational group.

Any future steps to be taken by the HZDS, the Farmers' Party of Slovakia, and the Slovak National Party will be discussed by them. Every decision must be approved by all three political entities, the TASR reports continues.

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Foreign Minister Comments on Consulate in Romania

LD0610220494 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1830 GMT 6 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer] At the HDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] press briefing this morning, Gyorgy Csoti, deputy chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Hungarian National Assembly, accused the government of constantly chipping away at the country's international credibility. He criticized Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs for having orally accepted as a possibility the opening of a Hungarian consulate in Timisoara, instead of the Cluj- Napoca one that was closed years ago by the Romanian authorities. The HDF politician recalled that three years ago the Romanian government named Tirgu Mures as the possible location of a would-be Hungarian consulate, which would be much more suitable as a second- best solution.

[Begin unidentified person recording] Anybody looking at the map of Romania to see where the majority of the Hungarians live in Transylvania, focussing on the Szeklerland for example, would immediately say that Hungarian tourists from Hungary would go where they have relatives, friends—in Tirgu Mures, Miercurea Ciuc, Harghita, in other words. After all, Bucharest is nearer to the Szeklerland than Timisoara, so should a Hungarian tourist get into trouble he would go the Hungarian Embassy in Bucharest. [end recording]

[Announcer] Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs is in the studio. It is true that relatively few Hungarian tourists visit Timisoara, and a future Hungarian consulate would also have to deal with the affairs of the Romanian citizens who visit here. Is it not possible that Gyorgy Csoti is right?

[Kovacs] Our point of departure is that during the early September negotiations in Budapest with Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu, it became clear that the Romanian Government showed willingness neither to reopen the Hungarian consulate in Cluj-Napoca nor to create a new consulate in Tirgu Mures.

In this situation the Hungarian Government can choose either to carry on insisting on Cluj-Napoca or Tirgu Mures for years—the previous government was good at this by the way—or try to break the deadlock and select another location. It is in the spirit of this second option that the idea of Timisoara was raised. We too, are familiar with the map, we too, know that it is far from Szeklerland and relatively few Hungarians live in Timis County. However, we think that a consulate must deal not only with the affairs of visiting Hungarian citizens, but also with encouraging economic and other relations, and for this latter task Timisoara is an equally good location. By the way, it is not yet a final solution, it is only one possibility, we have not even started negotiations about it. [passage omitted]

Leader Views FIDESZ Role in Opposition

AU0510210994 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 1 Oct 94 p 4

[Interview with Jozsef Szajer, parliamentary group leader of the Federation of Young Democrats, by Rita Csik; place and date not given: "The Opposition Role Is Not Disintegrating the FIDESZ"]

[FBIS Translated Text] For the deputies of the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ], it is not a problem to be together in opposition with a prime minister whom they were sharply criticizing even a few months ago, parliamentary group leader Jozsef Szajer told NEPSZAVA. According to Szajer, who recently resigned as a deputy chairman of the FIDESZ, in the new parliamentary power structure the opposition can at last act as a real opposition.

[Csik] At the FIDESZ's renewal of officers in the summer, you received the third largest number of votes among the deputy chairmen. However, you resigned your position a few days ago. Why?

[Szajer] Not for political reasons. I believe that the party's executive committee should have as many active people as possible. My resignation allows me to concentrate fully on the parliamentary group's work. Now that I am not a deputy chairman, I mainly represent the parliamentary group's interests and special viewpoints during our consultations in the executive committee. This is a clearer situation than having also to think in a deputy chairman's position.

[Csik] The FIDESZ is in its second opposition cycle in Parliament. Is the current opposition role different from the one we were used to in the previous cycle?

[Szajer] The opposition is weaker now than in the previous period. At the same time, during the Antall government the opposition parties did not cooperate with each other. Regular consultations between the FIDESZ and the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] were only started in the period preceding the elections. The government parties have a different attitude toward the current, weaker opposition, precisely because of its weakness. As a matter of fact, we are not needed even when laws requiring two-thirds majority are amended. The previous government always had to consult with the opposition in such cases. The law amendments did not depend on the ideas and goodwill of the government parties. Our position changed in the sense that the possibility of asserting our interests and criticizing the government has become limited because of the significant government majority.

[Csik] What possibilities do the government parties have and what are the opposition's "limited" chances?

[Szajer] The government parties can change everything, even without the opposition. Nothing can force them to

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reach a consensus. They can simply say that the opposition is obstructing and this is the reason an agreement is not reached. At the most, they can feel politically uncomfortable if a consensus is not reached with the opposition on an important issue. This became obvious during the debate on the local government bill. The opposition's chances now, as in the past, consist of being able to air their views. It is not unique that we cannot have a say in the actual decisions. The opposition in England is in a similar position, too. Now we are in a real opposition role. We continuously monitor the government's activities, and find the facts that are of public interest but which they want to hide behind their words.

[Csik] The FIDESZ is the party longest in opposition. How long is it possible to carry on in politics this way without eroding the party?

[Szajer] The FIDESZ has important positions in local governments. In this sense, we are not a party that is completely out of power because the local governments are also a form of government. Citizens have been able to see what it is like to live in a town led by a FIDESZ-member mayor. In my view, the activities of the FIDESZ mayors also prove that our party is suitable for government. I do not believe that a lasting opposition role in itself has to lead to the party's erosion. In my view, we can actually learn from the failures. The fact that the FIDESZ resisted the temptation of forming a closer alliance with the Socialists might be a serious political capital for us in the future. We acted according to our principles. We criticized the Antall government and also criticize the current one on professional grounds.

[Csik] How does it feel to be together and even work together with ministers whom the FIDESZ criticized rather severely in the past?

[Szajer] We do not perceive politics on a personal level. When criticizing the government, we are not referring to the actual people in it. Except, of course, when the given minister's actions show obvious incompetence. As an opposition party, we exercise the constitutional task of controlling the government. We are on speaking terms with the current government parties. However, our interests are mostly in common with the opposition parties, even if we previously criticized them. This is the logic of parliaments.

Free Democrat Kis Views Coalition Affairs

AU0610084094 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 1 Oct 94 p 19

[Interview with Janos Kis, member of the Alliance of Free Democrats, by Attila Zsoldos; place and date not given: "A Right Wing Suitable As Negotiating Partner Is in Our Interest—Janos Kis on Coalition, the Government's Room for Maneuver, and the Debate on Assessing the Past"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Zsoldos] The coalition is based on a balanced partnership of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] and the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ]. However, is the coalition agreement sufficient guarantee for maintaining the partnership on the long run, even in tense situations between the SZDSZ and the MSZP, which is twice as big?

[Kis] Conflict is natural: This shows that independent partners are governing together. It would be problem if either partner felt that it was not really interested in maintaining the coalition. In my view, this is not a serious danger. It is true that the MSZP itself has an absolute majority. Although the 54 percent is a lot, perhaps too much for one party to have, but for a government in Hungary today it is too little. We saw how the Hungarian Democratic Forum's [MDF] parliamentary group withered under the pressures of governing and this withering is probably also threatening the MSZP. Therefore, if the Socialists want to have a firm government, then in exchange for stabilizing the government's position, they must relinquish the 54 percent that they might reach through sheer muscle. The coalition will be maintained as long as they bear this in mind.

[Zsoldos] How dangerous is it for the coalition that, according to surveys, a large cross-section of MSZP voters yearn for the security of the late Kadar era and advocate explicitely anti- market views when the government has committed itself to a strictly restrictive economic policy?

[Kis] What the MSZP voters want is one think, and what they are willing to accept as the painful but unavoidable cost of future prosperity is another. Hungarian voters are generally aware that the past cannot be brought back and we can only get out of the crisis if we look ahead. They do not like the sharp competition situations of the market economy but, in my view, they do not expect the MSZP to bring back Gyorgy Lazar [premier in late Kadar era]. In other words, the government does have room to maneuver. The question is whether it can take advantage of it. This requires a lot of consistency: All participants in the economy must know what to expect and how much the government can yield. From this point of view, giving up the expensive dream of the world exposition was an exemplary decision because the government had the strength to say that it does not have tens of billions of forints to spare to implement the expo, and it had the strength to take responsibility for its decision. The vast majority of people understand such actions and respect the government for them, even if they do not necessarily like the decision. The problems start when the government cannot be respected because it is not united enough to back its own program. However, at the moment, this is mostly an internal Socialist problem, rather than an SZDSZ-MSZP problem. Of course, if the MSZP is unable to overcome the dispute over the economic policy then this may sooner or later also disturb relations between the two parties. [passage omitted]

[Zsoldos] According to the opposition parties, personnel changes in the state apparatus have resulted in the return

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of the former cadres. In its election campaign, the SZDSZ argued that it can prevent the nomenklatura from gaining ground.

[Kis] According to the MDF's internal opposition, the former government also consolidated the power of the nomenklatura and this is actually true in a certain sense. The question is what to do with this phenomenon. It must be clearly seen that, rather than a solely political problem, this is mainly a sociological problem. The question is the proportion between the potential elites and the public administration positions waiting to be filled, in other words, how many candidates exist for a public administration position and what proportion of them were not in any middle level positions before 1990. According to my estimate, this proportion is not very high. Therefore, in some cases, it is difficult to raise objections against people coming into positions again. However, the total of the many individual cases is very disturbing. What can be done? First of all, they must not allow the speed of personnel changes to increase and to endanger the stability of state administration. It must be made clear when the government has finished settling in and, following this, further replacements must only be made in exceptional cases. It is desirable that this occur as soon as possible. Secondly, incompatibility factors must strictly be examined. They must not approve high positions for people linked to well-identified interest groups. [passage omitted]

[Zsoldos] According to Istvan Eorsi [not further specified], we are witnessing the "moral and mental rehabilitation of the Kadar era." At the same time, Socialist intellectuals accuse the Free Democrats of still being preoccupied with the past. What are your views on this?

[Kis] A powerful historical image is part of the identity of both parties, and these images have major differences. The MSZP history says that something happened in October 1956, then something also happened in November and these are not nice to remember but, fortunately, consolidation followed, power and society made peace with each other and, on the basis of conciliation, an organic development—unique in the Soviet world system—began that prepared us for the transition to the market economy and democracy. For this reason, the Socialists are the country's natural leading force. It is true that time was jolted in 1989-1990 and four horrible years followed but, due to the will of the voters, all is well now and we can resume business at the point where progress was halted. According to the SZDSZ view of history, a democratic revolution took place in Hungary in 1956, it was suppressed bloodily, and the circumstances of the suppression and the ensuing reprisal defined the limits of the regime's ability to progress. By the mid-1980's, the country reached these limits, the implicit bargain between the power and society was no longer tenable—this is the reason the democratic opposition emerged and the increasingly independent social movements evolved in the expanding field of force between the party state and the opposition. Therefore, the difference is that the Socialists would like to see a straight connection between Kadar's reform policy and the new democracy, while the Free Democrats believe it important to confront all that was neither morally nor politically acceptable in the Kadar regime. The differences between the two attitudes cannot be spirited away by making a coalition, they must be discussed thoroughly. It is important to see whether the Free Democrats will recognize the truth of Eorsi's words, namely that the rehabilitation of the Kadar era is flooding public life, or whether they resist it. However, this debate must be conducted within the two parties, the media, and other intellectual forums, rather than at government sessions. [passage omitted]

MSZP's Geczi Views Trends Within Party

AU0610090594 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 5 Oct 94 pp 1,6

[Interview with Jozsef Geczi, Hungarian Socialist Party Executive Committee member, by "moldovanyi"; place and date not given: "The Differences of Views Have To Be Settled—Where Are the MSZP's Fault Lines?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Socialists are electing a new party leadership at their congress this coming weekend, where the party's statute will also be modified. Parliamentary Deputy Jozsef Geczi, member of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] executive committee, gave an interview to MAGYAR NEMZET on the political elite that will determine the congress and the political trends within the MSZP.

[Geczi] The MSZP does not have a grassroots social base partly because the position of employees is rather weak—they are happy to have jobs. The social-democratic intelligentsia that would be able to draw up a left-wing strategy mostly fell apart after World War II. This is one of the reasons why the few thousand activists and political elite who are trying to operate the party have a great responsibility; they are the ones who are trying to find out with what kind of policy they can satisfy the potential base.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Who can be seen as the MSZP's political elite?

[Geczi] The Executive Committee, the National Committee, the parliamentary group, the local government deputies, and the few thousands of Socialists who supported the change of regime and expelled the neo-stalinists. The question is whether this group will be enlarged or whether, as a result of the excessive pragmatism and concentration of power, our base will decrease.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Has cooperation been formed between the government, the Socialist parliamentary group, and the Executive Committee?

[Geczi] We were unprepared for government because the party's internal integration was not satisfactory. In addition to our own mistakes, the lack of an organized base was the reason for this.

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[MAGYAR NEMZET] What does "internal integration" mean in this context?

[Geczi] The party's various trends coexisted in some kind of truce; they were held together by the opposition role, the wild attacks of our opponents, and by the representation of sober thinking.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Has the time come to clear up the differences of views within the party or is the governmental responsibility a sufficient cohesive force?

[Geczi] In my view, we did not put the differences aside in the past, either. We had intense debates at the National Committee meetings with Matyas Szuros's group, for example, or when Gyula Horn [party chairman, now also prime minister] was being attacked regarding the provision of justice for past crimes. However, these disputes were not publicized and some kind of consensus was always reached. We had to learn from the mistake of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF]: Jozsef Antall, whom I respected very much, ensured the ability to govern through his pragmatism, but this was at the cost of creating an artificial peace within his party. This resulted in the national liberals leaving them, and their annihilation is a huge loss for the country. If the Socialists postponed their internal debates until after 1998, they could easily meet to the same fate as the Slovak democratic left wing did last weekend. In my view, it is harmful that the left-wing urban intelligentsia does not have any representation in Parliament.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Are they part of the party leadership?

[Geczi] They are only part of the National Committee. They have often pushed themselves to the peripheries due to their neo- left-wing traits and they do not have political positions, which is a problem. The social democratic group of Budapest was lost the same way, partly because of the fate of the social democratic party, or we could say that Rezso Nyers [former economic reform politician] does not have a successor in the middle-aged generation.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] From what you are saying, it seems to me that the parliamentary group is monolithic.

[Geczi] The MSZP has a group that professes left-wing values, but which is liberal in its social and economic views.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Who are the representatives of this group?

[Geczi] Laszlo Bekesi is the leading figure of this group that has a liberal economic philosophy. The group that calls itself social-liberal, previously social democratic, was formed around Ivan Vitanyi, and here we could perhaps mention Zoltan Szabo, who was a member of the Budapest executive committee and is a parliamentary deputy at the moment. A pure liberal perception can be seen here, but a social-liberal range of thought is also present, which was rigidly interpreted in such a way that social democracy can only come after the height of capitalism. In reality, social elements have to permeate the process of bourgeois and capitalist transformation. For representatives of the other extreme, being left wing only means that we have to care for the needy.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Do other groups also exist in the MSZP?

[Geczi] Most of the artificial feuds arose around the so-called populist wing. This movement was not set up on a united basis, it includes many different personalities. Matyas Szuros, who occasionally describes himself as the leader of the populist left wing, is the biggest eyesore for the liberals. In my view, Szuros is rather a nationally thinking politician with left-wing sentiments. In the MSZP, the populist line is mingled with the provincial Socialist deputies who arose during the time of the reform circles and represent a modern democratic platform using both traditional Hungarian social democracy and Western liberal models. We should not deny, either, that we also have a neo-reform communist group whose members have not settled their relationship with the past 40 years. We also have a pragmatic group that perceives social democracy as a technique for governing.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Who are the leading personalities of the pragmatic group?

[Geczi] Rather than giving a direct answer, I would like to experiment with another division. One side consists of people who operated as the internal opposition already before the change of the regime, they had rejected the value system of the old regime and were thinking in terms of a renewed left wing. The other side has the technocrats who have not thoroughly reexamined the old ideology, they were simply forced into the new situation by the new reality. Many of them had formerly been active in the Hungarian Communist Youth League [KISZ] and they appear to be trying out reform-KISZ methods from time to time.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Whom would you mention from this group?

[Geczi] Executive Deputy Chairman Imre Szekeres admitted that he represents the pragmatic line, and perhaps some members of the Leftist Youth Association can also be listed here. Young people in their twenties are turning into career politicians because they can see that, at the moment, it is easy to rise high in the MSZP. At the same time, naturally, rather than the existence of the trends, the problem is that certain groups find certain situations favorable for getting rid of those who advocate different values, too.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] The points of conflict cannot be seen from the outside.

[Geczi] The kind of economic policy we should pursue—on which a dialogue of deaf people was conducted in the

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party for years—is a basic point of conflict. It was obvious that the country's situation could not be improved without a monetarist economic policy. Many people tried to resist this, even Horn who, last summer, wrote a letter to the electors and this confronted him with Laszlo Bekesi. The opponents of monetarism are worried that an elite consisting of 20 to 30 percent of society would emerge, together with a significant impoverished strata. The supporters of monetarism believe that the poor people can be lifted up once the modern economy is established. Many people assume that the fault line is between the Alliance of Free Democrats and the MSZP but this is not so.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Is there a fault line in the MSZP?

[Geczi] There is a fault line between the long-term political and the technocratic ways of thinking. The modernization program can easily become narrowed down to the strengthening of certain interest groups if the program thinks in terms of narrow economic processes rather than the whole society. Pure pragmatism, however modern it is, can easily become captive to unknown forces. If this coalition fails in Hungary, a Meciar-type shapeless populism might emerge in Hungary, or an era of "Forza Ungharese" [in Italian, referring to Forza Italia in Italy] that uses the slogan of decency.

Workers' Party Officials Preview Congress

AU0610201594 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 6 Oct 94 p 6

[Interview with Deputy Chairman Sandor Nyiro and Chairman Gyula Thurmer of the Workers' Party by Lajos Pogonyi; place and date not given: "The Workers' Party Is Electing a Chairman at Its Congress—The Two Candidates for the Most Important Position Spoke About Ways of Progress"]

[FBIS Translated Text]*What are you expecting from the congress, in what way should the Workers' Party renew itself, and in what respects is one of the candidates for chairman—Deputy Chairman Sandor Nyiro or Chairman Gyula Thurmer—better than the other? Our interviews were held before the Workers' Party's 16th Congress, which is to begin on 8 October.*

Sandor Nyiro: Decency Is the Most Important

[Pogonyi] What are you expecting from the congress?

[Nyior] First of all, the renewal of the party. I hope that the internal tensions that have accumulated over the years will ease off.

[Pogonyi] In your view, what caused these internal tensions?

[Nyiro] Basically, the fact that the party did not get into Parliament. The party's methods must be made more democratic.

[Pogonyi] Have they not been democratic?

[Nyiro] We have operated democratically in the past, but we have to change many things. In my view, whether the party's leadership changes in a presidential or a collective and democratic direction will be the main question at the congress.

[Pogonyi] Which direction applies at the moment?

[Nyiro] The events of the past months showed that a presidential leadership has prevailed.

[Pogonyi] Do you mean that the Workers' Party has had a one- man leadership?

[Nyiro] I would not say this, but the chairman has exerted a strong influence on the mid-organizations. We have to renew ourselves from the local organizations to the party leadership. We have to open up toward the social strata and classes that we want to represent.

[Pogonyi] Whom do you wish to represent?

[Nyiro] Mainly those living on wages and salaries.

[Pogonyi] Your big rival, the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], is doing the same....

[Nyiro] Yes, they are our competitors, as was shown by the May elections. However, the issue is somewhat more complicated. The MSZP is progressing toward capitalism. We are not saying that socialism can be established, but we definitely want a social formation that is more democratic than capitalism.

[Pogonyi] Two of you are running for chairman. What are you better at than Thurmer?

[Nyiro] Good question. I might be clever enough to ask for the opinion of others and to listen to them.

[Pogonyi] Does Thurmer not do this?

[Nyiro] I did not say that. When someone spends several years in a position, he must not think that he is unerring and infallible, and carries the philosophers' stone in his pocket. In the Workers' Party—within a multiparty system—when selecting the leaders, it cannot be a criterion how many languages a person speaks or how many diplomas he has. Human decency is the basic requirement.

[Pogonyi] To which parties did you send invitations?

[Nyiro] The MSZP, the Social Democratic Party of Hungary, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, the Communist Workers' Party, and several left-wing organizations and cultural magazines. We also invited the left-wing workers' platform of the National Federation of Hungarian Trade Unions.

Gyula Thurmer: We Need To Modernize

[Pogonyi] How will this congress be different from previous ones?

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[Thurmer] I expect the congress to give political encouragement to the members of the Workers' Party. I hope that the congress's personnel and political decisions will help the party's modernization.

[Pogonyi] Is it true that tension can be felt in the party?

[Thurmer] There is a general tension in the party because the Workers' Party, although it did not suffer an ignominious defeat, did not achieve one of its main goals, namely it did not get into Parliament. Everyone has to take stock at such times. Determining our place on the political spectrum in relation to the victorious MSZP, which formed the government after the elections, is another source for debate. Yet another debate affects certain sections, certain intellectual groups, rather than the whole party. Some party leaders have also become part of this.

[Pogonyi] Whom do you mean?

[Thurmer] Mainly Deputy Chairman Sandor Nyiro, who is also running for chairman.

[Pogonyi] Tell me what the real difference is between the two of you.

[Thurmer] We have conceptual differences. The congress will have to choose between the two concepts. It will have to decide between the conservative and the modernizing attitudes.

[Pogonyi] Who is the conservative and who is the modernizer?

[Thurmer] I see myself as a supporter of modernization, although I know that verbally everyone supports modernization.

[Pogonyi] What has to be renewed?

[Thurmer] First of all, our image. I find it important that we rejuvenate the party. We are in competition in this respect, too. If we do not give people leading positions and challenging tasks, then other parties could easily lure them away. On the other hand, the supporters of the other line say that rejuvenation in itself is something impossible, that this slogan cannot be implemented. In my view, this is not true and everything depends on it. Our party documents might be perfect but we cannot be attractive without young leaders.

[Pogonyi] In your view, what attracts young people to the Workers' Party?

[Thurmer] First of all, that we represent true community interests. We say that young people should be able to have education, jobs, and to start families. All these are important because individualism has become the absolute measure in today's society. Young people desire solidarity.

[Pogonyi] Other parties are saying the same....

[Thurmer] Yes, at election time.

[Pogonyi] You recently said that the style of the Workers' Party is boring.

[Thurmer] We must be colorful, even if we have to accept that what we say or write is not perfect. The Marxist Youth Federation wrote a whole page in the FREEDOM newspaper. It has many thousands of members. They are independent of us but we agree on many political issues.

[Pogonyi] What are you better at than Nyiro?

[Thurmer] For example, I do not say that the party does not have democracy just because my opinion is in the minority. We have to strive for a new type of coexistence, for socialism. We know that this will not happen overnight. Our united concept to which I have contributed a great deal is more than what Nyiro has so far shown us.

[Pogonyi] In your view, how democratic is the party's leadership and to what extent does democratic centralism prevail? To what extent does a one-man leadership prevail?

[Thurmer] Decisions are made after democratic debates by democratically elected bodies. Naturally, we also have centralist elements in our operations. Party democracy does not mean that we continue to have endless debates after a decision is made. Nyiro usually mentions the example of the bourgeois parties. Well, I can say that Peter Tolgyessy was left in the minority at the 1992 convention of the Alliance of Free Democrats and Ivan Peto became the chairman. As far as I know, Tolgyessy was not elected deputy chairman.

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Foreign Minister on EU, NATO Membership

BR0610152494 Amsterdam DE VOLKSKRANT in Dutch 6 Oct 94 p 4

[Interview with Polish Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski by Anet Bleich in Amsterdam; date not given: "Minister Wants To Establish Poland in Europe"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Poland's passionate yearnings to be recognized by other peoples as an equal fellow European is a leitmotiv running through the statements of Polish Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski. "That is why relations with the Netherlands are also so solid. We feel that the people of the Netherlands views Poland as part of Europe, perhaps as a country on the border of Europe, but still in Europe."

The Polish minister, a sturdy man with graying hair, occupies a special position within his government. He does not belong to the former Communist Party or to Prime Minister Pawlak's Polish Peasant Party but was appointed by Lech Walesa to one of the three "quality seats" during the government formation process. As he himself says, he is a "presidential nominee." Nevertheless, at first glance, he seems the complete opposite of Lech Walesa, in whose company he is making a three-day visit to the Netherlands. There is no trace in Olechowski's precise statements of the romantic pathos that has such an influence on Walesa's actions.

Minister Olechowski is hoping for a clear deadline for the fervently coveted membership in the European Union (EU). He is thinking of the year 2000. "First, the EU has to make a decision about its own structures in 1996. Then there will still be room to negotiate the arrangements for our accession, and the matter can subsequently be completed."

As far as NATO membership is concerned, however, Olechowski does not wish to give any dates. According to him, that will come soon enough, as he put it. "It is a question of political will. To do this, we do not need to make any radical adjustments, as must happen for the EU in the area of the economy. I can see that serious debate and consultation has now begun in NATO regarding the membership of Poland and other Central European countries. I am expecting a nice surprise."

[Bleich] Does Russia still have a lot of objections?

[Olechowski] We must not let anyone impress upon us the idea that NATO has aggressive intentions vis-a-vis Russia or that enlargement to include Poland would make NATO aggressive. On the contrary, on the basis of its history, Poland is the very last country in the world that would want to be the front line in a bloc having aggressive intentions vis-a-vis Russia. As a member of NATO, Poland would try to build bridges, not wage war.

[Bleich] So why is it so difficult to convince the Russians of this, including reasonable Russians?

[Olechowski] I am not so sure that we have tried. We see NATO as a steadily growing alliance of countries having similar values and goals that want to make joint efforts at defense. Against whom? At the end of the day, against no one, only to maintain peace and security in the area covered by the treaty.

[Bleich] What if the Russians then say that they want to join, too?

[Olechowski] Then, of course, we would say: At the end of the day, you will join, too. There is nothing wrong with the idea of a security community stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok. There is a lot wrong with an EU over such an enormous area because then there would be very little integration. But listen: It is well known that Poland is actively lobbying to get Russia into the G-7 and is working toward a strategic partnership between NATO and Russia. We have no objection at all to Russia's participating in a collective security system, the core of which would be NATO. [end Olechowski]

The Polish minister also has a subtle position on Russian aspirations regarding the so-called near abroad. According to him, the art lies in "getting the noise out of the message." In Russia, there are naturally people pushing for enforced reintegration of the former Soviet republics. On the other hand, I would have no objection to integration or reintegration, provided it is done democratically, with the approval of both sides. It is of crucial importance to see whether it is a vassal-like relationship or simply a matter of strengthening former economic and cultural ties.

In practice, it is a mixed picture. Russia conducted itself quite correctly vis-a-vis the Baltic states and Ukraine when they had problems domestically with the Russians on the Crimea. However, some questions could be raised about how Russia operates in the Caucasus, with regard to Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.

[Bleich] This week, in interviews with LE MONDE and THE INDEPENDENT, among others, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl stressed the importance of the German-Russian friendship and said that it is not aimed at anyone. Does this satisfy you completely?

[Olechowski] We have unlimited confidence in a Germany that is democratic and European. As long as those two conditions are met, we are not worried. We could not imagine a foreign minister from a Germany that is an EU member ever concluding a treaty comparable to the pact between Von Ribbentrop and Molotov in 1939. As you know, that pact carved up Poland between German and Russia.

Because we are pleased to see a democratic Germany at the heart of the EU, we are also great supporters of deepening European integration. We do not see the often-mentioned contradiction between enlargement and deepening. Poland wants to join an EU that is as solidly integrated as possible.

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Former U.S. security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski gave the Germans some interesting advice: If they want to play a leading role in Europe in an acceptable way, they should create solid links to France and Poland. This triangle—I would rather not call it an axis—could have a stabilizing effect in the EU.

Half of Warsaw Against Sending Troops to Haiti

WS0610104094 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 6 Oct 94 p 3

[Unattributed report: "RUN Poll; Do Not Go to Haiti"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Should Poland send gendarmes to Haiti?

	Percent
No	50
Yes	31
No Opinion	19
Men: Yes	40
Men: No	50
Women: Yes	25
Women: No	55

Asked by the RUN [expansion unknown] center, as many as 50 percent of Warsaw inhabitants said that "Polish Army units should not be dispatched to Haiti."

Fewer than one-third of respondents were in favor of sending our troops there—more men (39 percent) than women (25 percent), more people with higher education (35 percent) than people with elementary education (18 percent).

No one has yet conducted a nationwide survey of Poles' attitudes toward our troops' participation in the UN mission in Haiti.

The differences revealed by the RUN study between the groups with various levels of education suggest that this negative attitude may be even more widespread in Poland than in Warsaw.

* * *

The poll was conducted between 1 and 3 October on a representative sample of Warsaw inhabitants over age 15.

Poll Tracks Support for Parties, Politicians

WS0510110094 Poznan WPROST in Polish 2 Oct 94 pp 19-21

[Article by Boguslaw Mazur: "Public Opinion One Year Before the Election"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *"Strategy for Poland"—yes or no? Is it good or bad, argue politicians, primarily among themselves, while half of all Poles do not even know it exists.*

Only one Pole in 10 admits being acquainted with basic provisions of the document that is to determine the course of economic development for the next few years. One cannot expect every citizen to meticulously study the "Strategy for Poland," but the fact that it is unrecognized on such a large scale should be unsettling to coalition politicians. Even the majority of people with higher education do not know any details of its provisions. This points to the lack of a coordinated information policy on the part of the government, which could raise interest in this document. The intentional abandonment of an information policy does not serve the government; Deputy Prime Minister Grzegorz Kolodko, the author of "Strategy"; or politicians as a whole. It does, however, benefit Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak and his party, whose position is strengthening. It is becoming increasingly obvious that the policy of the head of government and even his unusual conduct have allowed him to attract an electorate that closely resembles that of Stanislaw Tyminski. Criticizing his predecessors for "haste" in carrying out reforms, Pawlak has secured the support of 40 percent of people expressing their dissatisfaction with the course of change that has evolved in Poland over the past five years (36 percent of respondents declared opposite opinions).

Expressing his distrust in foreign capital, he gained the support of as much as 65 percent of citizens, who believe that we can solve our economic problems on our own, without Western aid. This way of thinking is most popular in rural communities and small towns, among people with poor education, who emphasize that their financial conditions have worsened. The "Strategy" is useless for gaining the support of this electorate.

Poles have far more clear-cut views on attitudes and issues relating to social welfare. As many as two-thirds of respondents approached by the "Pentor" Institute for Opinion Polls and Market Analysis claim that the new constitution should oblige the state to provide every citizen with a job and social welfare. Expectancy that such a provision will be included in the new constitution is psychologically viable but points to a deeply rooted belief that the state is a very powerful institution that, for obscure reasons, refuses to bestow its favors upon the people. It has to be "placed with its back up against a wall," and jobs, as well as money for free health care, will abound. Politicians who want to turn the constitution into an expression of wishful thinking of unrealistic dreams can count on huge support. This is particularly visible in the case of "Solidarity," which has been gaining popularity. The union clearly benefited from the operation of gathering signatures in support of a constitutional draft containing guarantees of this kind.

If a referendum on abortion were conducted today, liberals would get the upper hand. Set opinions gave

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Barbara Labuda, a deputy from Freedom Union [UW], success. Her success is even more impressive when viewed against the fact that she does not fulfill any important state functions. This confirms an opinion by Wladyslaw Frasyniuk that an attempt to remove her from UW may have a negative impact on support for the party as a whole. Until recently, similarly to the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD], various political camps came together in UW. At present, it is threatened by a division similar to the one the right has undergone. As a result of "clipping wings," none of the recognized politicians from the Christian-democratic or nationalist right have gained sufficient support to enter parliament. They still have not made their way onto the list of the 20 most popular politicians.

A lack of acceptance is also suffered by rightist groups. Despite the fact that opinion polls also list the specific parties that make up the new rightist blocs (such as "Alliance for Poland-Center Accord, Christian-National Union, Peasant Accord, Conservative Coalition, Movement for the Republic"), they have very weak support. It seems that these parties do not have a stable or relatively large electorate. It will be interesting to see whether the situation will change if Tadeusz Mazowiecki's party moves toward the Christian-democratic camp.

No major changes have occurred as compared to opinion polls conducted two months ago, which is probably due to the summer holiday period, which was hot in terms of temperature but rather cool as to the pace of political events. Only Bronislaw Geremek, head of the UW parliamentary club, and Ewa Spychalska, chairman of the All-Polish Trade Unions Agreement, have lost public support. It seems that the popularity of Labor Minister Leszek Miller, who has protected disabled pensioners and senior citizens against methods according to which their pensions were to be revalorized, will be reflected in polls in the near future—provided, of course, he implements his own information policy. It is also interesting to see that the rising popularity of the Polish Peasant Party and Solidarity was not accompanied by an increase in the popularity of the prime minister or Marian Krzaklewski. Nevertheless, except for the top three politicians, there has been...a steadily growing tendency toward disapproval of politicians, which outpaces supporters of increasing their impact on political life. The approval rating (or rather the lack thereof) for the political class is minus 425 points [as published].

Polish society, clearly stating its views on distinct attitude-related problems and expecting large-scale social security, is not very different from that of other nations, including those in the West. The differences lie in disproportions between expectations and considerations of how to meet them, if they can be met at all. The presidential campaign will most probably become an ideology-packed competition between populists closely following traditional political divisions. Polls indicate that only half of all Poles are convinced that the present parliament is legitimate enough to pass a new constitution. Were the political scene divided according to the criteria of five years ago, the 15 percent of society refusing the National Assembly this right could be joined by the one-third of those who would be undecided. A potential increase in people who believe that the Sejm and the Senate, although democratically elected, do not have a right to vote on a new constitution would undermine the institution of parliament itself.

In an election campaign so heavily overshadowed by ideology, the chances of Aleksander Kwasniewski, leader of the SLD, may become smaller, despite the fact that he is the most popular candidate for president. If, however, he met eye to eye with President Lech Walesa in the second round, old divisions would become particularly strong. In a confrontation with Waldemar Pawlak, the socioliberal, "European" Kwasniewski would have to confront, paradoxically, the socialist "electorate of the People's Republic," which Pawlak seems to represent. Moreover, both Walesa and a prime minister supporting state interventionism [etatysta] can count on support from the church.

One solution would be for the entire center-left to support Jacek Kuron, who remains the most popular politician in Poland. Even though he does not have as much support as a presidential candidate, it seems that he stands the strongest chance of defeating Walesa or Pawlak. Running in the election, he could also contribute to integrating the socioliberal communities. Far worse are the popularity ratings of potential rightist candidates: Hanna Suchocka, suggested by some UW activists, or Adam Strzembosz, first chairman of the Supreme Court. In this case, a lot would depend on the position of Waldemar Pawlak. His withdrawal from the campaign, in light of the lack of support for Jozef Zych, deputy speaker of the Sejm and head of the Chief Council of the Polish Peasant Party, could benefit the president. Although Lech Walesa is last on the list, if he captured some of the votes of rural communities and the right wing, he could get reelected. There are many more possible scenarios, especially if one considers that politicians as popular as Zbigniew Religa, head of the Nonparty Bloc in Support of Reforms, Leszek Balcerowicz, who has always had a group of faithful supporters, or, especially, Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski could run in the election. There is only—or still—one year left before the election.

"Strategy for Poland"

	Percent
I know it very well	1
I know parts of it	9
I have heard about it but do not know it	41
I have never heard of it	49

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Support for Presidential Candidates

	Percent
Aleksander Kwasniewski	20
Waldemar Pawlak	15
Andrzej Olechowski	9
Lech Walesa	8
Zbigniew Religa	7
Leszek Balcerowicz	7
Ewa Letowska	6
Jacek Kuron	6
Aleksander Malachowski	4
Leszek Moczulski	3
Hanna Suchocka	3
Jozef Zych	2
Adam Strzembosz	1
Other	9

Support for Political Parties

	Percent
Polish Peasant Party	27 (up 6)
Democratic Left Alliance	27
Freedom Union	14 (down 2)
Union of Labor	12 (up 1)
Solidarity	7 (up 4)
Nonparty Bloc in Support of Reforms	6
Confederation for an Independent Poland	4 (down 2)
Alliance for Poland	2
Other	1

Popularity of Politicians (in percent)

	Yes	No	Never Heard Of
Barbara Labuda	30	43	27
Tadeusz Mazowiecki	29	67	4 (down 3)
Marian Krzaklewski	28	53	19
Bronislaw Geremek	23	64	13 (down 6)
Leszek Miller	23	57	20 (up 1)
Ryszard Bugaj	22	48	30
Leszek Moczulski	22	69	9 (up 2)
Ewa Spychalska	22	43	35 (down 4)
Grzegorz Kolodko	21	42	37 (down 3)
Lech Walesa	21	78	1
Jacek Kuron	58	39	3
Waldemar Pawlak	52	44	4 (down 1)
Aleksander Kwasniewski	49	43	8
Andrzej Olechowski	39	40	21 (down 3)
Zbigniew Religa	38	47	15 (down 1)
Jozef Oleksy	37	47	16 (up 1)
Krzysztof Skubiszewski	35	48	17 (down 2)
Leszek Balcerowicz	33	59	8
Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz	33	56	11 (down 1)
Hanna Suchocka	32	63	5 (down 2)

Should abortion be allowed if the woman faces a difficult financial situation?

	Percent
Yes	55
No	24
Do not know	21

Should the Constitution oblige the state to provide jobs and social security for everyone?

	Percent
Yes	77
No	9
Do not know	14

Is the present parliament legitimate enough to pass a new constitution?

	Percent
Yes	49
No	15
Do not know	36

Poll Shows Lead for Democratic Left Alliance

MM0710075094 Bialystok GAZETA WSPOLCZESNA in Polish 29 Sep 94 p 2

[PAP-attributed report: "Who For the Sejm? Demoskop Asks, Respondents Tell"]

[FBIS Translated Text] If a Sejm election were to take place next week, it would be won by the Democratic Left Alliance (21 percent), which would outpace the Union of Freedom (19 percent) and the Polish Peasant Party (18 percent). These are the conclusions reached after the

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latest public opinion poll by Demoskop. The lowest popularity ratings were reported for Self-Defense [Samoobrona: a radical peasant group], the Conservative Party, and the Peasant-Christian Party (1 percent each).

Seventy-seven percent of those polled declared that they would take part in the election. Of those, 60 percent would cast their votes for a specific party, while 17 percent did not state any definite voting preferences. Twenty-three percent of respondents would not vote.

The lower places on the ranking list fell to the Union of Labor (9 percent), the Nonparty Bloc in Support of Reforms (7 percent), NSZZ Solidarity (6 percent), the Covenant for Poland (4 percent), and the Confederation for an Independent Poland and the Union for Real Politics (3 percent each).

Weekly Notes Solidarity Gaining Strength

WS0710084994 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 8 Oct 94 p 4

[Article by Jagienka Wilczak: "Solidarity Growing Stronger; Together, Old Friends"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The president's visit to the Sixth Congress of Solidarity ["S"] in Mielec can be regarded as the beginning of the election campaign. Walesa formulated its slogan in his innate strong language: "The left paw is too long; it gets in the way of our reforms." He suggested to the unionists a unification of forces and joint combat of the post-Solidarity camp against government inertia, the slowing of the reforms that threatens the country with the specter of another Polish People's Republic. The election is to be one of the stages of this combat.

Why did Walesa decide to stand before the delegates, even though his relations with "S" had been rather cool for a long time, and, since the congress in Zielona Gora (when Walesa took umbrage and did not come), had been simply bad, even hostile? Well, the president realizes that only support from the union and not from the sickly Nonparty Bloc in Support of Reforms can guarantee him an election success in the future. In Mielec, Chairman Marian Krzaklewski and the delegates expressed—in rather harsh words—their dissatisfaction with the economic, social, and political situation, as well as with the governing of the coalition. In a type of communique—a vote of no confidence for Prime Minister Pawlak and his government, passed in the form of a resolution and generally accepted—it was even recommended that the government stop its activity. Walesa added a threat that the time for joking was over. The union refused to lend Walesa support, guaranteed in a contract. Nonetheless, it did not turn down the extended hand. Even though the "S" bodies accuse the president of being inefficient, they do realize that today they need the president as much as he needs them. He has, after all, veto power and the right to launch a legislative initiative. If he likes, he can quickly use these instruments, in line with the union's expectations.

"S" is growing stronger. It is again attracting people who are dissatisfied with price hikes, with stopping mass privatization, with the fact that the promise of turning the state's wealth over to the people has not been kept. It is also attracting people who are critical of an attempt on the freedom of the press and the attempts to limit unions' rights. The improvement of the "S" position on the ranking list of political organizations is also a consequence of measures taken within the union. The presentation of a constitution draft and the successful campaign of collecting signatures under it have enlivened the "S" social movement. Krzaklewski is stressing, however, that the constitution is more important than the election of the new president because only the constitution can guarantee that political and economic transformation will be carried through.

Thus, predictions that the union will not survive until the next congress have turned out to be false. The fact that "S" is today internally stronger is proved by, among other things, the following: The congress in Mielec quickly managed to resolve the problem of the "rat" that was included in the agenda—the demand that Stasi files concerning people of the "S" structures be revealed to the delegates. The congress decided in a ballot that the 300-page copies of the files would be handed over to the heads of the regions at the end of the last session (the materials were not disseminated earlier to prevent them from being published by the press before they actually reach the interested people). However, Congress Spokesman Piotr Zak said that the documents do not contain any sensational information as yet unknown. According to Marian Krzaklewski, the unionists were the first to subject themselves to the self-file-checking process, and they had the moral right to demand insight into Gauck's documents. The wave of expectations was too great, so the arguments of the opponents on revealing the files, which, incidentally, were quite justified, could not prevail. In any event, the Stasi files did not cause as big a storm in the congress as many people expected.

Consolidation of the union is also proved by the fact that a resolution on the obligatory strike fund was eventually passed, which is indispensable in a professional trade union because it guarantees better results for employee protests in the future. I believe that this is a clear signal for the government that "S" is preparing a strike front and that it may soon start long protest actions.

It was expected that this congress would take a stand on the issue of establishing a political party by "S." However, it turns out that the unionists are not really eager to form a party, even though right-oriented organs insist on this, claiming that "S" is immersed in politics up to its ears. They say that the union is acting unprofessionally, at the level of plants, whereas this should be dealt with through leadership organs. According to Chairman Marian Krzaklewski, who strengthened his position at

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the congress (which also Lech Walesa could see and said: "Marian is so strong he may not feel recalled"), it is enough that the union has become a nonformalized social movement that attracts people with similar views on such issues as, for example, the constitution or the need to oppose postcommunism forces. Krzaklewski does not think "S" must establish a party in order to exert influence on developments in Poland, which was proved by the successful constitutional campaign. Incidentally, the collecting of signatures under the union's constitution draft is still going on, and Krzaklewski is hoping that the list of its supporters will increase by another several hundred thousand.

Now the question is how "S" will want to take advantage of its recent successes—whether it will once again decide that its best investment would be in Lech Walesa.

Former Minister on Conflict Over Military Powers

WS0710085494 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 6 Oct 94 p 2

[Interview with former Polish Defense Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz by Luiza Kowalska and Igor Zalewski; place and date not given: "The Generals' Action Was Caused by Walesa"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [ZYCIE WARSZAWY] How would you describe what happened in Drawsko? Was it a rebellion?

[Onyszkiewicz] I would not use the word rebellion, perhaps. However, it was certainly an extremely dangerous precedent, to use a less strong term. It was evidence of the attempts being made to use the Armed Forces as a political factor. If high-ranking commanders usurp the right to decide who should be defense minister, it means that they try to exert influence on who should be in government. If high-ranking commanders try to promote a certain model of situating the Armed Forces, it means that they try to exert influence on the shape of the state's political system. Now, this means entering an area that is politically most sensitive.

To be apolitical is not the same thing as being nonparty. Even though the Army does not include members of any political parties, it does place itself in the role of a political entity if it takes a stand on such issues as the state's political system. Now, in a democratic state, this is absolutely unacceptable.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] What role did the president play here?

[Onyszkiewicz] The action of the commanding cadres certainly was not spontaneous and unprepared. It was caused by the president. Again, to use the strongest term I can afford, this is deplorable.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] However, the president is the commander in chief of the Armed Forces, is he not?

[Onyszkiewicz] An honorary title is not the same as real power. This is very precisely specified in the Small Constitution and in the law on the general duty of defense. The president has several prerogatives. However, everything he does is done on the motion of the defense minister, who, in turn, is responsible for these decisions before the parliament. The president cannot make any decisions on his own.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] From where, then, do such wide powers for Walesa in the Defense Ministry come?

[Onyszkiewicz] Either Minister Kolodziejczyk is not fully exercising the rights he has, or he is meeting with passive opposition. It is possible that his orders are not carried out by the commanders in the General Staff, who are formally under him. If we do not want to be perceived as a Latin American country, we must help the minister restore the state of normalcy.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Does this mean that the Freedom Union will defend Koldziejczyk?

[Onyszkiewicz] I am convinced that it will, not because it feels politically close to him but because of the interests of the state.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] When you were defense minister, did you not feel the Belweder's influence on the Army?

[Onyszkiewicz] I did not feel it for a very long time. The situation changed when the parliament was dissolved. It was clear that I would soon vacate the post. Various orders that I gave were either blocked or slowed. It was stalling for time.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] The General Staff, you mean?

[Onyszkiewicz] Yes.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Did you feel opposition to the civilian control over the Army?

[Onyszkiewicz] I felt some opposition. It was justified with the thesis that, if a decision to appoint the defense minister turned out to be wrong, very dangerous situations might develop. The example of Jan Parys was quoted at this point. However, it is quite easy to refute this thesis: Who will guarantee that the post of president will be occupied by the right person? Well, after all, Stanislaw Tyminski was not so far from the Belvedere.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Why are generals so prejudiced against civilian control over the Army?

[Onyszkiewicz] In the General Staff, the opinion is quite widespread that the principle of civilian control over the Army may be implemented through the president—if the head of the General Staff were subordinated directly to him. This, of course, is utter fiction. Even if the president holds meetings with the head of the General Staff every day, he cannot have any control over this vast area. To achieve this goal, one must have a structure linked to

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the military structures. In other words, the president would have to have something that is a ministry of defense. Therefore, in all political systems, including the presidential ones, the president never has direct influence over the head of the General Staff. He always does it through the minister of defense. This is how it works even in France and the United States.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Now, because some time has passed since you were in office, do you not think that, in the dispute between Parys and Wachowski, the former was quite right? After all, his fears are now being confirmed.

[Onyszkiewicz] No, I do not think so. At that time, he reacted too hysterically, even though there were no reasons for such a reaction. There was not even the slightest reason to speak about the vision of a military coup in such categorical terms.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Do you think Kolodziejczyk will resign?

[Onyszkiewicz] I hope that even if the minister hands in his resignation, the prime minister will reject it. If he did not do that, he would agree that the Armed Forces have the possibility of exerting influence on the appointment of the defense minister. For Western political elites, this would be a clear signal that we have not yet lived up to the European standards that are required of a member of NATO and the European Union.

General Staff, MON on Drawsko Events

WS0710111694 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 7 Oct 94 p 2

[Article by Z.L.: "Concern in Drawsko"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As we have found out, considerable efforts are being made to agree on a date for a meeting between Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak and Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk. If Prime Minister Pawlak, who returned from Strasbourg last night, agrees to hold a meeting with the minister soon, Kolodziejczyk is determined to shorten his vacation and return on Monday. As we have learned, on Thursday the defense minister left the place on Hel Peninsula, where he was resting. The possibility cannot be ruled out that he is going to get ready for important talks.

"I can say quite definitely that I do not know anything about the alleged intention of Minister Kolodziejczyk to hand in his resignation," reported Defense Ministry [MON] Spokesman Janusz Grochowski.

"General Tadeusz Wilecki, head of the General Staff, was amazed when, upon his return to Poland (in recent days he visited France, where he was awarded, among other things, an Honorary League order; he also visited Germany—Z.L.), he read reports on the developments in Drawsko," Colonel Zdzislaw Czekierda, General Staff spokesman, stated yesterday. "The general is not going to comment on press reports because, according to him, the facts presented in them did not take place. They are merely press facts," Colonel Czekierda quoted his boss as saying.

It is worth recalling that some publications that have come out in recent days have included reports that, following the exercises in Drawsko, a meeting was held with the participation of, among others, the highest leaders of the General Staff and Lech Walesa. The military officials reportedly criticized Minister Kolodziejczyk and then expressed a vote of no confidence in him.

In line with the version presented by Gen. Wilecki, at the dinner with the participation of the president, the ministers, and the generals, "a discussion was held that was full of concern and at times quite animated concerning MON and issues of state security."

As the General Staff spokesman reported yesterday, Gen. Wilecki is going to accept the invitation of the Sejm National Defense Committee and take part in its session scheduled for 11 October. Committee Chairman Jerzy Szmajdzinski (of the Democratic Left Alliance) expects that next week, in the presence of MON Head Piotr Koldziejczyk, who has also been invited, the deputies will establish what actually happened and will discuss the situation in MON.

"The General Staff will soon hold a press conference, during which the military's problems will be addressed," Czekierda says.

Szeremietiew May Replace Kolodziejczyk in Defense

WS0510150394 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 5 Oct 94 p 2

[Article by Luiza Kowalska and Piotr Zaremba: "Szeremietiew To Be Head of MON?]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Rightist politicians are carefully avoiding criticism of the leader of the rightist Movement for the Republic [RdR]. He himself has for a long time been suggesting that he is prepared to cooperate with Lech Walesa.*

Will National Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk return from his holiday, or will he be replaced by RdR Leader Romuald Szeremietiew? "When I get back, I will make changes in the ministry," President Lech Walesa announced before leaving for the Netherlands.

"Spectacular exercises on the training ground were merely a smoke screen for the Belweder's clandestine game. No one had any idea of what was happening behind closed doors," said one of the participants of a dinner at which the head of the Ministry of National Defense [MON] was forced to hand in his resignation. When the president and the top-ranking generals were "settling matters" with the defense minister, the other

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officers, the journalists, as well as the guests, including the heads of the Sejm and Senate Defense Committees, were taken to dinner in another town.

After an hour, when everyone was back, the president publicly spoke to Kolodziejczyk, saying: "I hope you will serve the Army and Poland in various posts as well as you have so far." A moment later, the minister abandoned the idea of delivering a speech that he had prepared in advance and flew to the seaside for his planned two-week holiday.

Yesterday, before leaving for the Netherlands, the president expressed his dissatisfaction at the situation in MON and announced that he will make changes when he returns. "When you are talking about changes, you mean personnel changes," one journalist recalled. "Because it is the personnel that decides things," the president replied.

It is worth recalling that Kolodziejczyk was nominated as minister because the president himself wanted this.

The possibility cannot be ruled out that as early as this week the minister will show up in Warsaw. Even though in front of the president he committed himself to handing in his resignation, our information suggests that he thought better of it later.

The president, in turn, may already be thinking about how to introduce Kolodziejczyk's successor to MON. It is possible that this is what he discussed with Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak on 3 October.

As for Kolodziejczyk's successor, the name that is most often mentioned among journalists is RdR leader Romuald Szeremietiew. In the Olszewski government, he was deputy minister, and then director of MON.

For several months now, Szeremietiew has been a student of the Academy of National Defense. Moreover, high-ranking MON officers increasingly often express positive opinions about him.

Asked by TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY about the results of the governing of Parys and Szeremietiew, Colonel Konstanty Malejczyk, head of the military intelligence services, did not mention Szeremietiew at all. "The two persons that damaged the Armed Forces the most were Mr. Jan Parys and Mr. Radek Sikorski," he merely said.

Moreover, Szeremietiew has apparently recently obtained access to the Polish Army daily, POLSKA ZBROJNA, even though before that, as the RdR leader complained, it did not want to publish even his corrections. Yesterday he published an article on "Irregular Activities in the Defense Planning of the Polish Republic." His contacts with the Presidential National Security Office are also becoming increasingly frequent.

Asked by ZYCIE WARSZAWY whether he had received any offers concerning the Defense Ministry, Szeremietiew did not say no, even though he did not want to unequivocally confirm this. It is worth recalling that recently the RdR leader's partners of the rightist Alliance for Poland expressed fears that Szeremietiew is willing to reach an agreement with the Belweder and support Walesa in the presidential election.

He himself did not exclude such support. However, he submitted certain conditions—such as the recall of Minister of State Mieczyslaw Wachowski. Because there is increasingly more talk about the possibility of Wachowski leaving the Belweder, this obstacle would no longer stand in the way of this politician getting closer to Walesa.

Wilecki Said Main Candidate for Defense Minister

WS0710085694 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 6 Oct 94 p 2

[Article by Zbigniew Lentowicz and Kazimierz Groblewski: "Carving Up the Admiral's Skin"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Those who caused the commotion over the Ministry of National Defense [MON] were out of Warsaw yesterday. The president is visiting the Netherlands right now, and Piotr Kolodziejczyk is on vacation. General Tadeusz Wilecki, after returning from France on 5 October, met in Leipzig with the German Bundeswehr's general inspector. Both were present when an agreement on cooperation between the 11th Division of the Armored Cavalry of Zagan and the German 13th Mechanized Division of the 8th Military District was being signed. The only close aide of Lech Walesa who has not gone with him to the Netherlands is Mieczyslaw Wachowski, director of his Cabinet. However, he is not in Warsaw, either.

In line with our information, the successor of the present national defense minister is already being sought. Yesterday we confirmed the report that, during the session of the command cadres of the Armed Forces in Drawsko, the minister was criticized by several members of the military. The "court of law" that tried Kolodziejczyk was the idea of Mieczyslaw Wachowski, director of the President's Office.

We found out that, over the weekend, Walesa had said among his friends, off the record, that he would like to replace not only Kolodziejczyk but also Defense Deputy Minister Danuta Waniek of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD].

What did Minister Koldziejczyk, who used to be the president's trusted aide, do to antagonize Walesa? Several months ago, at a session of the government's Defense Affairs Committee, he said he was in favor of maintaining the present regulations, in line with which the head of the General Staff is subordinated to the minister. This is contrary to what the president wants to achieve. He would like the head of the General Staff to report to him.

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Yesterday's ZYCIE WARSZAWY carried an article that suggested that the most serious candidate for Kolodziejczyk's successor is Romuald Szeremietiew, leader of the Movement for the Republic and minister of defense in the Olszewski government.

On Sunday, in a television program entitled "Special Line," Szeremietiew hinted that he would accept such an offer, but he also unequivocally stated that he had not received it.

In line with our information, Wachowski does not really like Szeremietiew and thus stands in his way to assume the post vacated by Kolodziejczyk. As far as we know, he has not yet received a serious offer.

In MON one can hear opinions that Piotr Kolodziejczyk, despite everything, will keep his post. This will happen if the Belweder becomes convinced that it can completely rely on him.

If he left, the most serious candidate for the post would be General Tadeusz Wilecki, who is now heading the General Staff.

Who Caused All This Turmoil and Why

"The president is trying to subordinate the Army completely to him and to win its loyalty, which may result in activities contrary to the law, such as, for example, not carrying out orders from the defense minister," stated Janusz Onyszkiewicz of the Freedom Union yesterday, who added that he based this on information published in the press.

According to him, the head of the General Staff has found himself outside the minister's control, and the Army has been politicized. In line with the principles accepted in democratic states, the Army does not have a right to make statements concerning the state's policy. Despite that, Onyszkiewicz says, the Army—some of its leading commanders grouped in the General Staff—is making statements concerning the political system of the Polish Republic.

Not only politicians of the governing coalition announce opposition to any changes in the post of MON head. "I hope the prime minister will not accept Kolodziejczyk's resignation, if he presents it," Onyszkiewicz says.

"The president is not here to recall ministers in a coalition government headed by Waldemar Pawlak," says the SLD's Jerzy Szmajdzinski, chairman of the Sejm National Defense Committee. According to Szmajdzinski, "There are no reasons to say that Koldziejczyk is no longer useful in the post of MON head"—the more so because the preparations for the long-awaited parliamentary debate on defense are nearing an end. Contrary to what Walesa purports, the ministry has prepared several important draft laws. If they are not passed by the Sejm soon, issues that are very important to the Army would have to be put off for quite some time, Szmajdzinski says.

"At the training ground in Drawsko, I had a hunch that something was about to happen," says the deputy. According to Szmajdzinski, what the president wants to do is cause such a commotion, "divide the front into a large number of skirmishes, battles, meeting, and reconnaissance combats, be perceived as the only Providence man in this chaos, arranged by himself."

Tomasz Nalecz of the Union of Labor, member of the National Committee Presidium: "We will respond if the Belweder really takes any sudden and unforeseen steps. For the time being, deputies are completing work on the draft law on the office of the defense minister, which makes more specific the Constitutional regulations that exist now. In line with this draft law, the minister is directly in charge of the activities of the ministry and the Armed Forces. The head of the General Staff, who heads the Army in peacetime, is subordinated to him."

Commentary on Expected Changes in Defense Ministry

WS0710085294 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 6 Oct 94 p 1

[Commentary by Colonel Tadeusz Mitek under the "Our Comment" rubric: "An Atmosphere of Scandal is Unnecessary"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Army, or, to be more precise, the administration of the Ministry of National Defense [MON], has been making headlines for the past few days. Speculation about possibile personnel changes within MON are intensifying. One may assume that this is a vital public issue, on which the fate of the entire nation depends. Let us try to put this problem into proper perspective.

Personnel changes within the Defense Ministry are possible, as in any other ministry. Not only is this ministry, or, in more general terms, the Army, trying to find its place in the emerging democratic system. We are testing models applied in other countries through our own experience. We are seeking the best solutions, which could become constitutional provisions in the future.

Many points of view are accounted for in this quest, and controversies may appear, especially because the earlier obligatory provisions of the Constitution are not very precise regarding issues such as administration and command of the Armed Forces.

The existing discord does not justify public statements that "political squabbles involving generals" are taking place or warnings that "they are easy to start, but the outcome would be typical of Latin America rather than of Europe."

These warnings are farfetched and the geographical analogies invidious. Nothing seems to show that the Polish Army (WP) and its leadership would wish to play the same role as the military in Latin America or that

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they could be persuaded to play such a role, if anyone even wanted to try to persuade them.

European partners of MON and the WP do not share these anxieties. Had there been a trace of such suspicion, would Poland have been chosen to organize international maneuvers as prestigious and pioneering for the implementation of "Partnership for Peace" as "Cooperative Bridge '94"?

Many issues were raised during a briefing of the MON administrative staff in Drawsko. It is no secret that differences of opinion rose on the topic of administering the ministry. The president, as commander in chief, staff generals and commanders, civilian heads of MON departments and the chairman of the Sejm Commission for National Defense all voiced their opinions. Of course, it would be better for the debate to take place in an atmosphere of mutual trust. We should not be surprised, however, that controversies exist. Discussion is allowed and practiced in the Army before decisions are made—personnel issues included. Once a decision is reached, orders are executed.

Most of all, there is no need to exaggerate the issue. This is not "playing with fire," as the title of one commentary suggested. No one within MON, the WP Chief Staff, or the active service units would dream of overthrowing democracy. The Army does not have a passion for politics. It has burned its fingers on it in the past and has had enough. Categories of political scandal should not be applied to national defense, primarily because it does not serve the stabilization of the state security system.

It is undoubtedly true that the sensational rumors concerning MON are felt much more intensely by commentators than by the Army itself. The Army lives according to its usual rhythm, training new soldiers, participating in maneuvers, carrying on with its activities, and planning future objectives.

If the Army has any concern, it is worried whether it will have the adequate means and equipment for implementing its objectives. Members of the military expect no more than guarantees from their leaders, the civilian authorities, and the state economy that they will have the necessary means to secure defense. And we are obstinate in reminding them that we want to stay out of politics.

Finance Minister Discusses 'Strategy,' Budget

WS0710084594 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 1-2 Oct 94 pp 1, 7

[Interview with Grzegorz Kolodko, Polish finance minister and deputy prime minister, by Wanda Zagawa and Jerzy Sieradzinski; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [TRYBUNA] One hears all around that the "Strategy for Poland" is in danger. This is a program about which even President Walesa has said flattering things. What do you, as the author of "Strategy," see as the greatest threat—the instability of public opinion, conflicts within the coalition, or the unwillingness of the opposition to cooperate?

[Kolodko] Each of these elements deserves to be discussed separately. I generally believe that the greatest threat to the "Strategy for Poland" is a lack of ability or motivation to think strategically in politics. It is a common practice for our politicians to follow immediate goals, to which they subordinate their opinions and actions.

When presenting the "Strategy," I was naive enough to appeal for restricting certain issues from the sphere of political battles, which are fought too fiercely for an economy in the process of transformation and not always fair. I am very sorry to say that not only the opposition refused to exclude, for instance, the issue of social security from political squabbles.

We approach trade unions, the working community, with an offer to create a partnerlike negotiation system that could lower the social costs of reform. Meanwhile, Solidarity leaders reply that this is a "strategy of confrontation!" I am unable to comprehend this intellectually. Perhaps someone really wants this to be an opportunity for confrontation. If so, this is a policy on the edge of madness.

I tell some of my friends from the opposition: If you hope to come to power some day in a democratic election, it is in your interest to have a sound economy. The principle of "The worse things are, the better" is also against you. There are enough problems from which you could accumulate political capital—from the concordat and abortion to the constitution and sending our troops to Haiti.

[TRYBUNA] Is it the politicians who are to blame for the low public spirit? Perhaps there do actually exist rational reasons for the discontent of large segments of society.

[Kolodko] Some say it is worse because it was supposed to be much better. I will be frank: We cannot become the victims of campaign promises that are impossible to fulfill in a short period of time. This is a huge political dilemma for the left wing today. Not everyone has the courage to say this out loud and expand programs, adapt them to the material conditions of our economy and reschedule the attainment of goals for the whole term.

There exists another problem: People tend to compare themselves to others. Two extremes have developed very rapidly in our country—wealth and poverty. We have to curb poverty, although I have met with an opinion that it could be a moving force for change. I view such an attitude as irresponsible and dangerous. The aim of the "Strategy for Poland" is to prevent the impoverishment of wider segments of society. I do not advocate taking from the rich and giving to the poor but, rather, avoiding social conflicts and moving toward a higher standard of living by developing the economy. [passage omitted]

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[TRYBUNA] Labor and Social Policy Minister Miller has probably also "done his homework" and demands that senior citizens participate in the process of strengthening the economy and raising wages...

[Kolodko] I am glad you mentioned wages. We included a provision in the "Strategy" that they will increase by 11 percent, but this means it as an objective that has yet to be implemented. There are, however, processes that could cause real wages to decrease. This would certainly be the case if high inflation were to reappear.

If I were Machiavelli—and I do not like the guy—as minister of finance I would decrease real wages, at least for the time being, and win the compassion of 9 million senior citizens, overjoyed that I enabled them to come under wage indexation. I do not, however, intend to follow Machiavelli.

Wages will rise more rapidly than prices, and pensions no slower than the prices. It is true that disproportions will appear between the average pension and the average pay, favoring the latter, but I do not see anything wrong with that. This relation improved considerably; in the years 1994-95, pensions will rise more quickly than wages.

As an economist, I see no justification for wages to rise more slowly than pensions in a transforming economy, where the need for development is so great. I therefore declare that we will switch to price indexation in the interest of the pensioners—and you can print that in boldface.

[TRYBUNA] Is this how you intend to hold a dialogue with the pensioners?

[Kolodko] This is not a dialogue but, rather, an onslaught and campaign of embitterment. The pensioners were embittered against me. I have been labeled as public enemy number-one, although I am not. I prefer to tell senior citizens the whole truth rather than fill them full of hollow promises.

I think they have already understood this because, several days ago, I read on the front page of RZECZPOSPOLITA that the Social Research Laboratory in Sopot found that as many as 54 percent of Poles above age 59 claim they prefer valorization according to rising prices, and only 39 percent would want it to remain as it is.

What was the problem thus far? A manipulation of public opinion? Perhaps it was the younger people who shouted.

[TRYBUNA] After all, we are all potential pensioners, including you...

[Kolodko] That is why we are at present fighting for the economic interests and social security of those who will become pensioners in one year, three years, or 15 years. We cannot make mistakes as horrendous as those that were made in the past.

[TRYBUNA] Will the Central Planning Administration's projections determine the indexation method?

[Kolodko] According to projections I know and can present to the public, in 1996 prices may grow faster than wages if the level of financing the inefficient social security system from the budget is raised. Beginning in 1996, the real value of pensions would also fall if things are left as they are. My suggestion is to increase pensions by 7 percent over a period of three years, starting at the level of the first quarter of 1995—that is to say, after two wage valorizations.

[TRYBUNA] You are threatening taxpayers with your claims that taxes will increase unless we consent to changing the principles of indexation...

[Kolodko] From where else can we get the money? I am not threatening anyone; these are the facts. Theoretically, the preposterously high fees paid to the Social Security Agency [ZUS] could be raised even further, but that means ruining enterprises. We could apply for foreign loans, but we would be humiliated in the eyes of the world if we did not abide by our agreements with the London Club and pay the debt that has already been cut in half. Besides, no one would lend us money to finance pensions! Can we raise the funds domestically? The only means of doing that would be to legally incapacitate the central bank. Maybe there are such fools, but I am not one of them.

Increasing the domestic debt to 20 trillion zlotys [Z] in 1996 and to Z40 trillion the following year—this is how much is needed to finance the social security system—could lead to a return of soaring inflation. People will say things are worse, and they will be right. This is unacceptable to any responsible politician.

There remains one way out—to extract the money from our incomes. It will be a test for the real solidarity of our society—all right, I will pay, for instance, a 33-percent tax instead of a 30-percent one because there is no other solution.

[TRYBUNA] You could tax the stock exchange...

[Kolodko] I am sorry, but this issue has been made absurd by suggesting that taxing the stock exchange could solve the problem of pensioners in Poland. Along the same lines, another minister has publicly stated that taxing stock transactions will ruin the Polish capital market. This is so absurd that I do not wish to consider who is right.

[TRYBUNA] Were you the author of the idea to create a financial policy council so as to curtail powers of the National Bank of Poland [NBP]?

[Kolodko] This concept is already two years old and was put forward by the Polish Bank Union and a group of deputies. I got involved, and now I keep reading untrue reports, accusing me of nonsense. A journalist from CASH claims that Kolodko, in revenge for the NBP's

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latest decisions, is now suggesting the establishment of a council made up of politicians. This is absurd.

[TRYBUNA] Well, then, is there a conflict with the NBP or not?

[Kolodko] This is not a conflict but a discussion. The current discussion on trends of monetary policy, slowing down the rate of zloty devaluation, and the expected lowering of interest rates has to be distinguished from the issue of establishing a monetary policy council, which we have been considering for some time now. The same goes for methods of organizing supervision of social security, banks, and the stock exchange. I personally suggested eliminating social security supervision from the Ministry of Finance so as to avoid a conflict of interest between owner and inspector.

[TRYBUNA] Rumor has it that the president of the NBP visited you, waved a check in front of your face and said: We will never hand these banks over to you. Is this true?

[Kolodko] It is also said that the president is unlikely to sign the banking law. It would be worthwhile to ask the presidents of Polish banks what they think of the present auditing system. I know that this system is often compared to the infamous agents of the State Trade Inspectorate, who raided shops shouting: "And from where did that jar of jam come?" It was not enough to have receipts; shop owners were terrified anyway.

To make things clear, I would like to emphasize that the central bank will remain independent. We would like for it to cooperate with the government in laying down the economic objectives provided for in "Strategy for Poland" as an independent institution, instead of creating its own economic policy, because it is not legitimized to do so.

[TRYBUNA] Do you not have the impression that the manner in which opinions are exchanged with the NBP president has become embarrassing?

[Kolodko] Yes, I think so, except that I have nothing of which to be ashamed. As my daughters say: I am not the one who started it...

[TRYBUNA] The first major obstacle the "Strategy for Poland" will have to overcome is next year's budget. This year, it has already been overstepped by a decision that was passed a few days ago to reduce the debt in the health-care system. Do you fear more pressure will be exerted to satisfy other demands?

[Kolodko] "Strategy" shows other methods of solving such problems. To avoid a depreciation of achievements to date, a package of resolutions I have presented to the Sejm has to be passed, the budget has to be approved in its present form, we have to reach an agreement on mass privatization, and we must reform the center.

We have not even begun to discuss the budget in detail, and already so much demagoguery and so many false reports have appeared. Everyone, including the present coalition ministers and former ministers from the opposition, must understand that times have changed and that it is no longer possible to demand that means for satisfying all social needs be found in the budget, or to claim that everyone "has a right" to the money, unless we want to nationalize everything and return to a centrally planned economy. I do not wish to have anything to do with that.

[TRYBUNA] Thank you very much for the interview.

Polish-Ukrainian Trade Relations Examined

94EP0097A Warsaw ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE in Polish No 35, 28 Aug 94 p 9

[Article by Eugeniusz Mozejko: "Above All the Economy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At all of the highest-level Polish-Ukrainian meetings, emphasis was placed on the excellent relations that exist between the two countries, with no matters of dispute between them. A desire to develop closer cooperation was unequivocally declared, cooperation that, while serving both partners would also help to stabilize relations in Central-East Europe. But these praiseworthy intentions could not be concretely realized.

A setback in trade relations is under way. Commodity turnovers, which demonstrated a large growth last year, are again falling. Polish export to Ukraine in the first five months of this year amounted to slightly over $72 million, 8.5 percent less than in the same period last year. Its share in total export was not quite 1 percent. Import from Ukraine during the same period dropped by almost 13 percent, totaling $71.7 million, which is a fraction of a percent of our total import.

Even in the area of political relations, which does not present any problems, incidents have occurred that threaten to become worse. The recent arrest and trial of an agent of the Ukrainian KGB in Poland have caused Kiev's diplomatic intervention and harsh comments in the Ukrainian press. The arrest of a Cenzin representative have put Polish-Ukrainian relations to a new test.

Prime Minister Pawlak's visit to Ukraine was an attempt to strengthen the weakest element in Polish-Ukrainian relations—economic cooperation. Marek Pol, the minister of industry, who accompanied the prime minister, coordinated with his Ukrainian colleague, A. Holuczenka, the matter of increasing the export of Polish coal by 4 to 6 million tons a year and the import of Ukrainian ore. The wide-gauge railway line that runs through the southern part of the country is to be used to implement this plan. Problems of cooperation in the defense industry were discussed, including the conversion of some plants in this industry to civilian production. A Polish delegation will soon go to Ukraine to coordinate the details of this cooperation. Other plans discussed during the visit pertained to cooperation in machinery construction and in the chemical industry.

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The ministers of transport discussed the matter of improving transportation links between both countries: modernization of railway lines linking Kiev to Warsaw and the possible construction of a highway from Przemysl to Lvov. The Polish side was also interested in the possibility of using Ukrainian Black Sea ports to haul live animals and agricultural products. Poland and Ukraine will support the development of border cooperation, particularly in the already existing "Carpathians" Euroregion and the planned "Bug" region, and also between border voivodships and districts. The matter of establishing a Polish-Ukrainian commercial investment bank was raised again, as well as the opening of branches of banks from both countries on the territories of the neighbor, to act as intermediaries in the clearing of accounts. It was announced that, in a short time, international agreements would be signed pertaining to veterinary inspections, quarantines, and pesticides.

This is an extensive and concrete list of plans that may be implemented in the immediate future. In the declaration signed by Prime Ministers Pawlak and Masola, the priority areas of cooperation also included agriculture, the processing of agricultural products, and the pharmaceutical industry. Close cooperation is also anticipated in the energy industry, communications, the chemical industry, and steelmaking. The pertinent ministers of both countries are to develop programs for the implementation of the agreements signed at the highest level.

Poland declares its support for Ukraine's desire for close relations with Central-European free trade zone countries and participation in the Central-European Initiative.

For the development of Polish-Ukrainian economic cooperation both in the short and the long run, the implementation of plans in the banking sector—the weakest element in the turnover-control system, may turn out to be the most important. The matter of establishing a joint bank has been on the agenda of all Polish-Ukrainian meetings since the beginning of 1993. Unfortunately, it has not been able to reach fruition. It was said recently that such a bank, called the Ukrainian-Polish Development Bank, would begin its activities in the middle of this year, but even this schedule has not been met. We can only hope that the recent agreements will help to overcome the obstacles that this plan has thus far encountered. The establishment of a commercial investment bank would make it possible to gradually eliminate the intermediation in settlement of accounts in Polish-Ukrainian foreign banks, which prolongs these operations and increases their costs. It would also be the beginning of the development of an accounts-settlement system and the granting of credit in economic turnovers between both countries.

Naturally, it is not just goodwill on the part of both sides and improvements in the cooperation system that will determine the prospects of the development of Polish-Ukrainian economic relations. An important factor here is the condition of the economy in both countries: strengthening the growth tendencies in the Polish economy and overcoming the crisis in the Ukrainian economy. The Ukrainian economy has been in a state of deep collapse since 1990. The gross domestic product of Ukraine dropped in successive years by several percent (12 in 1991, 17 in 1992, and 14 in 1993). The economy is being destroyed by rampant inflation. Only in the former Yugoslavia in the past two years have the inflation indicators been worse. In 1992, consumer prices rose 1,176 percent over those of the previous year, and in 1993 the increase was 4,519 percent. The forecasts for this year talk about a 1,000-percent rise. The gross domestic product is falling; it will probably be 10 percent.

But there are some hopes for improvement. After the recent parliamentary and presidential elections, Ukraine's political situation is beginning to stabilize, which also creates a chance for the implementation of an economic stabilization program, strongly recommended by foreign advisers. An IMF delegation is now there, which should assist in developing such a program. In connection with this is the possibility of obtaining important financial aid from the West ($4 billion), promised at the last "Big 7" summit in Naples.

News has just come from Kiev that an agreement has been reached with the Russian supplier of gas, GAZPROM, in the matter of settling the amounts past due to this enterprise. This will remove the frequently renewed threat (which was carried out for a short time in 1993) to cut off the supply and thus one of the causes of disruptions in industrial production. Polish as well as Russian deliveries of coal, in turn, are assumed to make up for the losses in their own production. Production fell to 100 million tons, and this appears to be insufficient to cover the coal needs of this country. The greatest hopes lie in the announcement by President Kuczma of a forthcoming plan for radical economic reform.

It is difficult, obviously, to expect that Ukraine's economic difficulties will be overcome in a short time. Patiently breaking down barriers that are impeding cooperation with its neighbors may help to overcome these difficulties. Poland should certainly play a larger role here. This is an important condition for the success of good-neighbor relations between our countries.

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First Post-Embargo Flight to Belgrade Takes Off

AU0610121394 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 6 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The first Romanian plane to fly from Bucharest to Belgrade after 28 months of embargo, took off from Otopeni Airport today. According to our correspondent Dana Popescu, the Boeing 737 is piloted by the general director of TAROM Romanian airlines, Nicolae Brutaru. The aircraft is carrying members of the ROMPRES News Agency leadership and reporters from various papers, radio and television networks.

A ceremony will be organized in Belgrade later by the Yugoslav airline JAT.

Vacaroiu, Taracila on Possibility of King's Visit

AU0610200594 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1800 GMT 6 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Present at today's meeting of the Social Democracy Party of Romania Standing Delegation, Interior Minister Doru Ioan Taracila announced to the press, in connection with the possible visit to the country of the former sovereign of Romania, Mihai I, that, quote, we live in a rule-of-law country and those who do not request something cannot be given it. It would be better if he does not come, unquote.

Answering the same question, Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu stated, quote, I know nothing about the former sovereign's intention to visit the country. I have learned that a dialogue took place between the former sovereign and Mr. Paleologu. We have laws that have to be observed. So far, the former sovereign has not requested an entry visa. Until he does, I will have time to consider the issue, unquote.

Team Supervises Weapons Dismantling in Hungary

AU0610202494 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1400 GMT 6 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Major Elena Olariu, spokesperson for the Romanian Ministry of National Defense, held a news conference today in the Alba Iulia Hall of the National Military Circle. She announced that the National Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca will pay a visit to France on 12-15 October at the invitation of French Defense Minister Francois Leotard.

She also mentioned that a Romanian team is carrying out an inspection of three weapon-dismantling sites in Hungary on 3-7 October. Similarly, a Hungarian team inspected three weapon- dismantling sites in Romania in the middle of April. She noted that this activity is being carried out according to the provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which was signed by both Romania and Hungary. Such activities make a contribution both to the increase of confidence between states and to an exchange of experience between personnel specialized in inspection missions.

According to reports by our correspondent Mihai Cutus, during the same news conference, Major General Gheorghe Andrita, principal advisor to the national defense minister, discussed the social problems of the Romanian Army and presented measures to be taken in this field.

PL'93 Wants To Set Up 'Right-Wing Alternative'

AU0510181594 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 3 Oct 94 p 3

[Dorina Baesu report on meeting of National Council of the Liberal Party-1993 in Bucharest on 1 October]

[FBIS Translated Text] "It is no disaster if the Social Democratic Party of Romania [PSDR], with its 1 percent share, leaves the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR]. Likewise, if the Civic Alliance Party [PAC] gets carried away by its arrogance in the wake of the latest public opinion polls, which allot it some 10 percent of the electorate's vote, it would only do us a service. Such a thing would be good both for us and for them. PAC and the PSDR could make up, together with the Democratic Party [PD], a social-democratic pole and the Convention would thus become a right- wing alternative to a left wing government." This is the opinion of Dinu Patriciu [member of the Steering Committee of the Liberal Party-1993] expressed last Saturday [1 October], at the meeting of the National Council of the Liberal Party-1993 [PL'93]. He took the floor when the Council discussed the following agenda point: "Relations With Other Parties Within the CDR and the PL'93 Viewpoint on the CDR's Electoral Protocol."

Dinu Patriciu Believes That the PSDR Has No Place in the CDR

In the liberal leader's opinion, the PSDR has no place in the Convention, since it is a party whose vice president, Constantin Avramescu, praises Karl Marx and approves of almost everything he said. "The PSDR is an embarrassing member of the Convention," Dinu Patriciu said. Then, using the same plastic language, he characterized the PAC, the other "rebel" party in a few sentences: The PAC is "an incredible party in its evolution," and Mr. Patriciu said that he is watching "with a zoologist's passion this 'monster' growing before our own eyes." He added that "the PAC is a party of state employees, professors, and clerks drawing their salaries from the state budget. As much as they would like it, they cannot be liberals, as they claim. They only say so because it sounds good, while in actual fact they are socialists. They cannot be anything else but that." To these words, a liberal lady from the PAC, in attendance, jumped up and said: "Gentlemen, please do not be so doctrinaire. Do not hit at the intellectuals. Even though they may be earning their money from the state, they are liberals in thinking." Mr. Patriciu answered her humorously: "Lady, we may all delude ourselves into thinking that we

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are intellectuals, but not all intellectuals in this country have common interests. Simply put, some are right-wing, while others are socialist, as is the case of those from the PAC."

In conclusion, the PSDR should unite with the PD and Mr. Cunescu should become the president of this new party, while Mr. Roman [Petre Roman, PD president] should become its executive president. Mr. Manolescu [Nicolae Manolescu, PAC president] could set up, together with the other two, a social-democratic axis, since "it is not for nothing that the French socialists are sponsoring both the PAC and the PD," Mr. Dinu Patriciu said. In his opinion, the PSDR and the PAC are trying to erode the CDR's image while they are still inside it, so as to make their system of alliances appear more viable. "We also want a CDR reorganization, but, while they want to destroy the CDR, we want to build it up. Without these two left- wing parties, the Convention would become what the country needs now, namely the so necessary right-wing alternative! The PL'93 would be at one end of this liberal-conservative axis, while the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party [PNTCD] would be at the other end," the liberal leader said.

Regarding Local Election, PL'93 and PNTCD Reached a Compromise

In these circumstances, if the PSDR and PAC leave the CDR, the discussion of the electoral protocol will be conducted between the PL'93 and the PNTCD, which, of late, have understood each other better than usually. They agreed that the electoral lists should be made in accordance with certain previously established criteria, one of which is the share of the parties in the Convention. At this point, the representatives of all PL'93 branches took the floor. Some of them asked whether they should participate under the "Key" [the CDR's electoral symbol at the last general elections] sign at the local elections in their localities. However, the majority of them said that it would be better to use the "Horse" [PL'93 election symbol].

After the discussions, a draft resolution was worked out and adopted by a majority of votes of the National Council. The resolution stipulates that the CDR parties will participate on separate lists at the local elections for mayors and councillors. The best placed CDR candidates will be supported by the other Convention candidates at the second ballot. It was also agreed that none of the CDR candidates will campaign against each other. They will run under the "Key" sign only if an agreement has been reached at local level in this respect. A protocol will be concluded between the local CDR councillors to elect the deputy mayors and ensure a better cooperation among the member parties. At the general elections, the CDR parties will run on a common list, proportionally put together in keeping with the number of votes obtained at the local elections. Preliminaries will be organized in the large cities, like in the United States, with two candidates: one from the PL'93 and one from the PNTCD. Letters will be sent to the voters and, on the basis of the answers to these letters, the CDR will decide which one of the two will be the final candidate.

The PL'93 National Council gave a mandate to the Steering Committee to negotiate the CDR's electoral protocol, proceeding from the adopted resolution.

Civic Alliance Stresses Need for CDR Unity

AU0610085394 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 3 Oct 94 p 3

["Appeal for the Unity of the Democratic Convention of Romania" signed by the Nationwide Assembly of the Civic Alliance]

[FBIS Translated Text] Examining the situation in the two years that have elapsed since the 1992 elections, during which, due to the catastrophic ruling and arrogance of those in power, the opposition registered a quantitative leap, which we wish to turn into a qualitative leap, the Civic Alliance:

—reminds all the formations included in the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR] of their duty toward their electorate and the country's destiny, namely to stay united. Unity should not be an obligation but rather a calling;

—draws the attention of those who systematically block CDR actions under the pretext of need for reorganization, that the serious responsibility for harming the Convention rests exclusively with them;

—calls on all the parties and formations included in the CDR to exercise moral conviction and ignore the tendency to destroy the most important democratic coalition by establishing other possible alliances;

—calls on members to give up personal vanity and replace dissension with concrete action.

In this respect, the Civic Alliance supports the idea of convening the National Conference of the Democratic Convention in November 1994.

In order to obtain better results in the next nationwide vote, the Civic Alliance suggests that the nomination of CDR candidates start in time, on the basis of merit and with proficiency tests.

For a better turnout in the next elections, the Civic Alliance asks CDR parliamentarians to call for:

—the modification of the electoral law; changing from the system of electoral lists to the combined electoral list-single candidate system;

—the continuing presence of domestic observers at the elections (see Article 93 of the current electoral law);

—the law on political formations to be debated in an emergency procedure;

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—the prompt and correct distribution of electoral cards by the government.

The Civic Alliance calls on CDR parliamentarians to follow closely trends concerning civic, economic, and cultural rights that are violated by the current government.

With a view to achieving increased efficiency, the Civic Alliance calls on CDR parliamentarians to set up a single parliamentary group at the next session.

The Civic Alliance draws attention to the undisguised Romanian Television penchant to create a cult of personality in the case of President Ion Iliescu. Likewise, the Civic Alliance forcefully protests the action of Romanian Television wherein, in its current events broadcasts, it deliberately emphasizes destructive actions within the CDR and fails to report the contribution that the CDR makes in the Parliament and society in general, in the belief that publicizing such contributions might increase the democratic opposition's prestige.

The troubled times that we face currently reject frivolous politicking and compel us to promote a doctrinaire policy.

We declare that the unity of the Democratic Convention of Romania is the prerequisite for turning the CDR into a political force capable of winning the next elections and turning this success into a victory for democracy in Romania.

[Signed] The Nationwide Assembly of the Civic Alliance [Dated] Bucharest, 1 October 1994

CDR Executive Body Rejects PSDR Suspension

AU0610201494 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1800 GMT 6 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] With one vote against, cast by the Liberal Party-1993, the Executive Committee of the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR] has rejected the request of the CDR Council to initiate the procedures to suspend the Romanian Social- Democratic Party [PSDR] from the CDR, announced CDR President Emil Constantinescu this evening.

The communique read by Constantinescu to the press also points out that the members of the CDR Executive Committee also rejected the proposal made by the PSDR suggesting that the CDR presidency should be assumed by rotation. [passage omitted]

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UN Finds Bodies of 20 Soldiers on Mt Igman

AU0610153594 Paris AFP in English 1514 GMT 6 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Oct 6 (AFP)—UN peacekeepers on Thursday [6 October] found the corpses of about 20 soldiers on Mount Igman, southwest of Sarajevo, a UN spokesman here said.

UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] spokesman Paul Risley was unable to say whether the soldiers were Bosnian Serbs or troops from the Moslem-dominated Bosnian Army. A UN source in Sarajevo who asked not to be named told AFP that the Bosnian Army attacked an area southwest of Sarajevo, without specifying if it was Mount Igman.

'Mutilated' Serb Bodies

AU0610160594 Paris AFP in English 1540 GMT 6 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Oct 6 (AFP)—Special UN envoy for ex-Yugoslavia Yasushi Akashi said here Thursday [6 October] 20 Serbs were killed and their bodies mutilated in a Bosnian Army attack.

In Zagreb, UN spokesman Paul Risley said the bodies had been found by UN peacekeepers on Mount Igman, southwest of Sarajevo.

Mt Igman Attack Detailed

AU0610164194 Paris AFP in English 1610 GMT 6 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Oct 6 (AFP)—Twenty Serbs were killed and their bodies mutilated in an attack by the Moslem-led Bosnian Army, the UN's special envoy for ex-Yugoslavia Yasushi Akashi said here Thursday [6 October].

A UN Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) official who asked not to be named told AFP the Serbs, soldiers, were killed by a Bosnian Army commando who violated the demilitarised zone around the Bosnian capital in the early hours of the morning. The men attacked Serb positions near the village of Ljac, on Mount Igman, southwest of Sarajevo and on the edge of the demilitarised zone set up after Serb forces withdrew from the region.

In Zagreb, UN spokesman Paul Risley said the bodies had been found by UN peacekeepers. However he put the number of corpses at 17.

The sole road linking the besieged Bosnian capital to the rest of the Croat-Moslem federation runs along Mount Igman. Speaking to journalists after an emergency meeting with Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic here, Akashi said: "I very much hope that the agreement for the opening of the airport which was reached last night still holds and still will be honoured. But there is no denying that this casts some dark cloud on the otherwise new process that was opening before our eyes."

The agreement to reopen Sarajevo airport was concluded Wednesday after negotiations between Akashi and Serb leaders.

Mt Igman Muslims Reinforced

LD0610180094 Sarajevo Radio Republike Srpske Program for Abroad in Serbo-Croatian 1630 GMT 6 Oct 94

[Report by Modrag Stanisic]

[FBIS Translated Text] Shells fired from hand-held rocket launchers from the areas of [word indistinct], Stup, and Slanica started all of a sudden at about 1300; they rained down on our fighters' positions in Doglodi. They responded promptly, so the enemy's activities soon ceased.

Such incidents frequently take place in the northwest part of the Sarajevo theater of war, particularly around the water tank on the elevation overlooking Rajlovac and along the approaches to the main gate of the Pretis factory in Vogosca.

At the same time, the situation on Mount Igman has become more complicated. In recent days the Muslims have been sending, via the tunnel under the airport, fresh forces in large numbers and concentrating them in Malo Polje and (Jajisnik). There they set up emplacements, thus presenting a serious threat to the Serb fighters. Conflicts are not ruled out, so their combat readiness has been raised to a higher level of alert.

Akashi Remarks Questioned

AU0610195594 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 6 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] After the sudden talks with Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the presidency building today, UN special envoy Yasushi Akashi made a statement for journalists, which we will broadcast now:

[Begin Akashi recording in English with passage-by-passage translation into Serbo-Croatian] Ladies and gentlemen, I have just had a meeting with President Izetbegovic at my request concerning the tragic incident in the southern part of the demilitarized zone [DMZ] around Mount Igman, where 20 Serb soldiers were killed, including four nurses. Their bodies were found burned.

The command of the French battalion was there and established that this incident indeed took place. There have been many incidents in the demilitarized zone in the Igman area. I held talks with the Bosnian authorities on the withdrawal of all soldiers. I think that we will reach an agreement and that all armies will withdraw from that region.

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Last night, we saw soldiers of the Bosnian Army in that zone, near the location of the incident. In any case, these soldiers were involved in this, although we do not have concrete proof. I expressed my concern in view of the encouraging developments in the last 24 hours, including the exchange of prisoners and the reopening of Sarajevo airport.

President Izetbegovic gave me a guarantee that the Army will leave the DMZ. Our generals and the generals of the Bosnian Army will oversee that operation. I hope that this will not affect the peace process, and demand from all sides to cooperate fully with UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces]. [end recording]

This statement by Yasushi Akashi does not surprise those familiar with events in Bosnia-Herzegovina at all. Ever since he assumed the post that he is unfortunately holding at present, he has been demonstrating that his own wish is to present to the world the liberation struggle of the Bosnian patriots as some kind of a civil war or a religious conflict. Akashi is doing his utmost to cement the existing situation, and with his conduct is encouraging the aggressor's leaders not to accept any plans, not even the latest plan of the contact group for Bosnia-Herzegovina. He addresses the war criminal Radovan Karadzic with words such as excellency, and writes affectionate letters to him in which he praises some kind of alleged Karadzic cooperativeness.

Let us recall, Mr. Akashi directly influenced NATO not to bomb the chetnik forces around Gorazde. About 10 days ago, he also opposed the bombing of an ammunition store near Sarajevo. The death of several aggressor soldiers is a sad event for him. Let us also say, for the sake of the truth, that 18 civilians were killed in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the last week alone. Over 80 were wounded.

Why is Mr. Akashi not reacting to the 143,800 Bosniaks killed since the beginning of the war? Among them are 16,700 children. Or perhaps Akashi thinks that the Bosniaks are fair game. The more of them the aggressor kills, the more comprehensive the results of his so-called diplomatic activities.

Why is Akashi not questioning the expulsion of the thousands of Bosniak Muslims from Bijeljina, Janja, Banja Luka? Why does he not go to Banja Luka? Where is his courage and honesty? The last Bosniak Muslims from the Rogatice region were expelled last night at the Brotherhood and Unity Bridge in Sarajevo in front of his very eyes.

Mr. Akashi, what is genocide in your view? Be honest enough before the patriots of the suffering Bosnia-Herzegovina and do not come here to sell us a pig in a poke. We say thank you to you. We do not need the kind of help that you are offering us. The Bosniak Muslims and all those who consider Bosnia-Herzegovina as their only home have their pride.

'Massacre' Lights 'Powder Keg'

LD0610221394 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2056 GMT 6 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Lukavica, 6 Oct (TANJUG)—The Sarajevo-Romanija Corps of the Srpska republic army this evening warned that the massacre of the Serb soldiers, which was committed this morning by the Muslim forces, "has lit a powder keg that threatens to set ablaze not only Sarajevo, but also a much wider area."

A communique issued by the Information Service of the corps, which was forwarded to TANJUG, says that the UN peacekeepers "bear responsibility for the crimes committed because of their irresponsible behavior and failure to fulfill assumed obligations."

The corps communique says that the Muslims renewed their "attacks today on almost all Serb positions" and that "a Muslim sabotage-terrorist group infiltrated the area of Cakla on Mt. Igman, where a number of Serb soldiers were killed," not specifying the number of soldiers.

The corps stresses that Muslim forces reached the Serb positions "via the protected zone that the Serbs liberated and placed under UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] control on the orders of the international community."

"The gravity of this crime is all the greater for the fact that it was committed immediately after the promise made by UN envoy Yasushi Akashi and UNPROFOR Commanders Bertrand de Lapresle and Michael Rose that they would—even at the price of using aircraft against Muslims—return Muslim forces to their previous positions and prevent anyone from crossing the territory under UNPROFOR control," the corps said in the statement.

The statement adds that Muslim attacks "were particularly frequent in the past few days, the fiercest ones being in the regions of Mt. Igman, Mt. Bjelasnica, and Trnovo." Likewise, "the central parts of Ilijas, Ilidza, Vogosca, Rajlovac, and New Sarajevo were not spared."

The Serb military sources this evening announced that the Serb side filed a strong protest with UNPROFOR because of the Muslim attacks.

Rose Threatens Force in DMZ

AU0710102894 Paris AFP in English 1010 GMT 7 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Oct 7 (AFP)—UN Bosnia commander Lt-General Sir Michael Rose has threatened to use force to expel Bosnian troops from a UN-monitored demilitarised zone unless they agree to withdraw peacefully, a senior UN spokesman said Friday.

Rose spokesman Lt-Colonel Tim Spicer said the Moslem-dominated Bosnian Government had been warned

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to order its forces out of the Mount Igman area southwest of the city or face action "to ensure that they comply with the agreement. If this matter is not resolved peaceablly, i.e. they withdraw their forces to their normal position then it would be a matter for UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] to attempt to enforce the agreement," he said.

Serbs, UN Agree To Reopen Sarajevo Airport

LD0610145894 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1446 GMT 6 Oct 94

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Belgrade, Oct. 6 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Serbs and United Nations representatives have agreed to reopen Sarajevo airport for relief aid on Thursday, U.N. special envoy Yasushi Akashi said.

News agencies reported that Akashi made the announcement after six-hour talks with Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic late Wednesday evening in Pale, administrative center of the Bosnian Serb republic. Akashi said Karadzic had demanded that the U.N. Protection Forces guarantee the safety of humanitarian flights, clearly fearing that the Bosnian Serbs could be blamed for possible Bosnian Muslim attacks on Sarajevo Airport. [passage omitted]

Akashi said he had also discussed with Karadzic the exchange of prisoners between the Bosnian Serbs and Muslims, as well as the overall military situation in Bosnia. Akashi said the current POW exchange was a significant step forward involving nearly year-long negotiations. The exchange of about 300 POWs had originally been scheduled for Wednesday, but due to bad weather the evacuation of the wounded from the Muslim-held eastern Bosnian town of Gorazde had to be carried out via land routes instead by helicopter.

The problems faced by U.N. convoys were also debated, said Akashi adding that the Bosnian Serbs had given assurances regarding free movement of convoys through the Bosnian Serb republic.

Airport Reopening in Doubt

AU0610142594 Paris AFP in English 1416 GMT 6 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Oct 6 (AFP)—An accord on the reopening of Sarajevo Airport was under threat Thursday after the Moslem-dominated Bosnian army violated a demilitarised zone to attack Serb forces, a UN source said here.

UN special representative Yasushi Akashi was urgently recalled from the airport for crisis talks with Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic in a bid to save the airport agreement, the source added, which was reached late Wednesday after six hours of stormy talks with Serb leaders.

Krajisnik: Serbs Do Not Want War With NATO

AU0610160694 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 6 Oct 94 p 3

[BETA-attributed report: "Compromise Can Be Reached in Geneva"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Jagodina—Momcilo Krajisnik, chairman of the Srpska assembly, said yesterday that there were indications that the international Contact Group was ready to correct the maps on the territorial demarcation in Bosnia.

In an interview with Radio Jagodina, Krajisnik however did not give details about this, but he did stress that "some compromises, acceptable to all three sides, can be reached in Geneva." He rejected the possibility of a meeting between Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and President Alija Izetbegovic of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to discuss exchanges of territory. "The Muslims are not interested in talks, as the proposed maps suit their plans," Krajisnik said, adding that only the United States could influence the Muslim leadership to negotiate with the Serbs.

Asked to comment on the commitment of U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry to a more active role of the NATO air force in Bosnia, Krajisnik said that the Serbs side did not want war with a superior enemy. "We will certainly use our right to defense, but it would not be good to worsen the situation," he said.

Karadzic Discusses State Sovereignty

AU0610164294 Pale JAVNOST in Serbo-Croatian 1 Oct 94 pp 8-12

[Interview with Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic by Kolja Besarovic; place and date not given: "Fated for Victory"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Since the UN Security Council resolution on the further tightening of sanctions against the "uncooperative Bosnian Serbs" was issued last week, the Srpska republic has been facing complete political, economic, and information isolation. In addition, it has been confronted with new attacks and threats from both direct enemies and their powerful international sponsors. In this situation it is only natural that there is the wish to hear the opinion of the most competent personality in the Srpska republic, namely Mr. Radovan Karadzic. He has to be given credit for the success that the Bosnian Serbs have had so far in the realization of their aims. Despite his numerous obligations and meetings, he found time to express his attitudes on current political issues in an interview for JAVNOST.*

[Besarovic] The UN Security Council issued a new resolution several days ago by which the sanctions against the Srpska republic have been tightened. Does not this mean that the Srpska republic has been implicitly recognized as an independent state? What measures

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will the Srpska republic leadership take now that the international community has made this step?

[Karadzic] Aleksa Buha, the minister of foreign affairs of the Serbian republic, was right when he pointed out that the UN Charter dealt with states and not parts of them. This means that the Srpska republic has been recognized. What is more, I think that there is a good thing in this bad constellation—the international community is now addressing its requirements to Pale and no longer to Belgrade. I would like to inform readers that Yugoslavia and Serbia are completely innocent in this war. We made all our political and military decisions independently; Belgrade was not able to influence certain crucial matters. We asked them for advice and obeyed as one obeys his elder brother. This will be the case in future, too, but the decisions important for the Bosnian Serbs and their institutions will be passed by the Bosnian Serbs until we merge into one state, which is our ultimate aim. The Srpska republic can only be abolished by its people, and the people will do this only under one condition—that this territory becomes a part of Serbia. Otherwise the Srpska republic will retain its sovereignty as a state.

I would like to make a short comment about the latest interview with the respected academician Mihajlo Markovic, in which he expressed a far-reaching, perhaps the most far-reaching, statement in the 20th century history of the Serbian people. He said that we would not merge because of ideological reasons. First of all, I do not think that the respected academician Mihajlo Markovic, myself, or any other individual can oppose our merger. The decision on whether we shall merge or not will be made by the people. As far as the differences between us are concerned, I would like to deny the lies ascribed to us concerning our alleged support of a monarchy. This option has not at all been seriously considered in the Srpska republic. There are people in our leadership who are fond of monarchy, but we are not working on it. We think that that is a matter of luxury. The Serbs should first create a large state and complete all the other tasks before organizing a referendum on whether they want a monarchy. This matter might be discussed 10 years after all the crises have passed. I am personally completely neutral in this respect; I would not even participate in such a referendum.

As far as the rehabilitation of chetniks is concerned, we have to say that there were criminals among both the chetniks and the partisans, but we do not consider them a part of our heritage. A large majority of chetnik and partisan fighters against the occupier and the Ustasha were patriots. These partisans and chetniks are Serbian heritage; the criminals, present on both sides, are a misfortune for our nation. We have rehabilitated the chetnik patriots. Old people often ask us with tears in their eyes how it is possible that we, who remained loyal to the king and the homeland and who defended the Romanija, Ozren, and Manjaca mountains from the Ustasha in the then Independent Croatian State [1941-45], are called traitors. Whom did we betray? The leadership of the Srpska republic did only what was necessary to reach reconciliation. There is no reconciliation if one side wants to take an advantage.

Then, regarding privatization, we believe that our aim should be a market economy accompanied by privatization. The state should not be interested in controlling companies, but should only regulate relations.

[Besarovic] A complete media blockade of the Srpska republic has now been introduced. What measures will be taken by the Srpska republic in response to this pressure?

[Karadzic] We shall not introduce a blockade on everything that comes from Serbia because we think that nobody is entitled to enforce a blockade. We want our people to know what is going on in Serbia and what official Serbia thinks. We have never canceled Belgrade's main news bulletin or newspapers. The lie was told by President Lilic [of the FRY] that the Srpska republic had introduced a blockade against Yugoslavia and Serbia. We shall make efforts to see to it that our reporters remain free, that our people remain free, and that they get the complete information in order to be able to make their judgments based on it. During the referendum Serbian Television programs were regularly broadcast on the second channel, the Serbian Television news program was broadcast on the first channel, although they ran propaganda for the approval of the Contact Group plan. If we had not done so, we would not have been democratic.

[Besarovic] We assume that social policy will be one of the crucial elements in the general policy pursued by the Srpska republic.

[Karadzic] Social policy will always be an element of our policy, not only because of Serbian Orthodoxy, but also for humane reasons. It is necessary for the survival of every policy. Socialism is excluded, however! Nobody in Serbia should be scared of our social system. Our people will also decide on these matters in a referendum, by voting for either the parties that want socialism or for those which want freedom in behavior and the economy instead. Individuals, no matter how great or important they are, no matter how good they are in political theory and how powerful they are, cannot decide on whether or not our people will merge into one state.

[Besarovic] Belgrade politicians are reproaching the Srpska republic leadership for attaching too much importance to the role of the Serbian Orthodox church?

[Karadzic] Except for the communist period, the church has always been important for the Serbian people. Our faith is a source of our enthusiasm and spiritual pleasure, but it is also a source of our suffering. We were killed in these areas not because we had another skin color, but because we had another system of values, different beliefs, a different morality, and different social ideas that originated from Serbian Orthodoxy. It is not true

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that nowhere in the world does the church have the role that we want it to play. In Britain, for example, the church is not separate from the state, and the British sovereign is at the same time the head of the church. This is not the case here, as the church is separate from the state, but the political leadership respects it as much as the people do. If it is respected by the people, the political leadership cannot have the right not to respect it. Apart from that, Greece and the Srpska republic are surrounded by enemies of Orthodoxy so that we have to defend ourselves together with Orthodoxy and other things.

[Besarovic] We would like you to comment on the thesis that Belgrade does not want the merger now, not only for ideological reasons, but because of the different concepts for the future state. According to these theses, Serbia is still helping the Srpska republic since it wants to preserve a confederal, internationally recognized and unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina, which could become an important link in any reintegration of Yugoslavia.

[Karadzic] Serbia is not helping the Srpska republic at all now. As far as Bosnia-Herzegovina is concerned as a state, we shall never accept it. Someone has to come to defeat and disarm us in order to force our poor people, who want to stay here, to accept Bosnia-Herzegovina. Our knights will certainly fight and die, but they will not accept Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state. A reintegration of Yugoslavia is possible, but not through the occupation of territories and the suppression of Serbian nature; only by respecting this nature. This means that the Srpska republic has to be accepted, either as a part of Serbia, or as a sovereign and independent state, which can then enter a future Yugoslavia, if it is established and if there is interest in it. I personally think that if all the Serbian states are recognized, Yugoslavia will never come back into existence. Perhaps only as a local economic region, because every Yugoslavia up to now has been created in order to keep the Serbian giant under water and to weaken the nations in this territory through mutual conflicts.

[Besarovic] Does this mean that the Pale political leadership will insist on the international recognition of the Srpska republic as an independent state, or is it possible for it to accept staying in a confederation or union of an internationally recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina if the Contact Group, or someone else, offers more favorable maps?

[Karadzic] We can talk about everything after the recognition of our sovereignty and independence. It is good if we are offered a confederation with Serbia, since only sovereign entities can enter a confederation. We would be sovereign in other words. Whether we shall at the same time be a member of some kind of the Bosnian union depends on what this union will be. If the union is planned as a state, we shall not be a part of it, but if it is a European-type union with member states with their own currency, independent foreign policy, and economic relations with foreign countries, which I would especially like to stress, then we could make such a compromise. Sovereignty and independence are very important for us because there is neither freedom nor democracy without them. Nor is there economic development without them. We are prepared for this and have already received attractive offers from abroad for establishing links with other economic powers. It will be impossible to establish these economic connections, however, if Izetbegovic decides on our economic relations with the world. That is why we need sovereignty!

[Besarovic] There are views that the cooperativeness of the Srpska republic leadership, or to be more precise, its readiness to make certain concessions during this war in order to achieve peace as soon as possible, is a sign of weakness, as it has always been followed by new pressures. How would you comment on this?

[Karadzic] I think that your statement is true. The world wants to accomplish its tasks if it can and if the price is not too high. The cardinal mistake made by the Serbian people, that is by all the Serbian states, was that we did not merge into one state in time, in 1991, and confront the world with our legitimate requirements and ambitions. In that case we would have made considerably fewer concessions, and our state would have been recognized by now. Every concession makes our enemies in the West more courageous, and our friends in these countries less courageous, since our enemies are happy that the pressures are bearing fruit. A nation that makes concessions can be compared to a man who rides a sleigh down a hill in such a manner that he cannot stop it. I am afraid that the latest concessions made by Serbia and Yugoslavia could have the same effect as the sleigh on a hill—the international community could appear with new requirements toward Serbian Krajina, Kosovo, and Vojvodina, and the sleigh, as you know, is difficult to stop.

[Besarovic] Has the West in your opinion given up the intention to reduce Serbia to its 1912 borders?

[Karadzic] The Western strategy does not change so frequently. I would like to remind you that OSSERVATORE ROMANO, the official newspaper of the Vatican, wrote that Serbia should be reduced to its 1912 borders. I can say without false modesty that our struggle has put off actions in Kosovo and Vojvodina and thus saved Serbia for all time. It is true that we have—after two and a half years—succeeded in achieving a change in international relations, which could enable Serbia not to come under the hammer that destroys states, but we still have to count on the possibility that Western strategists have remained devoted to their original intentions to tear the Balkans apart and put them under Western domination. Their logic is clear. If we succeed in creating a state now, we shall have a large and important European state, with 12 to 13 million inhabitants, with an excellent geographic, political, and strategic position, a state of very diligent people. In other words, it would be

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a modern European nation with which the West would have to do business. If we fail to create a unitary state, it is possible that Serbia will soon disappear. Serbia with its population consisting of 65 percent Serbs and 35 percent other nationalities, with a very low birth rate and bad borders, unless we merge, would not be able to guarantee the Serbian people their existence. In just a few decades it would be governed by other people, by a political majority which will not consist of Serbs. The only chance for the Serbian people is to merge with the Srpska republic and the republic of Serbian Krajina. Everything else is fatal blindness and irresponsibility toward future generations!

[Besarovic] The United States is announcing more severe measures; they are even threatening air strikes as a means to force the Srpska republic's leadership to accept the contact plan. Will the Srpska republic do anything about this and take the advice that only offensive military action can prevent a lengthy and tough war?

[Karadzic] We have made neither large-scale offensives nor counter-offensives over the last four or five months. We are defending ourselves in a passive way, but we have been successful, so that the intentions of Muslim Bosnia to return to certain territories have proven futile. If the United Nations and NATO become more hostile toward us, we shall take the necessary steps; we have taken some already in order to show the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] that it is in our country and that it can be denied hospitality. In other words, hostilities can be responded to with hostilities. NATO should not even consider bombing Serbian positions. We shall shoot down their aircraft and seize their pilots, and the United Nations, which orders these attacks, will be denied hospitality. In a victorious march we shall then draw the final borders of our state. We do not want this to happen, however. I am telling you this reluctantly, but if we are forced to, we shall fight in the way that we are able to.

[Besarovic] Will it come to the announced lifting of the arms embargo on the Muslims and the departure of the "blue helmets" from the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, or will there be an attempt to carry out a modified version, similar to that desired by Izetbegovic—that the embargo is lifted, but the international "peacekeeping" force remains here?

[Karadzic] The international community obeys Izetbegovic, in other words, he has enough allies to try to realize such a scenario. We, however, will not allow the embargo to be lifted and UN troops remain in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina at the same time. They have prevented a total Muslim defeat so far, and if the embargo is lifted so that Izetbegovic's troops can be openly armed—although it has to be admitted that they have also been well armed hitherto— we shall require the UNPROFOR to be removed from our territory and from our borders immediately. It will then come to a bloody war, which will spill over our borders.

[Besarovic] It has been mentioned increasingly frequently that U.S. troops, which could be deployed directly on the Muslim side, could come to the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. Do you personally believe that the most powerful superpower will take such a step?

[Karadzic] I would like to see this happen! It would make our task much easier.

[Besarovic] It is well known that the Srpska republic leadership has so far preferred quality of territory to its percentage in the negotiations about territorial distribution. Could you, in spite of this, say what is the minimal limit below which you will not go in future negotiations?

[Karadzic] We possess 64 percent and control between 68 and 70 percent of the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. This means that we have no reason to go below 50 percent, but we would readily accept less than 64 percent, since we want to achieve peace immediately. We need peace not only because of the lifting of the sanctions from Yugoslavia and from the Srpska republic, but also because we know exactly what we want to do with our society and our state. We want a model free society; we want to enrich our people, to promote science and culture. We have good and realistic plans to achieve this aim. If the international community wanted to hear what the Serbs say, we would even go significantly below 64 percent of the territory in exchange for sovereignty. Sovereignty as well as quality of territory are necessary.

[Besaravic] Sovereignty meaning independence?

[Karadzic] Independence meaning the right to self-determination.

[Besarovic] As an internationally recognized state?

[Karadzic] As a subject according to international law.

[Besarovic] A subject that would be a member of the United Nations, or which could make use of the right to merge with another state?

[Karadzic] Yes. If we make such an agreement, we could also be represented by somebody else in the United Nations, but we insist on being independent and—as I have already said—we are ready to accept less than 64 percent of the territory. I cannot tell you exactly what percentage we would accept, but it is not the quantity but the quality of the territory that counts. The main Serbian territories must become a part of our state, the territory has to be compact and resources must be equally distributed, since we do not want to be pushed back into the mountains again, as was the case under Turkish rule in these territories.

[Besarovic] There is also the problem of the large cities, since all the urban centers of pre-war Bosnia-Herzegovina, except Banja Luka and the Sarajevo suburbs, are part of the Muslim-Croatian territory. Will you keep on insisting on a partition of Sarajevo so that the Serbs would have at least a part of the largest city in this former central Yugoslav republic?

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[Karadzic] If the 50-50 percent ratio is discussed, we are asking for a half of Sarajevo, and we want to have a half the mines, half the resources, half the power stations, half of everything. Access to the sea and Serbian Sarajevo are things that we cannot discuss—they have to exist because they are the conditions for our existence. We have seen that the international community has made efforts to grant the Muslims access to the sea. Why should the Serbs not get it, too? According to Paragraph 10 of the Corfu Declaration—which was signed by the Yugoslav committee, a member of which was Dusan Vasiljevic on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs—all the warring factions are entitled to access to the sea. In other words we are entitled to access even if there is no exchange of territories with Croatia. We have, however, chosen a more honorable solution toward Croatia—not to make use of this right, but to agree to an exchange of territories, so that Dubrovnik would have a deeper hinterland. If the Croats do not agree to the exchange, we will insist on getting half of the coast at Neum, which we are entitled to. If this solution is unacceptable to Croatia, since it would split it into two parts, we shall ask for access to the sea near Prevlaka. In order to have normal access to the sea, we are ready to exchange territory around Dubrovnik, which is an honorable solution for Croatia, since in that case it would get nine times more territory than it would be giving.

[Besarovic] Since the "Washington" Croatian-Muslim Federation is increasingly bursting at the seams, is there a possibility for a revival of conflicts between the present "allies," and is there the chance of Bosnia-Herzegovina being divided between the Serbs and the Croats?

[Karadzic] If it comes to war, there will be no Muslims or their state. If there is a political solution, the Muslims can save important territories, themselves as a nation, and their state. In that case, however, there may be no Croats. This means that the Croats will also have to save their territories because there is no state and nationality without territory. If Herceg-Bosna loses its territory, the Croats will disappear from the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, which will then be divided between the Serbs and the Muslims. It is only natural that we are not the Croats' enemies, nor are we the Muslims' enemies; we propose that both of them retain their territories. We have helped both from the civilian point of view, we have helped the Croats also from the military point of view because it is not in the Serbian national interest for the Croats to be defeated in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is quite certain that it will come to a conflict between the Muslims and the Croats since the Muslims do not want to make any territorial concessions to their federal "partners."

Especially not in central Bosnia, near Zepce and Usora. The Muslims' desire for Croatian territories is getting bigger and bigger because the two- and-a-half year war against the Serbs did not bring a significant part of the territory. They will try to compensate for this with the Croats.

[Besarovic] When will it come to a merger of the Srpska republic with the republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK]?

[Karadzic] We are merging many things even now. The sanctions imposed on us by Yugoslavia are preventing us now from merging economic elements, because the payments system has also been interrupted with the RSK. The educational and information systems, together with other state elements, have already merged, and we shall make further mergers, too. We shall create a unitary information space, in which the news programs broadcast from the RSK will also be received. Apart from this, we shall establish a soccer division as well as divisions for other competitions. We shall integrate important elements and the formal merger can wait, since we do not want to give Croatia a cheap excuse to attack us. If there is an attack on Krajina, however, the Srpska republic will certainly defend it. Not because this is dependent on someone's wish but because we have signed such a declaration and because it is the same nation that lives in the RSK. In other words, we shall not introduce any sanctions against the republic of Serbian Krajina, regardless of what happens, and we shall defend it if it is attacked, regardless of what happens.

[Besarovic] Is there a danger that—despite the wish of the Srpska republic leadership—a nation of western Serbs is established if the present negative process continues, or a danger that two Serbian states will exist for a long time—if conditions are more favorable?

[Karadzic] You can see that one nation, the German nation, is divided. Everything is united now apart from Austria. Hitler's "anschluss" failed and two nations were created. Ukraine is nothing but a Russian Krajina, Moldavia [Moldova] has created its own nation and does not want to live together with Romania. It is dangerous if new nations are born from the Serbian national body—Muslims, Montenegrins, or Macedonians, since this would be a loss for the Serbian nation. That is why we only have the adjective "Serbian" in the name of our state, just like Croatia has the name of Croatia, Bulgaria that of Bulgaria, and Greece that of Greece. We wanted to let everybody know that we do not want a new nation to be born within the Serbian nation. Even if we are not allowed to merge, or if anyone in Serbia opposes the merger, we shall try not to create a separate nation. That is the reason we have decided to promote the eastern variety of Serbo-Croatian in our state. We have not prohibited the western version, but we support the eastern version as the standard language spoken in the Srpska republic. We think that Serbia will face a great danger if we do not merge and remain one nation. The present leadership is committed to this solution and it is ready to resign as soon as the Srpska republic merges into one state with Serbia; it is, however, possible that the spirit of autonomy and the wish for a separate nation is born under future leaderships. Serbia would be more affected by such an option than we, but we would be affected, too, because we would be a small nation, with only one and a half to 2 million inhabitants.

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[Besarovic] Is the aim of this struggle the creation of a unitary Serbian state?

[Karadzic] Yes, we think that the most stable Serbian state would be a unitary Serbian state. It should be characterized by democratic decentralization, not of the confederal type, but rather of the French type, for example. France has preserved its unity through strong central power. It is inconceivable that there are people in Serbia who do not want us to merge. We are not coming as beggars to Serbia; we are bringing a nice dowry with us. We would be a rich country, and, apart from that, the Serbian nation would get freshness and vitality. If, however, this merger is opposed, there is the possibility that the distance between us would become larger, which would be a catastrophe.

[Besarovic] For the people on both banks of the Drina?

[Karadzic] Yes, for the people on both sides of the Drina. The Srpska republic and the Krajina will always have the same mentality, but a border along the Drina would be a catastrophe, primarily for Serbia. We would like to appeal to Serbia to lift the economic sanctions imposed on us as soon as possible, to establish a normal economic life because the world would accept this, too; military and political sanctions should remain effective.

[Besarovic] When the Serbian national movement was established in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, you insisted that one of its main aims is the reconciliation between the parts of the Serbian nation. Do you agree with assessments that a serious problem resulted from the present war circumstances, which give rise to negative tendencies—that people with academic qualifications and the urban population are leaving? How could these people be brought back under the present circumstances? Can it be claimed that they were treated like, let us say, a sect?

[Karadzic] I think that a large part of the educated population remained in the Serbian Democratic Party, which is said to be a movement—it used to be a movement, but it was a political party at the same time and participated in the elections. These people stayed under very unfavorable conditions, both in the vicinity of Sarajevo and in other parts of the republic. It is true that a proportion of people with academic qualifications left because of the standard of living, but many of them are still giving us signals that they belong to us, that they have remained with us and that they will return.

I think that considerably fewer people have left than is assumed. Those who left can return at any time, and we expect that more and more of them will. It is possible that there has been a kind of "segregation" during the war, because those who are in the trenches think that that is the only place to fight. They forget, however, that television, radio, the Serbian Academy of Sciences, as well as any other work in state institutions is a trench, too. All these places are trenches, and this kind of segregation will lose its importance as we approach peace. The people who are suffering most, and these are the people in the trenches, have the right to point out this fact, and I do not think that they have such a relation only toward people with higher education but toward everyone who is not on the front line. The heroes in the trenches may have a certain right to tease those who are not there.

[Besarovic] You have been exposed to criticism, attacks, even to very nasty insinuations. Would you have accepted your present role if you had known that history would take such a course—since the "minimum" aim of the Serbian Democratic Party before the war was to save the then Yugoslavia?

[Karadzic] I would have changed only one thing in my life—I would have had more children. I am very happy with my two children, God protect them, but I would have liked to have more. This is the only thing that I would change. I would like to repeat all the other things—my profession, my early marriage, and my affection for poetry and my friends. My friendships have lasted for a long time, for 30 years, and my friends have never turned into enemies. That is why I think that the disassociation from our brothers in Serbia will never grow into hostility in my heart, although I feel a certain bitterness and sadness over the nasty words aimed at us.

Tuzla-Podrinje Head, UNHCR Official Meet

AU0610124194 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 6 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] President of the Tuzla-Podrinje Canton Izet Hadzic received a UNHCR delegation headed by (Karim Abu Zaid), head of the mission's Zagreb headquarters. Key problems of the humanitarian situation in the canton were discussed. Particular attention was devoted to the issue of Srebrenica and refugees whose number has risen to 250,000. Heating in the coming winter months and how to secure it throughout the Tuzla-Podrinje Canton was also discussed. (Karim Abu Zaid) stressed that the UNHCR has taken all the necessary preparatory measures and has consulted with the UN Protection Forces in order to ensure that the humanitarian aid supply next winter is better and more regular. President Hadzic asked (Mrs. Abu Zaid) to see that the UNHCR office takes over responsibility for Srebrenica because it is unforgivable that the region is cared for from Belgrade [sentence as heard].

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Krajina 'Hysterical' as Prices Begin Rising

AU0610180294 Novi Sad DNEVNIK in Serbo-Croatian 6 Oct 94 p 2

[Report by "M.B.": "Prices of Strategic Products Increase"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Knin, 5 Oct—Over the last 10 days the prices of strategic products in the republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK] have gone up by 25 to 30 percent.

The republic's market inspectors explain this rapid jump in the prices of flour, bread, sugar, oil, and cigarettes as the result of market confusion, misunderstandings of import-export deals, the increase in wholesale prices, the alleged blockade of the RSK, and disruption in payment operations. The hysterical atmosphere created by the fear of shortages has also contributed significantly to the sudden jump in prices.

In such an atmosphere prices in both dinars and German marks have appeared, and thus the German mark has again been introduced into payment operations, albeit discreetly. According to the inspectors and Mile Bosnic, RSK trade and tourism minister, a pacification of the prices is expected once trade traffic is established between Yugoslavia and the RSK.

It is only a question of time before the Sremska Raca border crossing is opened to convoys and goods for the RSK.

Officials in the trade ministry of the RSK say that there will still be disruptions on the market and—to protect citizens' endangered standard of living—the government is expected to make a decision to cap the prices of strategic products through interventions from the state's reserves.

Article Assesses Montenegro Border Delineation

AU0610130794 Split NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 30 Sep 94 p 10

[Luko Brailo article: "Will There Be a War Over the South Border?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The Prevlaka problem has not been resolved," "Irresponsible Provocation of Instability," "Borders Are Drawn by Agreement" are only some of the key positions the Montenegrin state media have emphasized in the past several days in the announcements and reactions of the officials and political parties concerning the announcement of the decision of the Croatian State Committee for Borders and its positions regarding the new sea border with Montenegro.

Before embarking upon explanations concerning who "provokes instability" and why, we should remind ourselves of the statement of the president of the State Committee, Dr. Hrvoje Kacic, who said that the "land border with Montenegro remains the same, but with the change of the territorial sea border, Croatia gains 252 square km." While this necessary change was "a surprise" to the Montenegrin and FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] side, the Croatian side considers it a logical and completely justified move. Namely, the former sea border with Montenegro was "based" on the never verified (and wrong) division of the former Yugoslav maritime municipalities regarding their administrative participation at sea in these municipalities. These "borders" were never confirmed by any of the bodies of the then Yugoslavia, but in 1970 there appeared a maritime map with the "lines" drawn thus, and in the area between the former municipalities of Dubrovnik and Herceg-Novi they were marked at the expense of the Croatian territory. Croatia, as an internationally recognized country, therefore applied the proper method of determining the border at the sea, in accordance with the principles and regulations of the 1982 Maritime Law Convention. It is important that the land border between Croatia and Montenegro, that is, the border at the coast in the southwestern part of the Boka Kotorska Bay at cape Konfin, was determined without dispute.

The cape is north of the Cipavica Bay, some 600 meters from Cape Kobila. It is equally indisputable that, in the western part, at the entrance to Boka Kotorska, Cape Ostro marks the ultimate land point at the south of the Croatian state territory. The new sea border was established by drawing the line between Cape Ostro and the island of Mamula, and along the middle of the line a vertical was drawn toward the open sea. At a distance of 12 nautical miles on the vertical line the sea border was marked, establishing the border of the Croatian territorial sea in the area. This is what the Croatian "sin" regarding the new sea border is all about. Maps with the border determined this way will soon appear in official use. It is not necessary to go into too much discussion of how important exploiting the territorial waters and the so-called economic belt (which is further 40 nautical miles in the southern part of the Adriatic) is for Croatia, considering the fact that the territory belongs to Croatia, and that our country should exercise full sovereignty in that respect.

The Montenegrin reactions, especially those of Foreign Minister Miodrag Lekic, concerning the "irresponsible provocation of instability in the Prevlaka area" show that the people in the FRY still hope that part of the internationally recognized territory of the south of Croatia will be Montenegrin and Serbian after the so-called just demarcation. Namely, the leading Montenegrin diplomat expects that "within the integral solution to the crisis on the territories of the former Yugoslavia stability will be achieved in the region through a definite territorial demarcation on a permanent basis." Minister Lekic said the decision of the Croatian State Committee was "a one-sided projection and a wish that prejudices the solution of the issue outside the realistic and established framework," and established that "after the London Conference our country accepted the temporary compromise that the territory of the Prevlaka peninsula be under the control of the UN."

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Lekic's positions undoubtedly confirm that nothing has changed in the Montenegrin attitude toward Prevlaka since the summer of 1991. On the contrary, these positions, although stated diplomatically, have been radicalized, and they again imply the evoking of new (armed?) conflicts in the more or less calm situation at the border between Croatia and Montenegro, following the Montenegrin and "JNA" aggression in the Dubrovnik area. It is simply not true that after the London Conference the "FRY" allegedly agreed to "a compromise and temporary solution," since it is clear that the Yugo-army left the barracks at Prevlaka on 20 October 1992 on the basis of the provisions of the Vance plan (Articles 13 and 18), which relate to "the 'JNA' leaving the territory of Croatia." It is also not unknown that on that occasion the Yugo-army attempted to leave the positions at Konavli to the so-called Herzegovinian Corps, headed by Bozidar Vucurevic, so that the "Serb Herzegovina" could get the so highly desired access to the sea. The truth is that this intention was thwarted by the Croatian Army headed by General of the Army Janko Bobetko, which made the eastern Herzegovinian chetniks leave for Zupci and Grab, from where they have been retaliating by shooting at Dubrovnik airport.

This is the truth concerning the implementation of the Geneva agreement between Tudjman and Cosic, rather than the "compromise and a temporary solution." Namely, Croatia has, although attacked without reason, been the side that has made an immense concession in accepting that the so-called wider Prevlaka region (from Kumbor at Boka to Gruda at Konavli) be demilitarized, so that the basis for as tolerable a life and as tolerable a restoration as possible in the border area could be created. By leaving the barracks at Prevlaka the Yugoslav politicians and the military leadership indisputably provided proof of having been aggressors, and it seems that almost two years later they still have the same wish. The commander of the so-called Yugoslav Navy, the quickly promoted Admiral Dojcilo Isakovic, reacted similarly to Minister Lekic. He claimed that "it is in our interest that the Prevlaka problem be resolved through political means to the benefit of the FRY, though the 'Yugoslav Army' has another solution in case this does not work out."

Dr. Novak Kilibarda, leader of the National Party of Montenegro, also evokes the Yugo-army, by appealing to the "military leadership of the federal state to promptly protect the Yugoslav territorial waters, considering Prevlaka a constituent part of Montenegro, that is, Yugoslavia." Moreover, Kilibarda demands of the Assembly of Montenegro that "the responsibility of the president of the Republic of Montenegro for continually deluding the public concerning Prevlaka be determined." It seems that the central problem of the Montenegrin leaders and the political parties, who have not managed to explain to the Montenegrin and Yugoslav public why the "war for peace" was waged in the summer of 1991, lies precisely in this reference to Momir Bulatovic. Another indisputable truth is that at the beginning of the attack on the south of Croatia Prevlaka was from the "SFRY" [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] side used as casus belli, though later it was established that the "liberators" had to withdraw, on the orders of the same political and military leaders who had sent them to war.

It should also be pointed out that it was because of "Prevlaka and the operations at the Dubrovnik-Herzegovina battlefield" that 156 military conscripts from Montenegro died, over 900 were wounded, and over 300 seriously disabled. This is the reason the stories about the so-called compromise and temporary solution are being told, since the public there has never been fully introduced to the key provisions of the Vance plan, or the fact that the presence of the blue observers at Prevlaka does not mean the de- territorialization of the area that has belonged to Konavli, that is, the Dubrovnik area, that is, Croatia, since the year 1419. Nor is the public there familiar with the positions of Momir Bulatovic expressed at The Hague Conference of 18 October 1991, when he accepted the reasonable Croatian proposal that stated that "after the JNA withdraws, Croatia will not start militarization from my Cape Ostro."

The reasons the public there is presented with the positions that temporarily suit the authorities in Montenegro, that is, Belgrade, are therefore clear. However, with the question if these are only statements for "internal use" and an attempt at appeasing the public, it should be clearly stated that it is known that the officials of the "FRY" are still putting pressure on the international peace mediators, Owen and Stoltenberg, to give particular emphasis to the topic of Prevlaka in the talks with the Croatian authorities. Minister Lekic directly admits this in his statement by talking about "many contacts with the representatives of the international community concerning the geopolitical and strategic importance of Prevlaka," and the "acknowledging of our arguments to the benefit of a permanent and just solution." Another fact not to be neglected is that Owen and Stoltenberg have recently, during their visit to Podgorica, announced a visit to Prevlaka, and then secretly "inquired" about "certain areas" in Konavli, without the presence of the representatives of Croatian authorities, in the part of Konavli that minister Lekic would "justly demarcate" (from Kobila to Cape Ostro) for Montenegro and the "FRY," and a little further "around Molunat," an area that has long been viewed by Dr. Radovan Karadzic and the other leaders of the Bosnian Serbs as the "access to the sea." Finally, it should be openly stated that Dr. Radoje Kontic's "government of the FRY" has, for the second time in a year, postponed the assembly discussion and the passing of the "Law on the Territorial Sea and the Epicontinental Belt of the FRY," with the remark that the issue is "the just demarcation between Montenegro, that is, the FRY, with Croatia, in the Prevlaka area."

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Commentary on Tudjman's 'Impatience' With UN

AU0610192594 Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 30 Sep 94 p 2

[Commentary by Drazen Vukov-Colic: "A Cry on the Border of Patience"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The beginning was not good, but that does not mean that it will all end badly. In the crucial 48 hours that remained from the appearance of the first draft concerning the nature and length of the new UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] mandate until its predictable adoption at the Security Council (on 30 September), the Croatian state and diplomacy were all over the place trying to add to the final text of the resolution at least some of Croatian "essential demands." Not even the president of the republic is happy with what the French proposed at the beginning on behalf of the four-plus-one group, nor will the indignant Croatian public be if everything remains like that. The reporters who were present unanimously reassured their readers that "not everything is over even when it seems so," and according to these assessments, Croatia's powerful friends (primarily Washington and Bonn) will after all do something more decisive at the last moment to give the new resolution iron teeth and flesh. Certain things will certainly not remain as they were in the first draft, but the question remains as to how many floors can be built onto this when everything has been shoved into the cellar. The beginning was not good, but it would be good if Croatia could prove that it can still turn something important to its own advantage, which would at least partly confirm the importance and reputation of Croatia that Franjo Tudjman so proudly spoke of before the members of the world assembly.

What was proposed in the first draft does suggest a slight tap on the shoulder, but it does not change the nature of UNPROFOR's tasks, does not provide any deadlines, and does not list any specific actions. The blue helmets have been provided with a free hand for the more direct use of force, but this was conceived primarily as a more determined response to those who prevent them from freely moving around and doing their job, as self-defense rather than for imposing a solution, so the optimists will say that this relates to the protection of Croatian borders, but the cynics will counter that this is a warning to all those who might be considering blockades again. Croatia has been called a state for the first time (but it was at the same time told to sign its contractual obligations toward UNPROFOR in just the same way as Serbia and Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] were), while all acts carried out "through compulsion" were proclaimed invalid (extorted property contracts, expulsions, and seizures), but this would hold for everyone, not only Croats. What was most anticipated—the return of the refugees—was for the first time mentioned as a "voluntary possibility" of the return of all "into safety and with the help of the international community," but deadlines or pilot-programs are not mentioned anywhere, just as the demilitarization of the rebels or the main responsibility of Serbia can, in the first draft, be deduced only with much goodwill from the confirmation of everything that has already been written down and voted through.

This is the beginning and it will not take anyone's breath away, while the foreign press will probably have a hard time finding any new and particularly effective sentences or message in the president's speech at the General Assembly, where he said nothing that could be compared to some of Izetbegovic's announcements, except possibly the confirmation that Croatia is relieved that the decision on the lifting of the arms embargo is being postponed, or perhaps the guarantees to the Muslims that they will not be left in the lurch if the negotiations with Belgrade work out, or perhaps the support of Croatia in providing the Security Council with a "standing force for urgent interventions" and the renewed solidarity with Germany and Japan, which want to become permanent members of the Security Council. Ours is an unjust world in which the winners of World War II and the nuclear superpowers are still the most powerful, while the small nations (regardless of how old they are) and young states have been pushed into an exposed position between negligence and lack of principles of the power-wielders and the ghosts of their own past and unsquared old accounts. Croatia wants Europe, civilization, democracy, and peace; it has even agreed to a War Crimes Tribunal and the international supervision of the implementation of human and minority rights, but parliament is bitter, the people impatient and disappointed, while even friends—it seems—take into account everything else before Croatia. In the loosest analysis, the entire president's speech boils down to a cry bordering on impatience: Show me something tangible that will prove that you really want to help us; otherwise you will make us cross the borders that you have been imposing, alone. Give us help so that we do not give you the opposite, as in that case things will be much more difficult for you too.

Like most such speeches of most of the world's statesmen, Tudjman's speech was aimed equally at the domestic and foreign public. How does one show determination for internal consumption, and conciliation and patience to the foreign power-wielders? Both were skillfully mixed in his speech, while the final conclusions should be left until the results of this UNPROFOR test are evident, a test that Croatia has unnecessarily imposed on itself as a "to be or not to be" question.

HDSS's Babic Views Party's Aims, Program

AU0610200694 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 30 Sep 94 p 9

[Interview with HDSS leader Ante Babic by Ante Matic; place and date not given: "A Bridge Between the Emigration and the Homeland"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] *A new party has recently appeared in Croatia. It emerged from the internal conflicts between Drago Stipac and the old Radic followers [pre-World War II politician] and the relatively young followers of Radic, known as "the Kasina Group." The leader of the young Radic followers is Mr. Ante Babic, a well known publisher, journalist, and editor in Australia. He was among the first to return to Croatia (in 1990), after which he became an official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.*

Ante Babic founded several branches of the Peasants' Party in Australia, and the founding of the Croatian Democratic Peasants' Party [HDSS] has been greeted with great interest by the public, so we interviewed him.

[Matic] How did the founding assembly of the HDSS go?

[Babic] The presence of a great number of the former members of the HSS [Croatian Peasants' Party] confirmed the statements of "the Kasina Group" that the membership of the HSS were dissatisfied with their leaders. The HDSS assembly also showed that in Croatia the forming of serious and relevant political parties, which may expect to have a future, is still to come. The HDSS as a party will support a pluralist, but also a unitary Croatia. We are too small a nation to be able to survive without the belief that our future lies in a sovereign, independent, and democratic Croatian state.

From Peasants to Intellectuals

[Matic] How is the HDSS organized?

[Babic] All the central bodies of the party have been elected: a president, six deputy presidents, a head secretary, a senior treasurer, a Presidency consisting of 20 members, 30 members of the City Council, and a Court of Honor and Supervisory Board. All the social strata are represented in the party leadership—from peasants to intellectuals, and the HDSS has members and sympathizers all over Croatia.

[Matic] What are the main items of the HDSS program?

[Babic] Our aim is to create a strong, patriotic, modern, and professionally organized party that will play an important role in consolidating the Croatian state, building up democracy, economic development, and creating political stability and balance in Croatia.

To the West for Education

[Matic] What does your party propose?

[Babic] To be competitive on world markets, for example, and to be able to form partnerships on an equal basis, both our private and state companies must function and be organized after the model of companies in the West. We therefore propose that at least 100 young economists, managers, and other experts be sent to the developed countries for education, and that foreign economic experts be engaged as advisors in Croatia. We ask that all the laws that have been slowing down the development of the free market and our banking system be urgently transformed, as it is the greatest obstacle to foreign investment and a faster economic recovery. We propose revision of all the transformations carried out so far.

[Matic] What is the HDSS offering in other spheres of life?

[Babic] The HDSS offers programs for resolving the problems in agriculture, tourism, craftsmen's associations, the health system, education, personnel policy, and the promotion of Croatia abroad. We are also familiar with the problems of pensioners, young people, and intellectuals, who have been leaving the country in large numbers. We have been preparing special programs and proposals for each area of life.

Moreover, I would like to remark that, as president of the HDSS, I will do everything I can to establish an even stronger bridge between the homeland and Croats worldwide. We are facing a period of construction and restoration, and if we want to make Croatia a prosperous country as soon as possible, we must not shut the world out. I will support the establishment of a separate ministry or a state office for emigration and immigration, after the model of many Western countries.

Defaming the Homeland Is the Greatest Sin

[Matic] What will your foreign policy comprise?

[Babic] The HDSS will strictly abide by the rule that defaming the homeland before foreigners is the greatest sin. Otherwise, it will support the policy of consolidating the friendly relations with the United States, Germany, Austria, Hungary, and other countries that support a just solution to the conflict in these areas. We will propose that more informational and promotional effort is put into creating a better image of Croatia and better connections and relations with Britain, France, Russia, and other European and world forces that are at the moment perhaps a little less inclined toward us.

[Matic] What is the position of your party toward the Serbs in Croatia?

[Babic] The HDSS firmly supports the observance of all human and ethnic rights in Croatia, and we will be consistent on this. However, in order for the Croatian authorities to be able to apply the laws on the rights of the Serbian ethnic community throughout the territory of Croatia, the temporarily occupied territories of our country must first be liberated.

We also uncompromisingly oppose the Serbs having several states on the territory of former Yugoslavia. Any federalization or confederalization of Croatia is, therefore, out of the question.

[Matic] Will the HDSS soon become a parliamentary party?

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[Babic] We hope that it will become one in the foreseeable future. We are now in the initial stage of talks with two independent representatives in parliament. However, it is possible that in time HSS representatives and other parties will also join us.

[Box, p 9]

Professional Representatives

[Matic] We have heard that you have also proposed that the parliament representatives be fully professional.

[Babic] Yes, the representatives in the Croatian Parliament should be professionals, as is the case everywhere else, and they should not have additional jobs. Their relation toward parliament would significantly change if their existence and political careers depended on the quality of their work and actions in parliament.

In order to have good decisions in parliament, where laws are passed that determine everything that goes on in Croatia, we need good representatives. The representatives must have enough time and all the necessary information to discuss the proposed bills competently and to make decisions of vital importance for the state and the people.

Moreover, parliament should also be where future ministers, ambassadors, and suchlike, are educated and where they acquire the necessary experience.

I also support the full professionalization of the leading people in the leading political parties. This is the only way toward creating good parties and good politicians.

[Box, p 9]

We Are Nobody's Side-Kick!

[Matic] The HDSS is said to be the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] right wing's side-kick. Is that true?

[Babic] Absolutely not. THE HDSS will be at the very center of Croatian politics. We uncompromisingly support the consolidation of the Croatian state and building up democracy, which means that we oppose any extremism—either from the left or from the right. Our country has been given nothing by the HDZ or any other political party in Croatia or abroad. It emerged exclusively because the HSS members were dissatisfied with the leadership. The HDSS therefore does not owe anybody anything, and it will make all its decisions independently and only in the interest of the Croatian people.

When the vital interests of the Croatian state so require, we will cooperate with the party in power and opposition parties that support the building up of the Croatian state, which have forever ruled out any possible future Yugoslavias. Moreover, the fact that I have left the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the best proof that the HDSS will be an independent party, and that it is nobody's sidekick.

[Matic] You recently attended a meeting with the parliamentary chairman, along with the representatives of the Croatian state-forming bloc. Is the HDSS a member of this bloc?

[Babic] No. We met with Dr. Mihanovic as observers, taking up the invitation of the Croatian state-forming bloc. With this visit we wanted to express the necessity of passing a joint resolution of all the political parties in the Croatian parliament concerning the UNPROFOR mandate.

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Ethnic Albanian Party Threatens Election Boycott

LD0610133094 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1104 GMT 6 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Skopje, 6 Oct (TANJUG)—As the election campaign for the forthcoming parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for 16 October in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia enters its final stage, the republican state electoral commission has issued a statement saying that voters registered on the general electoral list are obliged to show their identity cards at polling stations.

According to the statement, voters who are not registered on the general list for the 16 October elections will have to show one of the following documents to prove their citizenship and identity—a blue identity card, a blue passport, or a certificate proving the right to citizenship.

It is precisely because of this "voting problem" that the Tetovo-based [ethnic] Albanian Party of Democratic Prosperity [PDP], is threatening that they might possibly boycott the elections.

PDP leader Abdurahman Aliti told Skopje-based NOVA MAKDEONIJA today that the possible Albanian boycott would be forced upon them because, he said, the republican statistics institute was creating electoral lists instead of processing them.

Aliti illustrates this with the claim that, in Tetovo for example, out of 126,000 voters registered on electoral lists only 71,000 were left after a review by the statistics institute. The situation is similar in other municipalities with an ethnic Albanian majority. According to the PDP leader, claims that so many people do not have citizenship are unrealistic and if this selective attitude is not changed there is really no point in Albanians in Macedonia taking part in the forthcoming elections. [passage omitted]

Alliance Warns of 'Terror' by VMRO Sympathizers

AU0610205394 Skopje MIC in English 6 Oct 94

[Statement by Tito Petkovski, spokesman of the Alliance for Macedonia, in Skopje on 6 October]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] At last night's meeting of the Alliance for Macedonia at the city square in Prilep, members and sympathizers of the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] created an incident with a group of citizens gathered at the meeting, using violence and aggressive threats. This organized act of violence, already seen in DPMNE's previous practice, was aimed at disrupting the meeting of the Alliance for Macedonia in order to cause a larger incident among the citizens.

The Alliance for Macedonia regards this organized attack by DPMNE as not only a common provocation, but a threat which the VMRO-DPMNE has openly been expressing during the entire year—that they will use terror to win power at these elections.

The Alliance for Macedonia will inform the foreign monitors in the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] about this incident, and provide the public with complete filmed material.

We are also informed that in Titov Veles, during yesterday and today, members of VMRO-DPMNE were making preparations for an incident at tomorrow's gathering of the Alliance for Macedonia.

The Alliance for Macedonia appeals to all citizens of the Republic of Macedonia not to be taken by such violent and organized acts aimed at creating fear among the people, compromising the elections and causing a method of street fights and destabilization of the Republic of Macedonia.

VMRO, Gligorov Supporters Clash

AU0710085094 Skopje MIC in English 6 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Before the start of the cultural part of the program (with Igor Dzambazov, Violeta Tomovska, and Dragan Vucic) at the meeting [of the Alliance for Macedonia in Prilep on 5 October], while the last work preparations on the stage were being carried out, a group of some thirty members of the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] filled at the time still empty spaces of some ten members in front of the stage. Beside the party placards ("Proudly, Macedonia" and the portrait of the presidential candidate of VMRO-DPMNE Ljubisa Georgijevski), this group also raised the banners "Down you Serbo-Communist gang," "Kiro, go back to your sons in Belgrade," "VMRO—salvation for Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia]," and "Macedonia—Prilep is not giving up your name." That way, calmly well isolated from the present policemen, without any shouting, they were allowed to stand there for some ten minutes.

Afterward, members of the Alliance's security came out from the back of the stage and forcibly scattered VMRO-DPMNE sympathizers. However, a fight broke out and there were a couple of people injured. The incident was quickly brought under control and the meeting continues without any further provocations, NOVA MAKEDONIJA writes.

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Government To Continue Negotiations With Croatia

AU0610170194 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 6 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The government today discussed the situation that has emerged after the passing of the Law on Formation of Municipalities and Their Boundaries. As is known, this is the most recent incident with Croatia over four hamlets south of the Dragonja River. The government's news conference is under way at this very moment. Foreign Minister Lojze Peterle explained the government stance as follows:

[Begin Peterle recording] The State Chamber passed the Law on Formation of Municipalities and Their Boundaries on 3 October 1994. In Article 2, Point 82, the hamlets of Buzini, Mlini, Skodelini, and Skrile are explicitly listed as the territories of settlements. The law, in Article 2, specifically refers to the territories of settlements and not the territories of hamlets. In the draft law that the Slovene Government forwarded to the State Chamber on 29 September 1994 the basic premise of the law was a consistent inclusion of settlements.

The above hamlets were included in the law during the third reading with an amendment whose controversy the government pointed out at sessions of the working commissions and at the State Chamber session. [passage omitted]

The Government of the Republic of Slovenia is of the opinion that we must continue a policy of constructive negotiations on all open issues between the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Croatia, especially as regards the drawing of borders. It is within this framework that we should assert Slovene views about the ownership of these hamlets.

In this sense the government supports the quickest possible resumption of work by the joint diplomatic commission.

In accordance with the above, the Slovene Government will propose that the Constitutional Court assess the constitutionality of Article 2 of this law in the part where it refers to the above four hamlets, that is, Point 82.

On the basis of everything stated above, the Government of the Republic of Slovenia proposes that the State Chamber again discuss this part of the law and alter it in the summary procedure so that it lists only settlements and not hamlets. [end recording]

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Federal

Kontic Seeks UNSC Permission To Export Goods

LD0710132694 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1108 GMT 7 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 7 Oct [TANJUG]—Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Kontic sent a letter today to David Hannay, chairman of the UNSC [UN Security Council] asking that the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] be allowed to make a one-time export of goods worth approximately $70 million to pay for necessary humanitarian raw materials.

In the letter Kontic informs Hannay that the Yugoslav Government and our citizens have learned "with a certain degree of relief of the adoption of the UNSC Resolution 943 on easing the sanctions against the FRY." "This is a positive step; however, we believe that the FRY's peace-loving policy is not valued adequately in that way," Kontic says in the letter.

Pointing to "dangerous consequences which the application of the sanctions has on the overall economic and social life in the country, particularly its humanitarian aspect," Kontic says that the sanctions "were unable to secure a permanent peace or the cessation of hostilities on the territory of former Bosnia-Herzegovina, as it had been expected."

"This became clear when the FRY accepted the Contact Group peace plan. Therefore, the FRY confirmed its firm resolve to pursue the policy of peace and cooperation in the resolution of all problems."

"Keeping the major part of the unjustly imposed economic and other sanctions in place is producing incalculable consequences on the FRY economy, demographic structure, health and social development, and even on the entire east European region," Kontic says.

"Bearing in mind the above mentioned circumstances, particularly the fact that the FRY has not been able to obtain necessary foreign currency due to the ban on its exports, we are asking you to allow us to make a one-time export of goods to the tune of $70 million so that we should earn money to import basic humanitarian materials (raw materials for medicines, fertilizers, gas for the production of fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides, fungicides and raw materials for the production of detergents and soaps)," the letter says.

"We expect you personally to urge the granting of our request, and also to initiate further procedures for easing the sanctions against the FRY," the letter notes.

Jovanovic Comments on Butrus-Ghali Meeting

LD0610235894 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2121 GMT 6 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] New York, 6 Oct (TANJUG)—Following his talks today with UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali, Vladislav Jovanovic, Federal minister of foreign affairs, completed his several-day visit to New York, where he held meetings with over 30 ministers in the course of this year's session of the General Assembly.

Following his talks with Ghali, Jovanovic gave a news conference.

In his talks with the secretary general, according to Jovanovic, emphasis was laid on the situation in Bosnia, the further easing of sanctions against Yugoslavia and the issue of Krajina. Jovanovic stressed that the complete suspension of the sanctions would be the fastest way to peace in the former Yugoslavia and stressed that linking the sanctions to a resolution of the Krajina issue would not be conducive to peace, as the sanctions were imposed in connection with the war in Bosnia. Yugoslavia believes that the Vance plan is the original and the most important international document for resolving the Krajina problem and that Croatia has unnecessarily been politicizing the issue, Jovanovic said.

He stressed that Yugoslavia, even though it is not taking part in the work of the General Assembly, has remained an active UN member and has been making a great contribution to the peace process.

Butrus-Ghali pointed to the need of intensifying dialogue on the territory of former Yugoslavia. He particularly stressed that negotiations betweeen Knin and Zagreb would speed up the final phase of lifting the sanctions.

At the news conference, Jovanovic presented the main principles of Yugoslav foreign policy, speaking about its contribution to the peace process and its support for the Contact Group plan. He stressed that it could not be ruled out that the Serbs in Bosnia would accept the Contact Group plan with certain amendments and with the full lifting of the anti-Yugoslav sanctions. The Contact Group plan is not perfect, it has flaws, but it is a solid basis for further negotiation, the Yugoslav minister stressed.

Replying to journalists' questions, Jovanovic said that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has no territorial pretensions on any other country and that the problems in Bosnia and Krajina ought to be resolved between the sides in dispute. He stressed that Yugoslavia can recognize Bosnia and Croatia only after all their peoples have recognized them, which is not the case now, the Yugoslav foreign minister said. [passage omitted]

President Lilic Receives Russian Special Envoy

LD0610141594 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 6 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 6 Oct (TANJUG)—Zoran Lilic, president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY], today received Vitaliy Churkin, the special envoy of the Russian president.

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It has been announced by the FRY president's office that in the talks that were conducted in a very cordial atmosphere, President Lilic welcomed the easing of the sanctions, something the FRY sees as only the first step in their being lifted completely and as soon as possible. The FRY sees in this, Lilic said, the return of our country to the international community as an equal member, to which, objectively speaking, it belongs.

We consider this initial easing of the unjustly imposed sanctions to be recognition of our continued, consistent, and constructive policy of peace and of the FRY itself as an important and unavoidable factor in the peace process and stability in the Balkans and Europe, the FRY president stressed.

President Lilic said that our country highly appraises the resolute and comprehensive involvement of the Russian Federation—and especially President Yeltsin himself and Russian diplomacy—in strengthening the peace process with the aim of achieving a just and lasting solution to the crisis on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, especially in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. Lilic thanked Churkin for his significant personal contribution to the peace negotiations.

Expressing his thanks for the great tribute paid to Russian policy and diplomacy, Churkin again confirmed the firm decision of the Russian Federation to continue to support the legitimate interests of the Serbian people and above all the peaceful policy being resolutely pursued by the FRY—something his country had had the opportunity of assuring itself of in a very concrete way.

The priority aim of the FRY is peace, Lilic stressed. The conditions for the rapid achievement of this goal are, in the first instance, the complete lifting of sanctions because this represents support for the forces of peace, and discouragement for those who favor the war option.

It is precisely as a result of this that it is necessary to frustrate attempts to set conditions in an unprincipled way for the lifting of the sanctions against our country, by making additional demands that have nothing to do with the achievement of peace in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

But it is also important, Lilic added, that the international community does not allow the lifting of the arms embargo to go ahead because this would certainly lead to the escalation of the war, with unforeseeable outcomes and consequences for the region of Europe as a whole.

President Lilic welcomed the strengthening of Russia's position on the international scene and its well-known policy of partnership, which he assessed as a very important factor of stability in Europe and the whole world. This policy of the Russian Federation is important for peace and stability in the Balkans, Lilic concluded.

At the end of the meeting, President Lilic wished Vitaliy Churkin great success in his new post.

Kontic Tells Russians UN Fuel Ban Needs Lifting

LD0610175094 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1612 GMT 6 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 6 Oct (TANJUG)—Federal Prime Minister Radoje Kontic today sent a letter to Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin asking him to use his influence in the United Nations to initiate a procedure for the export of fuel to the FRY.

In his letter, Kontic expresses deep gratitude to the Russian Federation and Chernomyrdin for "their understanding of the situation in the FRY and their involvement in lifting the blockade that has inevitably affected the development of our country, especially its humanitarian aspects."

Recalling that "the international community has adopted a more favorable approach to the FRY, having acknowledged our country's contribution to the peaceful settlement of the civil war in former Bosnia-Herzegovina," Kontic stresses that "conditions have been created for the UN Sanctions Committee to acknowledge the request of the Russian Federation for the export of natural gas and other fuel to the FRY." [passage omitted]

Government Appoints New Deputy Ministers

LD0610182094 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1606 GMT 6 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 6 Oct (TANJUG)—The federal government at today's session, presided over by Federal Prime Minister Radoje Kontic, has approved the guidelines for the conduct of financial policy up to the end of the year, and decided to set about preparing the guidelines for the 1995 federal budget, the Federal Secretariat for Information has announced. [passage omitted]

In keeping with the new decree on the organization of federal ministries and other federal authorities, the new composition of the federal government's Committee for Cooperation with UN Peacekeeping Forces was named. Federal Prime Minister Radoje Kontic was appointed chairman of the committee, and Deputy Prime Minister Jovan Zebic was appointed as his deputy.

Dr. Radoslav Bulajic was reappointed deputy federal minister of foreign affairs; Milisav Markovic, hitherto assistant minister of internal affairs of Montenegro, was appointed deputy federal minister of internal affairs; Drago Vucinic, hitherto deputy director general of the Yugoslav Payments' Service, has been appointed as deputy federal minister of finance; Dusan Latinovic, hitherto chairman of the Municipal Committee of the Socialist Party of Serbia in Kikinda, has been appointed as deputy federal minister of justice.

Slobodan Djokovic, hitherto director of Srbijanka in Valjevo, has been appointed deputy federal minister of industry; Bozidar Antic has been reappointed as deputy

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federal minister of trade; Pavle Todorovic, hitherto deputy director of the Institute for Health of Serbia, has been appointed deputy federal minister of labor, health, and social welfare; and Radonja Minic, earlier a federal minister, has been appointed deputy federal minister of science, development, and the environment.

Miroslav Milovanovic, hitherto deputy federal minister of finance, has been appointed secretary of the Federal Ministry of Finance. Djordjije Vukcevic, previously secretary general of the federal government, has been appointed secretary of the Federal Ministry of Industry. Miodrag Mitrovic, hitherto an adviser to the secretary general of the government of the Republic of Serbia, has been appointed secretary of the Federal Ministry of Science, Development and the Environment; and Mladjen Skobalj, hitherto undersecretary in this federal ministry, has been appointed secretary of the Federal Ministry of Labor, Health, and Social Welfare, it is said at the end of the statement.

Budget Reportedly Behind Perisic Resignation

AU0710120694 Belgrade NOVA NADA in Serbo-Croatian 5 Oct 94 p 8

[Unattributed report: "General Perisic Leaving?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As our editorial board has learned from reliable sources, General Perisic, chief of the Yugoslav Army General Staff, is tendering his resignation. Unofficial sources say that the reason for his departure includes disagreements over military budget allocations. Namely, Gen. Perisic demanded a 100 percent increase but received only 30 percent—which evidently did not satisfy him.

Existence of 'Special Military Factories' Denied

LD0610182494 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1733 GMT 6 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Novi Sad, Oct. 6 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Defense Minister Pavle Bultovic said in Novi Sad Thursday that Yugoslavia had no special military factories.

During a visit to Novi Sad, 70 km north of Belgrade, Bulatovic said Yugoslavia had factories which allocate part of their program to the requirements of the Yugoslav Army and part for civilian use. Bulatovic said this was the basic concept in the development of specialized production.

Representatives of the "14 Oktobar" industry of machines and components of Krusevac, central Serbia, said Thursday they had managed to master the production of the M-84 Abi tank with their subcontractors in only 8 months. He said the tank was the latest model of its kind in the world and that military experts had said it met the strictest tactical-technical requirements of modern armored vehicles.

Since the factory was founded two years ago, it has realized many projects, starting from the modernization of existing armored vehicles to the development of new ones which are of vital importance for state defense.

The former Yugoslav Federation was a world renowned manufacturer of weapons and military equipment. Four years ago, the former Yugoslavia exported 2.5 billion dollars' worth of weaponry annually, ranking among the world's top ten arms exporters.

The M-84 tank was the best-selling export product of former Yugoslavia. It is currently one of the best tanks in the world. Its qualities were best tested in the Gulf war, where it was used by the Kuwaitis. The T-84 [as received] was sold for about 1.3 million dollars on the world market, depending on the equipment provided.

Data on J-22 Orao Aircraft

94BA0411A Belgrade VOJSKA in Serbo-Croatian 7 Jul 94 pp 30-33

[Article by Aleksandar Mikic, graduate engineer: "Assault Plane in Our Sky"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Following the Yugoslav aircraft industry's success in the 1970's with the G-2 Galeb [Sea Gull] and J-1 Jastreb [Hawk] airplanes, our designers, production engineers, and aircraft industry tackled bigger challenges—the designing of more up-to-date combat aircraft. At the same time, a need was felt in units of the JRV [Yugoslav Air Force] for a new tactical aircraft that would replace the F-84 Thunderjet, which up until then had been the workhorse in supporting fighter-bombers, and would strengthen the fleet of Jastreb light assault planes.

The new project required very large financial resources and quite broad cooperation. Interest was shown by the neighboring state of Romania, which intended to replace older models of the MiG-17 with an up-to-date assault plane. Cooperation in designing the new assault plane would at the same time broaden the economic ties with that neighboring country that had been initiated with construction of the Djerdap Hydroelectric Power Plant. This had particular importance to the strengthening of intergovernmental relations between Yugoslavia and Romania.

The general design of the new assault aircraft began to be developed in 1969 in the VTI [Aeronautical Engineering Institute] in Zarkovo, outside Belgrade, although the first sketches and conceptions had emerged two years earlier. The Romanian partner, the institute IMFCA (Institute for Fluid Mechanics and Aerodynamic Structures) in Bucharest, joined the project in 1970, when joint tactical-technical requirements expressing the needs of the two air forces had been shaped up. The joint program was given the name YUROM (YUgoslavia-ROMania).

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The Design Philosophy

The YUROM program called for making a transonic twin-engine plane that would be simple to operate and easy to maintain. The aircraft was intended for support of units at the front and for assault operations. It accordingly had to be able to take off from concrete and semiprepared runways, to penetrate successfully at low altitude, to possess the appropriate attack navigation system, to be quite resilient in combat, and to be able to carry a variety of weapons.

A secondary role was envisaged for this plane as a fighter-interceptor in combating helicopters, transport planes, and fighter-bombers in a similar category.

Parallel versions were developed of a single-seater for combat use and a two-seater to train pilots, which also had to be capable of combat with a somewhat shorter tactical radius. Equipment for photographic, infrared, and electronic reconnaissance, which was prepared for integration on the reconnaissance version of this plane, was being developed at the same time.

The well-known and reliable engines of the company Rolls-Royce in the series 600 Viper family were chosen for the power plant. The choice between two engine models went to the Viper 632-41R, the strongest in the Viper family. Afterburning and a 25-percent increase in the thrust of that engine were achieved in cooperation with Rolls-Royce. The new engine was given the designation 633-41 and was installed in the series-manufactured aircraft.

The prototype documentation was completed in mid-1972, and then work began to build the prototypes—one in Mostar at the Soko Factory and the other in Craiova (Vlaska) at the CNIAR factory. Both prototypes took off for the first time, one in Yugoslavia and the other in Romania, on 31 October 1974, some 20 minutes apart. The Yugoslav aircraft was christened the Orao, while in Romania the plane was given the designation IAR-93. The aircraft was shown in public for the first time in the "Victory 75" parade, when the Orao led the air force squadron.

While the prototype single-seater was undergoing intensive testing, two prototype two-seaters were completed for the retraining of pilots. Both took off on 29 January 1977.

New Technologies

Quite a few new technologies were mastered and applied in the course of the plane's development: chemical milling of armor plate, the milling of integral armor panels using numeric-controlled machines, honeycomb metal sandwich constructions were made by soldering, and new procedures were also used in processing and shaping Plexiglas for cockpit canopies and the fabrication of integral wing and fuselage fuel tanks.

A sizable technological leap was taken with development of the Orao plane from the Galeb and Jastreb aircraft. This is particularly evident in the development of the afterburner, which was achieved by Rolls-Royce and Lucas of Great Britain, with assistance from the Romanian Turbomecanica and the Orao Aircraft Plant in Rajlovac, outside Sarajevo. The preliminary production run was started while the afterburning engine was still being developed. The first planes soared from the preliminary production run into the sky in 1977 without afterburning chambers. In Yugoslavia they were designated the IJ-22 (single-seater) and INJ-22 (two-seater), while in Romania they bore the designation IAR-93A. They were intended for a reconnaissance role, and so they were soon equipped with up-to-date reconnaissance equipment installed in containers.

Beginning with the preliminary production run, only the airfoil and the engine were still identical in the Yugoslav and Romanian versions. The two countries selected different suppliers to equip the planes, except for the ejectable seat and engine assemblies, with our version installing a higher portion of equipment from domestic manufacturers.

Once the afterburning engine was developed, the first flight of the series-produced Orao with the new engine followed on 20 October 1983. Series production was continued after the successful tests, and the plane was designated the J-22, with NJ-22 for the two-seater version. The J-22 aircraft was then introduced into the combat squadrons of the Yugoslav Air Force. It was also included in the armament of the Romanian Air Force with the designation IAR-93B.

During testing on 22 November 1984 the J-22 assault plane broke the sound barrier in a gentle dive, achieving a speed of Mach 1.024.

The J-22, although a series-manufactured aircraft, was equipped according to the design of the VTI as a flying laboratory for testing electrical flight controls. During 1983 and the following year, the electrical components were developed and tested. As the operation of the equipment on a test stand was tested, its reliability was also ascertained. The system of electrical controls for controlling bearing was installed on a plane modified and prepared for that purpose. All flight tests were performed in the Air Force Experimental Center, and completely satisfactory results were obtained for electrical control of bearing, which was realized as a quadriplex analog system.

Assured Future

Although it was conceived between 1968 and 1970, the Orao has shown a high level of resilience under actual combat conditions. The plane was equipped with systems for passive electronic countermeasures against missiles with infrared homing warheads, that is, with antiradar dipoles.

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In order to keep the Orao in armament and so that it could compete with its rivals, a project was conducted to modernize it and extend its life and combat use even into the first decade of the next millennium.

Completely integrated avionics were the essence of the modernization; within that context, emphasis was put on up-to-date attack navigation systems. This new system affords a large jump forward in increasing precision in navigation and fire control. The system presupposes installation of radar and a new design of the nose section of the fuselage, an inertial platform, computer, and domestically produced headup display of the electronic navigation system, as well as two multifunction screens. Our headup display belongs to the most recent generation of the current Thomson VE-120T.

The rest of the avionics, such as the reconnaissance equipment, systems for increasing battle toughness and to control armament, radio equipment, identification device, and so forth, were integrated into a unified whole. The entire system of avionics was interconnected by a main fiber-optic data trunk allowing high signal throughput.

The new avionic architecture affected the design of the instrument panel, which is dominated by two multifunction screens, along with just a few conventional electromechanical instruments. The interior of the cockpit also becomes an esthetically more pleasant and ergonomically functional work environment for the crew.

In addition to those changes, the quality of armament has also been undergoing improvement. For self-defense of the aircraft, the arsenal of weapons has been bolstered with short-range air-to-air missiles with infrared homing, which are installed on two new armament lines on the wingtips, each with a carrying capacity of 100 kg. The capacity of the existing external racks under the wings was increased to 500 kg each, and the one under the fuselage to 1,000 kg. The assortment of weapons has also been broadened with laser, antiradar, and antiship missiles and short-range air-to-air projectiles.

Provision has also been made for the oxygen gas system to be replaced by a new liquid oxygen system, which is more efficient and safer. The capacity and effectiveness of the air conditioning system would be increased because of the increased demands of the new avionics. Deicing of the lips of the air intake was also introduced; this will considerably increase the area of this aircraft's use.

The Orao aircraft has made it possible for the Yugoslav aircraft industry to master dozens of new technologies and to employ sizable capacity in the defense and related industry. Designers and producers acquired valuable experience. A great deal of credit goes for its development and production to the Military Engineering Institute, the enterprises Sokol, Utva, Prva Petoletka, and Orao, the Cajavec Aircraft Testing Center, and many other contractors and collaborators. The Yugoslav Air Force has with the Orao received an up-to-date combat aircraft with multiple armament that has been tested in combat operations. Thanks to the necessary modernization, it will take an important place in the front lines of combat of the Yugoslav Army's Air Force in the future as well.

[Box, p 31]

The avionics of the J-22 consist of the following units:

Communications: VHF, UHF, intercom (two-seater)

Identification: IFF

Navigation: VOR/ILS/marker, radio altimeter, ADF, DME, gyromagnetic compass, gyroplatform

Fire control (J-22): the older generation of the headup display Thomson-CSF VE-120T, computer, control panel, Maverick unit, and Lightning unit; instead of the VE-120T, the IJ-22 and INJ-22 have the gyrostabilized Ferranti D282 sight

Equipment for increasing combat toughness: radar and laser detector, passive jamming, and containers for electronic countermeasures

Reconnaissance: containers for electronic, aerophotographic, and infrared reconnaissance. Containers for nighttime illumination. Fitted under the fuselage of the IJ-22 and INJ-22

[Box, pp 32-33]

Armament

The armament consists of two twin-barrel GS-23L 23-mm cannon, 200 rounds each. The cannon are integrated into the fuselage and located beneath and behind the air intakes.

The five armament lines have the following capacities:

one under the fuselage (800 kg)

two underwing internal (500 kg each)

two underwing external (500 kg each)

The maximum weapon-carrying capacity is 2,800 kg.

The assortment of weapons is diverse and includes bombs (free-falling and braking), cluster bombs, aerosol bombs, bombs to disable runways, a container for dropping pellets in hedge-hopping flight, 57-mm NRZ, 128-mm NR, and guided and homing air-to-surface missiles.

[Box, pp 32-33]

The J-22's Assemblies and Systems

The aircraft Orao is a twin-engine, turbojet, high-wing aircraft intended for performing tactical assault missions within the zone of the front and also in the enemy rear. It is manufactured in single-seater (J-22) and two-seater

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(NJ-22) versions and as a single-seater (IJ-22) and two-seater (INJ-22) reconnaissance plane, but the latter's engine does not have afterburning.

The wing is trapezoidal, swept-back, low thickness ratio with pronounced strakes (hybrid wings). The NACA 65A-008 airfoil profile was used. The angle of the dihedral is - 3.5 degrees, and the sweep of the leading edge is 43 degrees and 35 degrees at the quarter-chord point. A pair of aerodynamic guides are installed on the upper surface of the wing. The wing's mechanization consists of the aileron, Fowler flaps with one slot, and two-segment leading-edge flaps. Structurally, the wing consists of the right and left half-wings. The half-wings are made of duraluminum, they have two spars, and a milled skin (the skin is fabricated together with the stringers), which, along with the spars and ribs, offers high resistance to fatigue.

The fuselage is the semimonocoque type, spar-stringer. The conventional duraluminum structure guarantees the fuselage (and the airplane) 8,000 hours of flight within the range of loads defined for a combat assault plane.

The forward and rear parts of the fuselage can be separated in the area immediately behind the wings. This connection, which is made at eight points, facilitates rapid and simple access to the engine, which can therefore be easily installed and removed.

The ridge, which makes the transition to the cockpit canopy, contains the elements of the controls, the air-conditioning equipment, antennas, etc. The tail end of the fuselage contains the housing of the braking parachute, above the jet.

The forward part of the hull has an oval cross section, while in the central and tail portions it has the section of a rounded rectangle. The transition is filled with the air intakes, located on both sides of the cockpit.

The tail surfaces consist of the conventional vertical tailfin, with rudder, and the wholly movable tailplane, powered by a servoactuator. The tail control surfaces have trapezoid geometry, with a pronounced sweep. The tailplane and rudder have a honeycomb, glued structure.

The air brakes are installed on the underside of the fuselage, beneath the air intakes, but forward of the space for the main landing gear. The brakes are of the "gate" type, perforated, and operated hydraulically.

The landing gear is retractable, hydraulically movable, tricycle type, manufactured by Prva Petoletka in Trstenik.

The nose gear is steerable and has one wheel. It retracts forward into the fuselage.

The main gears are retracted rearward into the fuselage and have double wheels. The tires are low-pressure.

The locking of the undercarriage in the extended position is mechanical and telescopic.

The propulsion system consists of two single-shaft Rolls-Royce turbojet engines in the Viper family, as follows:

Viper MK632-41R, without afterburner, for the reconnaissance version IJ-22 and INJ-22, with 1,814 daN [dekanewtons] of thrust.

Viper MK633-41 with afterburner and a thrust of 1,760/2268 daN for the assault version J-22 and NJ-22, respectively.

The engines are located side by side, in the rear section of the fuselage.

The IJ-22 and INJ-22 are capable of using two JATO rockets on takeoff.

The cockpit is pressurized and air-conditioned. It is equipped with all the necessary piloting, engine, and navigation instruments.

It is distinguished by good visibility. The cockpit canopy is raised rearward electrically. In the two-seater, this is done by manually raising the hinged leaves of the canopy sideward.

The seat is the Martin-Baker type MKYU.10LB.

The windscreen glass is three-ply, bulletproof, and provides the pilot protection against small-arms fire.

The rear seat in the two-seater is raised 256 mm above the forward seat, so that the instructor can also have good visibility over the head of the student.

Flight controls are conventional rigid levers which transmit the pilot's requirements to the control surfaces. They are moved hydraulically.

The force on the stick can be adjusted depending on the flight conditions.

The system to improve stability and controllability (UPSU) yields performances which meet the strictest military regulations.

The hydraulic system is made up of two independent circuits:

The first circuit is activated by an axial motor-driven pump and supplies actuators of the ailerons, rudder, wholly movable tailplane, variable exhaust nozzle, and the braking parachute. The second circuit is also powered by an axial motor-driven pump (a second motor) and supplies actuators of ailerons, rudder, wholly movable tailplane, air brakes, landing gear, leading edge flaps, variable exhaust nozzle, nose wheel steering mechanism, and wheel brakes.

The operating cylinders of the control surfaces are double-chamber, so that if one circuit fails the controls continue to function thanks to operation of the other circuit.

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Supplemental sources of pressure in the form of an electric pump and hydraulic pressure tank have also been used as yet another security measure.

The electrical system uses electric power obtained from two air-cooled generators (9 kW [kilowatts], 28 V [volts] DC), driven by motors. One generator is sufficient to meet the aircraft's needs.

An auxiliary source of power is the Ni-Cd [nickel-cadmium] storage battery (24 V/36 Ah [ampere-hours]/18 kW maximum), which provides enough power for the self-starting of the engine and needs on the ground at unequipped airfields.

AC current (3x115 V, 400 cps [cycles per second], and 1x26 V, 400 cps) is generated by three operating and one standby static transformers (300 VA [volt-amperes]).

The fuel space has a total capacity of 3,100 liters and consists of three integral tanks and two rubber tanks in the fuselage and two integral wing tanks.

Additional fuel (1,500 liters) is placed in jettisonable tanks, two under the wings and one under the fuselage.

The tanks are emptied by pressure, with air brought from the engine compressor.

The tanks are filled under pressure and by gravity.

The oxygen system uses oxygen gas. The system allows for 2 x 30 minutes of flight at the maximum rate of consumption.

The air-conditioning and pressurization systems facilitate normal work of the crew and avionics, deice the windscreen and remove drops of rain, and they pressurize the cockpit and the anti-G suit. In addition, the cockpit is also ventilated and isolated in case of pollution of engine air.

The emergency rescue system consists of the Martin-Baker MKYU.10LB zero/zero ejection seat. Ejection is through the cockpit canopy even at zero speed and zero altitude of the aircraft.

In the two-seater, the seats are ejected separately, but the second crew member (the instructor) can initiate sequential ejection of both seats. Each seat has combined parachute, seat straps, and a survival kit.

Article Outlines Croatian Weapons Purchases

AU0710101394 Belgrade VOJSKA in Serbo-Croatian 29 Sep 94 p 11

[Article by Milan Mijalkovski: "Threat of Continuation of War"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Until Croatia obtained the status of an independent state in December 1991, the Croatian land forces managed, through imports and the confiscation of some weapons of the former Yugoslav People's Army [JNA], to arm themselves with 190 tanks, 200 armored personnel carriers, 450 artillery pieces of various calibers, 250 anti-aircraft weapons, and 286 armor-piercing weapons. The Air Force had two MiG-21 aircraft, 30 modified crop-dusters, and 30 helicopters.

Since then, Croatia has mastered the production of pistols, based on the Walther pistol; a 7.9-mm sniper rifle; the "Sokac" 12-mm automatic rifle; and 60-mm, 82-mm, and 120-mm mortars. It produces a recoilless gun with several types of projectiles, light PVO launchers, based on the Russian model, and several types of anti-personnel and anti-armor mines. Regarding the more complex combat systems, Croatia can carry out repairs and overhaul guns, howitzers, and aircraft engines.

Since 1991, Croatia has not stopped acquiring offensive weapons from abroad, thus violating UN Security Council Resolution 713 that prohibits the import of arms to the territory of the former SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia].

Croatia's land forces today have 270 T-55 and M-84 tanks and are expecting the delivery of another 130 T-72 tanks. They have 380 armored personnel carriers of various types. Another 200 self-propelled combat vehicles for the infantry have been bought and are waiting to be transported to Croatia. They also have 820 87-mm and 130-mm artillery pieces and 105-mm, 120-mm, 152-mm, 155-mm, and 203-mm howitzers. They have also obtained 122-mm self-propelled howitzers, M-65 and M-77 multiple-rocket launchers, and the Malutka and Milan anti-tanks missiles. In addition, they also received 2,500 Armbrusts and RPG-7. Among the new offensive weapons are also surface-to-surface missiles of unknown make, surface-to-air missiles of Soviet make, and 600 various anti-aircraft and artillery systems.

MiG's on Croatian Airports

The Croatian Air Force, which had two MiG-21 aircraft three years ago, obtained 24 such aircraft and 12 SU-25 aircraft in 1992. Some of them are in the countries where they were bought and are used by Croatian pilots for training. It is known that, at the beginning of the war in Croatia in 1991, 200 pilots deserted from the former JNA and fled to the National Guard Corps.

Considering that the Croatian leadership is not convinced that it can reintegrate the republic of Serbian Krajina with such a large amount of weapons, it continued to purchase even greater amounts of weapons of long-range and destructive power. During 1993, Croatia bought radar systems for monitoring and surveillance, the R-65 and R-300 surface-to-surface missiles, the KUB and OSA surface-to-air missiles, MiG-21 and MiG-29 aircraft, AN-2 and Il-76 transportation planes, and MI-8 and MI-24 helicopters.

Naturally, it is not in Croatia's interests for everyone to know who it obtained the weapons from and how many, nor is it in its interest to reveal what else is being

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prepared for delivery, and the intensity of activity undertaken in obtaining these "goods." That is why the reports are often contradictory. Croatian intelligence services have an important role in confusing this issue. They have launched an enormous amount of disinformation in order to confuse the enemy and deceive the Croatian public about its own "supremacy" over the "aggressor." However, some facts are irrefutable and they fully confirm that Croatia has systematically been buying offensive weapons in large quantities in violation of the aforementioned UN resolution.

It has been established that Croatia buys arms from Germany, former socialist countries, and former republics of the Soviet Union most frequently. There are many published reports on that. Let us only mention a few: two German ships for bulk freight carrying anti-tank missiles and 60 tanks recently entered Zadar. An Austrian firm sold Zagreb PTR "Armbrust." Croatia, with the approval of Bonn, received 30 MiG-29 aircraft, one A-10 aircraft, 32 MI-24 helicopters, and 41 Leopard tanks. The director of a French firm, Aviasud, stated that his company had sold Croatia a fairly large number of reconnaissance airplanes (the air-defense units of the Krajina Serbian Army shot down a Croatian reconnaissance airplane near the village of Sodolovci). In the middle of August 1994, on the same day, two attempts to deliver arms to Croatia were frustrated. At Boryspil airport near Kiev in Ukraine, an AN-26 airplane loaded with 4.5 metric tons of various arms and ammunition was halted and NATO forces in the Adriatic intercepted a Croatian ship, Sveti Duje, loaded with missiles. Finally, following the shooting down of a Croatian MiG-21 near Vrginmost (in September 1993), UN monitors at airports in Croatia reported that on that day four aircraft took off and three returned, although the Croats claimed at that time that they only had two MiG-21 aircraft.

Forceful Reintegration of Krajina

Facts show that Croatia is still purchasing offensive weapons intensively. Does this mean that Croatia is preparing for the continuation of the war? Since the Croatian leadership is probably aware that the republic of Serbian Krajina has respectable defense forces and that it is capable of fiercely responding to every attack by Croatian units with powerful weapons, it is trying to gain supremacy in hardware, believing that this would be enough to reintegrate the republic of Serbian Krajina into the constitutional system of Croatia by force.

However, that they are afraid of the other side is illustrated by the fact that, by preparing itself for a new war adventure, Croatia is trying to convince its "folk" that they are protected with modern anti-missile systems, particularly the area around Zagreb.

Yugoslav Economy Receives Favorable Assessment

MS0610105594 London FINANCIAL TIMES in English 6 Oct 94 p 3

[Report by James Whittington: "Yugoslav Economy in the Balance"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] There cannot be many places in the world where a central bank governor is hailed as a national folk hero. But in Serbia and Montenegro, the two remaining constituents of Yugoslavia, the septuagenarian governo of the National Bank of Yugoslavia, Mr Dragoslav Abramovic, is viewed as the nation's economic saviour.

A former employee of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, Mr Abramovic is credited with reversing the economic collapse of rump Yugoslavia caused by international sanctions and the war in Bosnia. On January 21 he introduced an economic stabilisation programme based on a new currency, the super-dinar, which was pegged at parity with the D-Mark [German mark, DM] and backed by hard currency and gold reserves.

The results, eight months on, have confounded his critics and exceeded all expectations. Inflation was brought down from a dizzy 313m per cent in January to minus 0.8 per cent in March. Last month it stood at 0.2 per cent, according to the Belgrade Institute of Economic Sciences. Industrial production is on the increase, wages are rising, and shops have been surprisingly full in spite of an economic embargo imposed by the international community 28 months ago as punishment for fuelling the war in Bosnia.

The psychological effect of the affable governor who relentlessly seeks to explain and convince the population of his programme has been immense. The lifting of some sanctions yesterday in the fields of sports and culture, and the re-opening of the international airport in Belgrade, will be a further boost.

But cracks are appearing and there are signs that what the Serbian press has dubbed "the economic miracle" might be crumbling.

The re-appearance of black market money-changers trying to meet an insatiable demand for D-Marks has signalled a weakening of the dinar. A black market rate of 1.2 dinars to the D-Mark last week had risen to DM1.4 yesterday. One money-changer in Belgrade explained that the demand for D-Marks comes from widespread smuggling and sanctions-busting operations.

"People need hard currency to trade outside and buy petrol and demand is very high, especially from (Serb-held) Bosnia," he says. "Until now supply simply met demand but as people are getting rich from smuggling they want more." As the black market premium widens people are switching to D-Marks for fear of a repeat of the hyper- inflation of last year.

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Moreover, shop prices are showing inflationary pressures. In the past week there have been shortages of milk, meat, and cooking oil as shopkeepers have removed their stocks rather than raise their prices. And the price of smuggled petrol is also rising.

Mr Jurij Bajec, from the Belgrade Economic Institute, believes that the central bank must quickly intervene to defend the dinar while maintaining a tight hold on monetary and fiscal expansion. He says that at the beginning of the economic programme the money supply was increased slowly in tandem with the growth in foreign exchange reserves, but by mid-year it began moving ahead.

"The money supply has reached a critical point of YD2.1bn [Yugoslav dinar] of which around 50 per cent is in cash, which is enormous. If it exceeds this then inflation will return which will be beyond control," he says.

Foreign exchange reserves, which are supposed to be a national secret, stand at around DM500m, which leaves little room for manoeuvre.

Mr Abramovic dismisses these fears of inflation. "There's no need to question the fate of the dinar because nothing negative has happened so far in the economy," he says. He points out that average monthly wages have risen from DM30 in January to DM200 in September.

Instead of maintaining tight fiscal and monetary policies he wants to expand credit and increase investment to maintain the rise in output. This year gross national product of about $10bn is forecast to grow by 8 per cent, after contracting by 30 per cent in 1993. "I don't believe in a credit inflation," he says. "The private sector is flourishing and our enterprises need more, not less, money."

Where this is to come from is not clear. The domestic banks are in so much trouble that they can only afford withdrawals of DM30 a month on even healthy current accounts. The Belgrade stock market is all but defunct apart from trade in short-term promissory notes. And the government has no access to international capital markets or its foreign bank accounts because of sanctions.

Most of the ifs and buts surrounding the economy come back to psychology. If Mr Abramovic can continue to persuade the Serbs that they have never had it so good under the sanctions, all will be well.

Until sanctions are lifted, however, the unnatural distortions in the economy, including the miraculous fixed exchange rate, are likely to store up problems.

Serbia

Phone Lines To Srpska Republic To Be Restored

AU0610163494 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 6 Oct 94 p 7

[Report by "R.M.": "Hello, Pale"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The prices of telephone and telex message units will not change until the end of the year, because the rise in the prices of post, telephone, and telegraph services [PTT] would be a direct blow to Avramovic's program," Milorad Jaksic, general director of the PTT of Serbia, said at a news conference yesterday in Kragujevac.

Jaksic also said that the interruption in the telephone lines with the Srpska republic [in Bosnia-Herzegovina] was not of a political nature but, he stressed, "there were certain technical problems, which will be repaired soon, so the lines between Serbia and the Srpska republic will be normalized, just as the telephone lines between Montenegro and the Srpska republic have been normal throughout this period."

Deputy Describes Past Army, 'Chetnik' Links

AU0510152594 Belgrade TELEGRAF in Serbo-Croatian 28 Sep 94 pp 6-7

[Interview with Branislav Vakic, FRY assembly deputy, by Zorica Miladinovic; place and date not given: "General Perisic Gave Us Uniforms, the Army Gave Us Weapons, and Special Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia Trained Us"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Branislav Vakic is an assembly deputy (Serbian Radical Party), he who was the commander of the War Headquarters of the "Old Serbia" group of volunteers, lead many of them on battlefields throughout the former Yugoslavia, and was given the title of chetnik warlord. The FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] Assembly Committee for Mandate and Immunity Issues decided to withdraw his parliamentary, so now he is a man with a fragile immunity as well.*

Nevertheless, Branislav Vakic decided to speak out about the times of war cooperation with the authorities here, when the "joint work" protected him from unpleasant situations.

[Miladinovic] Do you have any proof supporting your claim that Serbian volunteers and chetniks cooperated with the Yugoslav Army?

[Vakic] These claims are serious, and I certainly can prove them. Already after the first incidents caused by the Croatian side and their attacks on Serbian villages in Slavonia, Serbian volunteers and chetniks set off for the region at the invitation of the territorial defense and the Serbian people there. The late Vukasin Soskocanin invited us to Borovo Selo and there we got weapons, Thompson rifles, from the then JNA [Yugoslav People's Army]. At the beginning of November 1991, we, the Serbian chetniks, were invited by the JNA and entered Vukovar via Negoslavci. At that time, we were given weapons by Veselin Sjivancanin, major in the then JNA, and cooperated with it, that is, with the Yugoslav Army.

After Vukovar was liberated, we set off toward western Slavonia. There, my volunteers and chetniks were given

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weapons. General Uzelac, commander of western Slavonia, was personally informed about it. However, due to the major treason by Yugoslav generals, western Slavonia was given to the Croats, the army withdrew, and the people fled.

Later on, at the beginning of 1992, we set off for Serbian Herzegovina. We received weapons from the Trebinje Territorial Defense after an order was issued by Mr. Vucurevic, president of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Herzegovina. We received fuel and uniforms from Major Gen. Bozovic's special units of the military police that were located in Kumbura, near Herceg Novi, as part of the then JNA. Maj. Gen. Bozovic also supplied us with vehicles. I received one personally. With my vehicle and chetniks, I went to the Marshal Tito Barracks in Podgorica several times, where I cooperated with officers and was given petrol. Whenever vehicles broke down, I sent them to Danilovgrad to be repaired—I possess documents about this. I also possess documents about our cooperation with JNA units from Montenegro in this section of the battlefield, that is, in Herzegovina.

[Miladinovic] What was your cooperation with the Yugoslav Army in Serbia like?

[Vakic] At the beginning of 1992, the then JNA invited us to send our volunteer units to Krajina. I sent a large group of volunteers from this part of Serbia to JNA barracks in Bubanj Potok near Belgrade. At the barracks, the volunteers were also given weapons. In March 1992, we sent a large group of volunteers to the 4 July Barracks in Belgrade where they were given both weapons and uniforms and were were trained. During those six months, that is, from January to July 1992, more than 6,000 of our volunteers were stationed and trained in these Belgrade barracks and then sent to the region near Drnis, to Divoselo and Pocitelj. I possess written documents proving this, and the military authorities also possess them.

[Miladinovic] You also went to the battlefield at Skelani.

[Vakic] At the beginning of 1993, the Turkish converts [poturica]—I do not want to honor them by calling them Muslims—launched an offensive and attacked the JNA. The JNA did not react then, and the Skelani Territorial Defense called the chetniks. At that time, at least at the beginning, we were to some extent armed by the Yugoslav Army and then by the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MUP] of Serbia. However, there were many volunteers, I alone had 300 men on that section of the battlefield. There were not enough weapons and uniforms for all of us. I sought help from Gen. Momcilo Perisic, currently chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army, who was then the commander of the 3d Army in Nis. I went from Skelani to meet him three times. He promised, and supplied, uniforms for 80 fighters, underwear, some food, and a set of night-vision binoculars that I needed. I did not receive any weapons from him, but he put me in contact with Maj. Gen. Ojdanic, Uzice Army commander. Gen. Ojdanic later sent me to Gen. Mile Mrkic who was stationed in Skelani. At that time, the Yugoslav Army needed us and the cooperation was good.

[Miladinovic] All that sounds like a "perfect coordination."

[Vakic] Even then, not everything was all right. As early as 1992, our prominent volunteers, Zoran Doderovic and Milan Cuk, were killed by the JNA. Colonel Ljubisa Beara, Officer Vinko Pejcic, and Major Ostojic were involved in that. Col. Beara ordered Pejcic and Ostojic to kill the two. They drilled the Pinzgauer vehicle carrying the volunteers with bullets and then set it on fire with the bodies inside. Last year, these three officers were sent to prison, however, this March, Beara was completely pardoned and the sentences of the other two were halved. Until this day, they have not been put in prison.

By the way, Ljubisa Beara is the man who organized the famous "September '93" Banja Luka coup meant to overthrow Karadzic. After the event at Prevlaka, near Debeli Brijeg, when our volunteers were killed, the League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia gave Beara a flat in the center of Belgrade. It was probably a reward for a Serb for heroically attacking another Serb.

[Miladinovic] You do not mention cooperation with the MUP of Serbia at all.

[Vakic] There is much such cooperation. In battles from Skelani to Srebrenica, we fought alongside the special forces of the MUP, under the command of Obrad Stevanovic, the third man in the Serbian MUP. I had excellent cooperation with him on the Skelani battlefield. He had his headquarters in Bajina Basta, and I would travel from Skelani to talk to him. I would go to him whenever I needed something, and he would issue orders about where one should go. From the beginning of April until 25 May last year, we fought alongside the special forces of the MUP.

A little later, the MUP of Serbia invited us to prepare ourselves and, if need be, fight together with them. We responded to the invitation, I gathered the men, and we went to a training center on the Tara Mountain during July and August last year. At that time, I was in contact with "Frenki" of the MUP special forces. The moment I gathered a sufficient number of volunteers, he would send an official MUP bus from Belgrade to Nis. From Nis, my volunteers left for Tara to undergo training. At that time, I had about 400 people from Nis, Zajecar, Pirot, and Kragujevac. From there, chetniks and volunteers, together with MUP special forces, were supposed to set off toward Srebrenica or Gorazde if the Turkish converts launched a major offensive.

We prepared ourselves together with MUP members, the training was good, and the cooperation was excellent. A note of appreciation was sent to the "Old Serbia" volunteer unit. We received the note—as it says on it—from the War Headquarters of the special units of the MUP of

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Serbia located in Bajina Basta. The note bears the date of 25 May 1993. The reason given for presenting it to us is as follows: "For successes and cooperation during combat operations in the liberation struggle of the Serbian people in the Srpska republic." The document is stamped and signed. I will mention here the name of Obrad Stevanovic, commander of the special units of the MUP of Serbia, not to criticize him, but to make public the fact that we cooperated.

That is why I do not see any reason for the MUP to arrest and harass our men, to beat up the very people they trained. They have lists of our men from Tara and it is these men who are now suffering the most. However, I cannot blame the MUP special forces for that. They are just as nationalist as we, Serbian chetniks, are. This persecution of volunteers involves the very top Serbian police leadership, ranging from Sokolovic [Serbian interior minister] to Radmilo Bogdanovic [former Serbian interior minister].

[Miladinovic] Assertions about police persecution are rather abstract. Do you have any examples?

[Vakic] Of course that there are examples. I shall mention only one example from Nis that is rather recent. A few days ago, one of my volunteers, Sinisa Mitrovic, 32 years old, committed suicide in a state of grave depression. He was at the Tara Training center, together with special forces. He lived in Nis, had no job and no money, and the Nis police searched his flat and beat him up on several occasions. He asked me for help several times and I interceded for him with the Nis police department. But the threats and harassment by police against him did not stop.

[Miladinovic] Did you fight together after the training on Mt. Tara?

[Vakic] No, the cooperation was interrupted. As early as 15 September 1993, the Serbian Radical Party demanded the replacement of the Serbian Government and Milosevic dissolved the assembly. There were some fierce attacks against the Serbian Radical Party, and particularly the volunteers. They were accused of being paramilitaries and war profiteers, and even of committing genocide against their own people.

[Miladinovic] The authorities, therefore, do not remind you of the cooperation, but issue serious accusations of war profiteering and crime.

[Vakic] The Socialists still claim persistently that we are paramilitaries and war profiteers, but that is not true. After the battles for Vukovar, those authorities who control the so-called border on the Drina River set up three checkpoints and, at least on one of them, goods were taken away from volunteers if they took something with them. Things could be taken only by the people in power and people close to those in power. I and my volunteers witnessed property from the plundered Vukovar being taken away in trucks. It was taken by the Yugoslav Army, that is, the people in power.

I also possess an authorization note that can serve as an illustration of my assertions. The note bears the following inscription: The Republic of Serbia, the MUP of Serbia, special units. It also bears a clearly written date—25 May 1993—and a place: Bajina Basta. It is an authorization note allowing the MUP members to take with them from Skelani "things that have been taken as war booty from territories where war operations were carried out." The note I possess lists what they may take from the battlefield: a television set, a water heater, two typewriters, and a cooker. It also says that the document is issued on the basis of an order issued by Gen. Mile Mrkic, commander of TG [Tactical Group]-1. Only do not ask me where I got it from.

[Miladinovic] Nevertheless, where did you get it from?

[Vakic] I got it from a man who is our friend, a friend of the Serbian chetniks, although he is one of leaders of the MUP of Serbia. He gave me it in order for me to be able to show it to the gentlemen in the Assembly when they start calling us war profiteers and criminals.

[Miladinovic] Did you cooperate with the authorities about the "war issues"?

[Vakic] I had to cooperate with members of the authorities, as I had many volunteers, the interest in going to battles was great, and we did not have much money. In Nis, the local Socialists helped me, of course. Mile Ilic, head of the Nis Socialists and Federal Assembly deputy, also helped us when we needed to be given buses for volunteers leaving for the battlefield.

[Miladinovic] Now, however, your parliamentary immunity is shaky.

[Vakic] In fact, this followed from Socialists from Prokuplje and Zitoradje accusing me of having committed a crime that does not exist; everything was fabricated. They did the same before the 1993 elections when a rumor was spread that I had been arrested. I had neither been arrested nor had charges been filed. Charges were filed only at the beginning of 1994 alleging that, on 13 March last year, I drove along the Prokuplje-Zitoradja road carrying explosives in my car. However, at that time, I was a Federal Assembly deputy with parliamentary immunity and, on that very day, I attended a meeting of the Federal Assembly Security Committee whose member I was. A day before, we had a meeting of the Chamber of Republics, which I also attended.

[Miladinovic] Do this car and explosive from the indictment exist?

[Vakic] I possess a document saying that I returned that vehicle as early as April 1992. The witness of the prosecution apparently was not in our country at that time. At the Assembly session this week, I shall ask for my immunity to be withdrawn, although it may happen that the socialists will fail to vote for that. I want to appear in court and prove that they are liars and that this is the way they want to keep power.

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[Miladinovic] However, the indictment says that the explosives were confiscated.

[Vakic] I do not know what that is all about at all.

[Miladinovic] Your parliamentary immunity was "mentioned" at the time of the incident in the Federal Assembly between you and Mr. Mihajlo Markovic.

[Vakic] Mr. Mihajlo Markovic is a great provocateur, but that is probably clear to the citizens as well, after watching reports from the Assembly on television. He provoked me several times, he even called me an Ustasha. Anyway, I did not hit him, I pushed him. I told this to the Inquiry Committee, as well as at a Belgrade Municipal Court, where a suit was filed against me.

[Miladinovic] That is the unofficial version that we have already heard. What about the unofficial version?

[Vakic] I will tell you, but off the record.

Montenegro

President Bulatovic Receives Russia's Churkin

LD0610154694 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1454 GMT 6 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Budva, 6 Oct (Tanjug)—President of Montenegro Momir Bulatovic received Vitaliy Churkin, Russian deputy minister for foreign affairs and Russian President Boris Yeltsin's special envoy, in Budva today.

Churkin is, as stated, paying a protocol visit to Montenegro prior to assuming the post of Russian ambassador to Belgium and the Russian Government's representative at NATO HQ.

In the course of their friendly and cordial talks they expressed mutual satisfaction with the successful and constructive cooperation in the current process of resolving the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. President Bulatovic paid tribute to Russia's diplomacy and to Churkin in particular for his personal efforts and contribution to the efforts to secure a lasting and peaceful solution for the former Yugoslavia.

Cholera in Albania Leads to Oil Smuggling Decline

AU0610144794 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 6 Oct 94 p 4

[I. Berjashi report: "Marked Decline in Traffic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tuzi, 5 Oct—Since the appearance of cholera in Albania, the sole border crossing between Albania and Montenegro, Bozaj-Han i Hotit, has been quiet, with only the occasional customer. The border regime has been tightened as a preventive measure against the introduction of the disease.

Montenegrin officials at the crossing point first demand a "yellow card" issued by the Albanian health authorities, and then more documents. Also, in order to go to Albania, you must be equipped with a so-called "yellow card," and each person must pay 60 German marks for vaccination. Montenegrin citizens who were in Albania when the cholera broke out must report to doctors at their nearest clinics for five successive days after their return home. The "headache" of cholera has also caused problems to itinerant traders. There is not a single trader from Albania in the markets of Podgorica, Bar, Tuzi, or Ulcinj, which used to be full of such people. Last week, they were sent in a Montenegrin police bus on a "special picnic" at the Bozhaj border crossing. This operation was conducted without any political fuss. Meanwhile, market inspectors are everywhere. A few days ago, a truckload of eggs thought to be from Albania was confiscated and destroyed. "Sanitary officials" have also not been standing idle. They have nipped in the bud (!) the activities of the oil smugglers, even though we saw two tankers with BM (Belj Manastir) license plates on the Ulcinj-Bar road today. Those with reserve stocks are waiting for new prices, even though gasoline is now 30 percent more expensive, of course on the black market. Thus, a liter of "green" gasoline is sold for three dinars, and oil for two dinars.

The Montenegrin opposition press stresses that doctors anticipate this "emergency" situation to last for two to three months, during which there will be an extreme shortage of oil products.

Kosovo

Rugova: '1974-Style Autonomy' 'Unacceptable'

AU0610115794 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 1 Oct 94 pp 1-2

[Report by Y. Avdiu on news conference by Ibrahim Rugova, president of the Republic of Kosova, in Pristina on 30 September: "Kosova Has Its Own Borders"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dr. Ibrahim Rugova began yesterday's regular news conference by replying to a question from the correspondent of the Belgrade daily BORBA about whether, if the international community were to make a final decision to secure Kosova an autonomous status like that of 1974, the Albanians would accept this. Rugova said that any 1974-style autonomy is unacceptable, because many changes have occurred. The state that Kosova was once a part of has been destroyed. We have had the referendum and the elections. We also have bitter experience of both the first and the second federal Yugoslavias. We therefore demand that Kosova should be a neutral and independent state, open to all its neighbors, which would ensure all rights for the Serbs. We think that this would be the best possible solution.

Albanian Intellectuals Convicted for Legal Activities

The current situation in Kosova is tense. The political sentencing of Ukshin Hoti, a university professor and

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the chairman of a political party, testifies again to the political show trials against Albanian intellectuals, politicians, and activists and the harassment of legal activities. As is well known, all the parties in Kosova include everything for which Ukshin Hoti was convicted in their programs. This conviction by a summary procedure shows again that the aim is solely to sentence people. We therefore demand the release of Ukshin Hoti and others, including the officials of the Kosova Chamber of Commerce, who are expected to appear in court. We also demand the suspension of two other political show trials that are in progress, one in Peje [Pec] against 14 activists of the Peje local government and members of the leadership of the National Front [Balli Kombetar], and the other in Mitrovice.

Repression on the pretext of searching for weapons has continued throughout Kosova this week. There has also been continuing violence against education, as in the case of several schools in Ferizaj [Urosevac]. There have also been forced enlistments in the army, as in the case of Xhevdet Berisha from Skenderaj [Srbica] and Gezim Callaku from Stariterg. Violence has been stepped up against activists of the Democratic League of Kosova [LDK], as in the case is Novoberde, where the entire party leadership was detained by the police and the activist Avdi Uka was held for several days and threatened with death. Such violence has also begun in Kamenice, Viti, Shterpce, and the 2d and 3d Branches of Prishtina.

Extreme violence has also been done to the economy, Dr. Rugova said. According to reports, 38 private Albanian firms have been closed or are expected to be closed for the alleged nonpayment of taxes. There have also been cases of plunder in Malisheve, Mitrovice, and Vushtrri [Vucitrn]. This might be called economic, social, and cultural violence. We are therefore calling continually for an international presence in Kosova, Dr. Rugova said. He added that Kosova has been at the center of the international public's attention this week. He welcomed the proposal by Alfred Sherman, former adviser to former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who called for the establishment of an international police force in Kosova, in order to pacify the situation. Dr. Rugova said that the visit to Kosova by German Bundestag Deputy Peter Roschenbach had been very successful. This visit will have a positive effect at this time, Dr. Rugova said, when visits to Kosova by international delegations have become scarcer.

Talks With Serbia Only in the Presence of a Third Party

Dr. Rugova went on to reply to journalists' questions. Commenting on a question regarding a joint statement by Clinton and Yeltsin calling on Serbia to recognize Bosnia's international borders, at a time when Tudjman has also called for international recognition of the borders of Croatia, a journalist asked whether this had any connection with the question of Kosova. Dr. Rugova replied that Kosova has its own borders.

Asked to comment on statements by U.S. Vice President Al Gore and German Foreign Minister Kinkel that "Greece is playing a destabilizing role in the Balkans," Dr. Rugova replied that these two statements are very important at this time, because this is the attitude of both the European Union [EU] and the United States. They are a warning to Greece as an EU member to play a more pacific role in the Balkans and to contribute to cooperation and understanding.

Asked to comment on statements by Greek officials alleging that an Albanian-Turkish bloc against the Greeks in being created, Rugova emphasized that these are mere accusations without any substance. Albania is pursuing a policy of cooperation with all its neighbors in the region. These are accusations that serve to increase the attacks against Albania.

Another question put to President Rugova was of how he would comment on the campaign by the Serbo-Greek Orthodox lobby alleging that Islamic fundamentalism exists in Kosova, and how we could assemble evidence to refute this. Rugova replied that this is an old accusation against us and does not hold water. It is an attempt to manipulate us, undertaken by those who are attempting to create an Orthodox axis in the Balkans. All foreigners who have come here have noticed the great religious tolerance. The Albanians have three religions. Both historically and today, the Albanians have shown great religious tolerance and have never been extremists. During his visit to Albania, Pope John Paul hailed this religious, human, and cultural tolerance of the Albanians as a stabilizing factor in the Balkans. We have also shown this tolerance toward the Serbs, who at present reject such a thing. This matter of fundamentalism is therefore one of those labels that we must bear in mind on a political and national level.

Another question was whether there will be any changes and any aid for the university now, at the start of the new academic year. Dr. Rugova said that the university will resume work this year and continue as before in private houses. There are no changes. I congratulate the students on their work. Even under these circumstances, we must work to create a high-level stratum of intellectuals. We will assist the university and will help in other ways. We must help the students. I thank the citizens of Prishtina for the help they have given to the students and the university. We are now at the stage of creating institutions that are to help students by allocating scholarships and are also creating a foundation for the training of young cadres abroad. The university and other institutions must commit themselves to this. Replying to a question about the opening of an Albanian university in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia], Rugova said that the opening of this university is a positive step, but it would be better if it were a state university.

TANJUG's correspondent asked for explanations of an interview given by Dr. Rugova in which he said that

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there will also be talks with Serbia about certain separate issues. Was this true, and did it mean that Rugova had changed his stand? In reply, Rugova said that it is true that he had said that there could be talks about specific issues within the framework of the overall talks with the Serbian side. With the aim of not obstructing these talks and negotiations, we have agreed to also talk about separate specific issues, such as education, the media, health, etc. However, we have bitter experience. Two years ago, the talks on education and the media within the framework of the Geneva Conference yielded no results of any kind. There will be talks with Serbia about every issue, but of course with the participation of an international third party, Dr. Rugova said.

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